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Evidence is material under Brady “if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”

Our caselaw recognizes that “[m]isstatements of the burden of proof are highly improper and would, if demonstrated, constitute prosecutorial misconduct.”

d 739, 750 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted); , 122 (Minn. 2009)

“Evidence is material ‘if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, 4 the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)).

For cases involving “serious prosecutorial misconduct,” we will reverse unless the misconduct is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, meaning that “the verdict rendered was surely unattributable to the error.” State v. Hunt

Bailey disagrees, to argue the district court improperly balanced the evidence because anxiety and PTSD could affect ex-girlfriend’s “ability to accurately perceive and recall the events.” 2 We are not persuaded.

“Misstatements of the burden of proof are highly improper and would, if demonstrated, constitute prosecutorial misconduct.”

the district court clearly and thoroughly instructed the jury regarding the burden of proof.”); (holding that a prosecutor’s “questionable” burden-of -proof analogy was cured by subsequent statement of the correct standard by prosecutor and court, which instructed the jury to disregard any statements to the contrary).

“[M]isconduct is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the verdict rendered is surely unattributable to the error.”

“[T]he remedy for a Brady violation is a new trial.” (citing Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972)).

[the] presumption of innocence goes away.” Although prosecutors have “considerable latitude” in making a closing argument and the argument is not required to be “colorless,” “[m]isstatements of the burden of proof are highl y improper and would, if demonstrated, constitute prosecutorial misconduct,”

Evidence is material under Brady if “there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

.” d 294, 299 (Minn. 2000).

“A prosecutor’s misstatement of the burden of proof is ‘highly improper’ and constitutes misconduct.” ().

“Evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” (quotation omitted).

This statement may be troubling because “[m]isstatements of the burden of proof are highly improper and would, if demonstrated, constitute prosecutorial misconduct.”

0-01 (Minn. 2000) (q uotations omitted).

State v. Hunt , -02 (Minn. 2000).

“[T]he remedy for a Brady violation is a new trial.”

State v. Hunt , , 299 (Minn. 2000) (quoting United States v. Bagley , 473 U.S. 667 , 682, 105 S.Ct.

“[T]he remedy for a Brady violation is a new trial.”

(concluding that a prosecutor’s closing argument in which the prosecutor made “a n analogy to the ancient Greek juries, the substance of which implied that Greek juries would place a stone on either side of a scale for each successful arg ument by one party or the other” did not constitute plain

“Evidence is material under Brady ‘if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’”' Id, ().

7 “The state’s obligations in discovery derive from the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure and also from the constitutional guarantees of due process.”

Any “misconduct is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the verdict rendered was surely unattributable to the error.”

See State v. Strommen , 89 (Minn. 2002)

-01 (Minn. 2000) ( “Nondisclosure of evidence that is merely impeaching may not typically result in the kind of prejudice necessary to warrant a new trial.”).

13 Supreme Court’s decision to grant a new trial without a showing of prejudice “in the interests of justice” and “in the exercise of [its] supervisory power over the trial court.” n.6 (Minn. 2000).