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“Whether a judge has violated the Code of Judicial 4 Conduct is a question of law, which [appellate courts] review de novo.”

“A judge’s conduct must be fair to both sides, and a judge should refrain from remarks which might injure either of the parties to the litigation.” (quotations omitted).

On appeal, -50 (Minn. 2005), and argues that the district court could not rely on the recording because defense counsel lacked access to it.

If an appellant has been deprived of the constitutional right to an impartial judge, the error is a structural error, which requires reversal and remand without regard for whether the appellant was prejudiced by the error.4

at 367– 69; (concluding judge was not impartial where judge (among other things) suggested to prosecutor a new strategy to prove defendant knowingly violated an order for protection and identified a witness to call); (concluding judge was not impartial where judge (among other things) introduced facts adverse to the defendant that the State had not introduced into the case).

“Whether a judge has violated the Code of Judicial Conduct is a question of law, which we review de novo.”

10 WL 3755963, at *2 (Minn. App. Aug.

and prohibits the trier of fact from reaching conclusions based on evidence sought or obtained beyond that adduced in court.” -50 (Minn. 2005).

“Whether a judge has violated the Code of Judicial Conduct is a question of law, which we review de novo.”

Reviewing Michael’s claims of judicial bias de novo, we are unpersuaded.

A judge exhibits emergent bias when it conducts an independent investigation into prejudicial extra-record information and when they fail to “set the knowledge aside and consider only the evidence adduced in deciding the case.”

(impartial judge and finder of fact); -68 (Minn. 2004) (judge communicating with jury outside defendant’s presence); (denial of the defendant’s peremptory challenge); (Minn. 19

Lopez, d at 119-21; (establishing that, if the record demonstrates that a district court conducted independent investigation of information outside of the record to decide the case, the court’s impartiality would reasonably be questioned).

4 Father relies on State v. Dorsey , to argue that “a judge must not appear biased by resolving all disputes in favor of one party without addressing conflicting evidence.” The portion of Dorsey to which Father cites does not support this argument.

7 and “set[] aside collateral knowledge they possess.”

d 238, 249 (Minn. 2005).

He asks that we reverse his convictions and remand for a new trial, or in the alternative, remand for 2 a new evidentiary hearing on the grounds that the district court’s investigation into facts outside the record relating to Bell’s criminal history violated Duol’s –53 (Minn. 2005).

(procedural due process); d 238, 249 (Minn. 2005) (fair trial).

d 238, 249 (Minn. 2005).

“Although the right to a trial before an impartial judge is not specifically enumerated in the Constitution, this principal has long been recognized by the United States Supreme Court.” (citing Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 (1986)).

“[J]udges may not engage in independent investigations of facts in evidence—regardless of whether the evidence and investigation involve immutable facts.”

Although it was improper for the judge to refer to Jaeger’s family-law circumstances, we presume that the assigned judge can and will “set as ide collateral knowledge and approach cases with a neutral and objective disposition.” –49 (Minn. 2005) (quotation omitted).

“An impartial trial requires that conclusion reached by the trier of fact be based upon the facts in evidence and prohibits the trier of fact from reaching conclusions based on evidence sought or obtained beyond that adduced in court.” State v. 10 Dorsey, -50 (Minn. 2005).

(holding within a criminal context that the trier of fact must base decisions “upon the facts in evidence”).

(prohibiting a judge from presiding over a trial if the judge shows “actual bias” against the defendant).

(concluding that being deprived of the right to an impartial tribunal was structural error requiring automatic reversal).

Because mother has not established that the district court used an improper procedure or otherwise violated her right to due process, we do not consider mother’s argument that the denial of her right to counsel, her right to self-representation, and her right to testify are structural errors that “defy analysis by harmless-error standards.” (quotation omitted).