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6 An attorney meets the objective standard of reasonableness when they provide their client “with the representation of an attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under the circumstances.” (quotations omitted).

represents an attorney’s decision regarding trial tactics and lies within the proper discretion of trial counsel.”

An attorney’ s performance is objectively unreasonable when the attorney does not exercise “the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would [exercise] under the circumstances.” (quotation omitted).

Regarding the second prong, a defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the attorney’s error “so prejudiced the defendant at trial that a different outcome would have resulted but for the errors.”

Counsel’s representation is objectively reasonable when counsel exercises the “customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under the circumstances.” (quotation omitted).

An attorney performs within an “objective standard of reasonableness” when he provides “the representation of an attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under the circumstances.” (quotation omitted).

A. Prong one of the Strickland test An attorney performs within an “objective standard of reasonableness” when “the representation of an attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under the circumstances.” (quotation omitted).

An attorney meets the reasonableness standard if they provide the “client with the representation of an attorney exercising the customary skills 9 and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under the circumstances.” (quotation omitted).

Minnesota courts define the “objective standard of reasonableness” in the first prong of the Strickland test to mean “the representation of an attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under the circumstances.” (quotation omitted).

(concluding that attorney’s decision to not request intoxication instruction “was a matter of trial strategy” and stating that court does “not review for competence matters of trial strategy”).

(explaining that Vick, the appellant, “bears the burden of showing that the court abused [its] discretion”); (same).

An attorney meets the objective reasonableness standard when the attorney “provides [the] client with the representation of an attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under the circumstances.” (quotation omitted).

This standard requires defense counsel to represent a client “exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under the circumstances.” (quotation omitted).

An attorney meets the objective reasonableness standard when the attorney “provides [the] client with the representation of an attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under the circumstances.” (quotation omitted).

An attorney meets the objective reasonableness standard when the attorney “provides [the] client with the representation of an attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under the circumstances.” (quotation omitted).

“A strong presumption exists that counsel’s performance fell within a wide range of reasonable assistance [and] [p] articular deference is given to the decisions of counsel regarding trial strategy.” (citation omitted); (“Appellate courts, which have the benefit of hindsight, do not review for competency matters of trial strategy.”).

See State v. Krosch , - 20 (Minn. 2002) (declining to address arguments in the absence of citations to legal authority); State v. Doppler , (concluding that matters of trial strategy cannot support claims of ineffective assistance).

15 An attorney’s performance is substandard when the attorney does not exercise “the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would [exercise] under the circumstances.” (quotations and citations omitted).

See State v. Doppler , ( concluding that counsel’s choice of defense was trial strategy and stating that “[a]ppellate courts, which have the benefit of hindsight, do not review for competency matters of trial strategy”).

(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

“What evidence to present to the jury, including which witnesses to call, represents an attorney’s decision regarding trial tactics and lies within the proper di scretion of trial counsel.”

Attorneys have discretio n in representing their clients and regarding trial tactics such as “[w]hat evidence to present to the jury” and “which witnesses to call .”

(“We are in no position to second-guess counsel’s decision to focus his strategy on other defenses instead of investigating [other] suspects.”); Jones, d at 236 (“Which witnesses to call at trial and what information to present to the

State v. Doppler , (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)).

A. Leading Questions An attorney’s performance is constitutionally substandard if he does not exercise “the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would [exercise] under the circumstances.” (quotation omitted).

What evidence to present to the jury, including which witnesses to call, is also a tactical decision that “lies within the proper discretion of trial counsel” that we “do not review for competency.” accord State v. Jones

Under the deficiency prong, appellant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that his counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” (quotation omitted).

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”

An attorney’s performance is objectively unreasonable when the attorney does not use “the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under the circumstances.”

(noting that parties agreed to waive 14-day statutory requirement to impanel grand jury).