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Even though the district court analyzed the initial stop under the reasonable- suspicion framework, we are not constrained by that legal analysis because, as an appellate court, we “independently review de novo the issue of probable cause.”

(stating that a driver’s failure to observe traffic laws at 3:00 a.m., when “drinking is often found to be involved,” can provide an objective basis to investigate DWI (quotation omitted)).

“[W]e review the district court’s findings of historical fact 14 relating to the probable cause determination for clear error under the clearly erroneous standard but we independently review de novo the issue of probable cause.”

Analyzing reasonable suspicion is a “common -sense, nontechnical” approach that considers “the factual and practical considerations of everyday life,” and the standard is “not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” State v. Lee , (quotations omitted).

probable cause.” (- 82 (Minn. 1998)).

(d 378, 382 (Minn. 1998) ).

“Further, an officer may have probable cause even if none of the commonly-known physical indicia of intoxication is [sic] present.”

Probable cause is a “common -sense, nontechnical” concept that involves “the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on whic h reasonable and prudent [people], not legal technicians, act.” State v. Lee , (quotation omitted).

at *8; (explaining that probable cause and reasonable suspicion are “not finely - tuned standards,” but are rather “fluid concepts that take their substantive content from the particular contexts in which the standards are being assessed” (quotation omitted)).

We have emphasized that an analysis of reasonable suspicion is a “ ‘common-sense’ ” and “ ‘nontechnical’ ” approach that considers “the factual and practical considerations of everyday life”; this standard is “ ‘not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.’ ” d 378, 382 (Minn. 1998) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695–96 (1996)).

Assessing probable cause requires us to objectively consider whether the totality of the circumstances and the specific facts warranted “a [person] of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.” State v. Lee

See State v. Lee , (considering the time of day as one factor in determining whether warrantless blood test was justified by probable cause).

Probable cause is a “common-sense, nontechnical” concept that involves “the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent [people], not legal technicians, act.” (quotation omitted).

See, Giddings v. Comm’r of Pub.

State v. Lee , , 383 (Minn. 1998).

“Probable cause to search exists when the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.”

It is a “common-sense, nontechnical” concept that involves “the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent [people], not legal technicians, act.” (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695-96 (1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

(factoring the time of day into the probable-cause determination and recognizing that drinking often occurs later at night).

We examine the district court’s findings of fact for clear error, giving due weight to inferences drawn from those facts, and defer to the district court’s credibility assessments.

“When this court reviews a trial court’s order following an omnibus hearing, determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause as they relate to searches and seizures ‘should be reviewed de novo on appeal.’” (-83 (Minn. 1998)) “The question of the legality of the arrest turns not on the reasonableness or practicality of obtaining a warrant, but on the reasonableness of the arrest.”

-82 (Minn.1980) (stating that "the constitutional prerequisite to the warrantless nonconsensual removal of blood of a conscious or unconscious driver” is "probable cause plus exigent circumstances”); (stating that the probable cause that is required for purposes of a warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw is probable cause to believe the defendant has committed a crime and “probable cause to believe that ...

review de novo the issue of probable cause.”

(relying on vehicle crossing a fog line to establish reasonable suspicion 9 for suspecting the driver of criminal activity); (incorporating the time of day into the probable cause determination and recognizing that drinking is often involved later at night).

(incorporating the time of day into the probable cause determination and recognizing that drinking is often involved later at night).

On appeal from a district court’s finding that a police officer had probable cause to arrest, this court reviews findings of fact for clear error, giving “due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by [the district court].” -83 (Minn.1998) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 , 116 S.Ct.

Safety, (“When the facts of a case are undisputed, probable cause is a question of law to be reviewed de novo.”); (noting that “we review the district court’s findings of historical fact relating to the probable cause determination for clear error under the clearly erroneous standard but we independently review de novo the issue of probable cause”); Smith v. Munch, 65 Minn. 256, 260 , 68 N.W.

When this court reviews a trial court’s order following an omnibus hearing, determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause as they relate to searches and seizures “should be reviewed de novo on appeal.” -83 (Minn.1998).

-83 (Minn.1998) (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 , 116 S.Ct.

See, (holding that the natural exigency related to the collection of blood-alcohol evidence justifies a non-consensual blood-alcohol test when a Minnesota peace officer has probable cause to believe that criminal vehicular operation has occurred); (holding that removal of a blood sample without consent when a Minnesota peace officer has probable cause to believe that the sample will yield evidence of gross misdemeanor criminal vehicular operation).

*903 ( , 383 (Minn.1998)).

-83 (Minn.1998) (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 , 116 S.Ct.

-83 (Minn.1998) (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 , 116 S.Ct.

In doing so, we review findings of fact for clear error, “giving due weight to the inferences drawn from those facts by the district court.” (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 , 116 S.Ct.