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Indeed, the Minnesota Supreme Court recently stated, “We have consistently held that our criminal sexual conduct statutes do not require the [s]tate to prove that a defendant used extrinsic force—that is, force beyond the force inherent in a nonconsensual sexual act.” Letourneau, d at 392 n.9 ( -38 (Minn. 1986)).

A downward durational departure is justified only if the defendant’s conduct was “significantly less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the offense.” d 413, 415 (Minn. 1985).

(concluding that there was sufficient evidence to constitute “bodily harm” when the victim experienced pain from being struck); (finding sufficient evidence of physical injury based on a bruise).

For example, Bauer relies on State v. Mattson, in which the supreme court reinstated the district court’s downward durational departure when the defendant’s conduct was “significantly less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the offense.” -60 (Minn. 1989) 46 (concluding that an upward durational departure was unjustified); - 24 (Minn. App. 2022) (affirming denial of a downward durational departure), rev. denied (Minn. Dec.

(quotation omitted); see also Weaver, d at 573-74 (“In the final analysis, an appellate court’s decision whether a particular durational departure is justified ‘must be based on [its] collective, collegial experience in reviewing a large number of criminal appeals from all the judicial d

It is “justified if the defendant’s conduct is significantly less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the offense.”

See, (concluding that evidence that the defendant grabbed the victim’s breast and caused pain and bruising was sufficient to support his conviction under Minnesota Statutes section 609.343(e)(i) (1984), prohibiting sexual contact where the defendant used force or coercion and caused personal injury to the

See, (concluding that evidence that the defendant grabbed the victim’s breast and caused pain and bruising was sufficient to support his conviction under Minnesota Statutes section 609.343(e)(i) (1984), prohibiting sexual contact where the defendant used force or coercion and caused personal injury to

See, e.g., Roy, d at 344-47 (sentence imposed after revocation of stay of imposition); -16 (Minn. 1985) (sentence imposed after conviction); -29 (Minn. 1985) (sentence imposed after conviction).3 We have discovered no cases applying the jurisdictional rule to bar an award of interjurisdictional custody credit to effectuate a sentence correction.

at 624 ( 8 (Minn. 1985)).

d 413, 415 (Minn. 1985).

It is “justified if the defendant’s conduct is significantly less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the offense.” d 413, 415 (Minn. 1985).

The district court may depart durationally from the presumptive sentence if it finds that the “defendant’s conduct is significantly less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the offense.”

A downward durational departure is “justified if the defendant ’s conduct is significantly less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the offense.”

3 Furthermore, appellate courts determine whether an appellant’s offense is typical or atypical by relying on their “collective, collegial experience in reviewing a large number of criminal appeals[.]” (quotation 2 See, –200 (Minn. 2018) (civil action arising from traffic collision that did not involve culpable driver leaving the scene); Kraus v. Saffert, 293 N.W.

In general, an appellate court determines whether an appellant’s offense is typical or atypical by relying on “our collective, collegial experience in reviewing a large number of criminal appeals.” (quotation omitted).

In assessing a motion for a downward durational departure, the relevant inquiry is whether a “defendant’s conduct is significantly less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the offense.” State v. Mattson , ().

“[A] downward durational departure is justified if the defendant’s conduct is significantly less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the offense.”

(“[T]he evidence of pain and bruising established in this case has been sufficient to establish personal injury.”).

“[A] downward durational departure is justified if the defendant’s conduct is significantly less serious than typically involved in the commission of the offense.”

See Roy, d at 345; Willis, d at 428

A district court may grant a downward durational departure “if the defendant’s conduct is significantly less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the offense.”

In determining whether to grant a downward durational departure, a district court must consider whether the defendant’s conduct was “significantly less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the offense.”

e his criminal sexual conduct “was a single and isolated incident, and was significantly less serious than typical.” In determining whether to grant a defendant’s request for a durational departure, the district court looks to the defendant’s conduct and considers whether it was “significantly less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the offense.” .

Durational Departure In determining whether to grant a downward durational departure, a district court must focus on the defendant’s conduct and consider whether it was “significantly less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the offense.” State v. Mattson

“[A] downward durational departure is justified if the defendant’s conduct is significantly less serious than that 10 typically involved in the commission of the offense.”

In determining whether to grant a durational departure , a district court must focus on the defendant’s conduct and consider whether it was “significantly less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the offense.”

“[A] downward durational departure is justified if the defendant’s conduct 6 is significantly less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the offense.”

A downward durational departure is justified only if the defendant’s conduct was “significantly less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the offense.” State v. Mattson , 15 (Minn. 1985).

“[A] downward durational departure is justified if the defendant’s conduct is significantly less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the offense.”

“[A] downward durational departure is justified if the defendant’s conduct is significantly less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the offense.” State v. Mattson

A district court may grant a downward durational departure “if the defendant’s conduct is significantly less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the offense.” State v. Mattson

This is not a case, like State v. Mattson, in which it was “ beyond question that the Minnesota offense wa s the sole reason for defendant’s Wisconsin incarceration .” .

A downward durational departure is justified if “the 12 defendant’s conduct is significantly less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the offense.”

A downward durational departure “is justified if the defendant’s conduct is significantly less serious than that typically in volved in the commission of the offense.” State v. Mattson , .

A district court may grant a downward durational departure “if the defendant’s conduct is significantly less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the offense.” State v. Mattson