Cited by

10 542–43; (reaffirming the principle that “the standard Rule 15.01 inquiry [is] insufficient to ascertain the voluntariness of a contingent plea”).5 Accordingly, in State v. Danh, we held that to ensure the voluntariness of a contingent plea, two additional requirements must be met— the State must disclose

(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)); -42 (Minn. 2003).

Because postconviction proceedings are intended to “vindicate [the] denial of fundamental rights and thereby prevent manifest injustice,” today we clarify that postconviction proceedings, just as criminal trials and direct appeals, must comport with the fundamental due process guarantees of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions.

The district cour t did not take the required steps , and Kouyate is entitled to a new plea - withdrawal hearing with conflict -free counsel.3 The state argues that the supreme court’s holding in Butala v. State , d 333 (Minn. 2003) compels a different result, but we a re not convinced for two reasons.

sists the district court’s lack of inquiry “is especially problematic because Mr. Bacon’s guilty plea was induced by the state’s promise to dismiss a charge against his girlfriend.” The Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized plea agreements with a contingent or “package deal” are not “per se invalid” but “are generally considered ‘dangerous because of the risk of coercion.’” (

Alford, 400 U.S. at 31, 91 S. Ct. at 164, accord Butala v. State , (“The involuntariness of a guilty plea constitutes such a manifest injustice as to entitle a defendant to withdraw his plea.” (internal quotation omitted)).

As to “factual matters, [appellate] 13 review is limited to whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to sustain the postconviction court’s findings.”

And to be valid, a “guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.” (quotation omitted).

39 (Minn. 2003); Danh, d at 542.

.” Butala v. State , (quotation omitted).

The state relies on Butala v. State

The Minnesota Supreme Court addressed whether a defendant shoul d receive substitute counsel on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea in Butala v. State , d 333, 341 (Minn. 2003).

-41 (Minn. 2003) (rejecting argument that “mental stress at the time of the plea[]” affected validity of the plea, when the argument contradicted the district court’s recollection of the plea hearing); (rejecting claim that guilty plea was invalid b

We "extend a broad review" of questions of fact when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, Butala v. State , , 338 (Minn. 2003) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted), and leave "[t]he weight and credibility of the testimony" in the province of the jury, State v. Moore , , 108 (Minn. 1989).

“The involuntariness of a guilty plea constitutes such a manifest injustice as to entitle a defendant to withdraw his plea.” Butala v. State , (M inn.

d 333, 339 (Minn. 2003); Danh, d at 542.

Alternatively, Carson asserts that remand is necessary so the district court can appoint substitute counsel and consider whether his trial attorney pressured him to take the plea deal.1 The preferred procedure when considering a plea withdrawal motion that asserts inadequate counsel is to “afford substitute counsel for purposes of making the motion.”

(determining that where state promised not to prosecute defendant’s family member, but never intended to do so, “the coercive effect of offers of leniency .

Appellate review of a postconviction decision “is limited to whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to sustain the postconviction court’s findings.”

(holding that “the better procedure” in cases where the defendant moves to withdraw a guilty plea based on inadequate trial counsel is to “afford substitute counsel for purposes of making the motion”).

d 333, 339 (Minn. 2003); Danh, d at 542.

2 (“In its discretion the court may allow the defendant to withdraw a plea at any time before sentence if it is fair and just to do so.” (emphasis added)); (stating that “[t]he ultimate decision of whether to allow withdrawal under the ‘fair and just’ standard is left to the sound discretion of the trial court” (quotation omitted)).

see also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56–57, 106 S. Ct. 366, 369 (1985).

We review issues of law de novo and we examine “whether the postconviction court’s findings are supported by sufficient evidence.” (noting that appellate courts “extend a broad review of both questions of law and fact” when reviewing postconviction proceedings (quotation omitted)).

d 539, 542 (Minn. 1994).

(noting that appellate courts “extend a broad review of both questions of law and fact” when reviewing postconviction proceedings).