Cited by

the court should consider the totality of the circumstances.”

An initial stop is lawful if officers “had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular persons stopped of criminal activity.” (quotation omitted).

the court should consider the totality of the circumstances and should remember that trained law-enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person.” (quotations omitted).

[b]ut there was just no cover or lightbulb.” (declining to imply finding of lack of credibility in light of officer’s undisputed testimony); see also Umphlett v. Comm’r of Pub.

(citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981)).

See, (concluding that officer who had observed 4 a vehicle “weaving within its lane .

A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if, after reviewing the record, this court “reaches the firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”

at 826 (citing State v. Kvam , ).

See State v. Kvam , (stating that appellate courts may remand for findings when necessary to review the district court’s order).

“A [district] court’s finding is erroneous if this court, after reviewing the record, reaches the firm conviction that a mistake was made.”

Fo r this reason, we remand this case to the district court for a determination of whether Dale’s South Dakota convictions arose from a single course of conduct and, if so, to correct Dale’s criminal-history score and sentencing worksheet by recording a criminal-history point from only the more serious offense.4 See State v. Kvam , (stating that appellate courts may remand for findings when necessary to review the district court’s order).

A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if, after careful review of the record, we “reach[] the firm conviction that a mistake was made.” State v. Kvam , d 525, 529 (Minn. 1983).

(stating that “at a pretrial suppression hearing the [district] court acts as finder of facts, deciding for purposes of admissibility which evidence to believe and whether the state has met its burden of proof” (quotation omitted)).

Other times, we can decide the constitutionality of a seizure de novo, based on the existing record, if we are “able to infer the findings from the [district] court’s conclusions.” State v. Kvam

(“In some cases we have concluded that a remand for findings is necessary before we will decide the validity of the lower court’s order.”); Miller, d at 279 (“Because the weight and believability of witness testimony is an issue for the district court, we defer to that court’s credibility

“[A]t a pretrial suppression hearing the [district] court acts as finder of facts, deciding for purposes of admissibility which evidence 7 to believe and whether the state has met its burden of proof.” d 525, 528 (Minn. 1983 (quotation omitted).

d 525, 528 (Minn. 1983) (noting that when a district court credits an officer’s testimony that he observed a traffic violation or weaving, then the stop is valid).

In determining whether the reasonable-suspicion standard has been met, courts “should consider the totality of the circumstances and should remember that trained law-enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person.” (quotation omitted).

In determining whether the reasonable-suspicion standard has been met, courts “should consider the totality of the circumstances and should remember that trained law-enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person.” d 525, 528 (Minn. 1983) (quotation omitted).

(explaining that a remand for findings is sometimes necessary before an appellate court will decide the validity of a district court’s order); State v. Rainey, 303 Minn. 550, 550, (deciding an appeal notwithstanding the lack of findings where “there was absolutely

(stating that, when reviewing a pretrial suppression hearing, a remand for findings is not necessary when there is “no conflict in the evidence and the trial court’s conclusions were consistent with the evidence”).

“A [district] court’s finding is erroneous if this court, after reviewing the record, reaches the firm conviction that a mistake was made.”

A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if, after reviewing the record, this court “reaches the firm conviction that a mistake was made.” d 525, 529 (Minn. 1983).

A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if, after reviewing the record, this court “reaches the firm conviction that a mistake was made.” d 525, 529 (Minn. 1983).

A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if, after reviewing the record, this court “reaches the firm conviction that a mistake was made.” d 525, 529 (Minn. 1983).

See, d 525, 528 (Minn. 1983) (stating that officer who observes a driver weaving within his lane in an erratic manner is justified in stopping the driver to investigate); (holding that continuous weaving within the lane for one-half mile provides reasonable suspicion of crim

(declining to imply finding of lack of credibility in light of officer’s undisputed testimony).

A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if, after reviewing the record, this court “reaches the firm conviction that a mistake was made.” d 525, 529 (Minn. 1983).