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The district court’s decision not to reopen a dissolution judgment and decree “will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.”

e district court ou tlined Whitney’s requests for relief and denied them “as the [c]ourt has denied her motion to amend the [c]ourt[’s] findings of fact, conclusions of law and order.” A district court’s decision not to reopen a dissolution judgment and decree under Minnesota Statutes section 518.145, subdivision 2, “will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.”

A district court’s “decision not to reopen the judgment and decree will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.” .

See Kornberg v. Kornberg , (“A successor judge may reverse a prior decisio n only if the successor judge believes the prior decision is clearly erroneous or unjust, or when a substantial change occurs in the essential facts, the evidence, or the applicable law.”), aff’d, .

(reviewing decision not to reopen a default judgm ent under abuse of discretion); see also Laymon v. Minn. Premier Props., LLC, (“We review an entry of default judgment for abuse of discretion.”) , aff’d, ; Moir v. Moir

This court applies a clear -error standard of review to a district court’s finding that a party breached the duty to make a full and accurate financial disclosure, Maranda, d at 164, and an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to a district court’s ultimate decision to reopen a dissolution decree , Thompson, d at 428 ().

d 379, 384 (Minn. 1996).

2, “will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.” d 379, 386 (Minn. 1996).

Mother argues that, the successor judge could not reconsider whet her the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction to decide child cu stody because father’s motion as king the district court to readdress the point was filed after the expirati on of the time to file a motion for amended findings of fact.

& n.2 (Minn. 1996) (concluding that one district court judge has the authority to amend a different district court judge’s order related to the same case).

A district court’s findings of fact will not be set aside unless “clearly erroneous.” aff’d

n.1 (Minn. 1994); n.2 (Minn. 1996) (noting that the law-of-the-case doctrine “is not normally applied by a district court to its own decisions” (citing Loo, d at 744 n.1)).

“[A district court]’s decision not to reopen the judgment and decree will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.”

d 379, 386 (Minn. 1996).

The district court’s decision refusing to reopen a judgment “will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.”

A district court is empowered to enforce the provisions of a judgment “so long as the parties’ substantive rights are not changed.”

n.3 (Minn. 2008) (concluding appellant’s first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder convictions were not reversible based on the district court’s incorrect statement of the standard for premeditation because the evidence supported the court’s finding of premeditation under the correct standard); n.3 (Minn. 1996) (concluding the district court’s application of the incorrect standard of proof regarding fraud was not reversible error because no showing of fraud could be sustained under t

(“The court has the power to implement or enforce the provisions of a judgment and decree so long as the parties’ substantive rights are not changed.”).