Cited by

Also, we generally refuse to consider trial strategy as part of the first step because “[w]hat evidence to present to the jury, including which defenses to raise at trial and what witnesses to call, represent an attorney’s decision regarding trial tactics which lie within the proper discretion of trial counsel and will not be reviewed later for competence.”

“[A] defendant has a constitutional right to due process in the form of a fair trial.”

A defendant also has a constitutional “right to present a complete defense.”

“Included in this constitutional right is the right to present a complete defense.”

Nor does “personal tension” in the 12 attorney-client relationship, or mere disagreement with counsel’s trial strategies, Gillam, d at 449-50.

-42 (Minn. 2005) (recognizing that expert testimony about the effects of drug use can aid the jury in assessing a witness’s credibility, but nonetheless concluding that the district court acted within its discretion in precluding an expert from testifying to past general effects); -51 (Minn. 1999) (concluding that expert testimony about the effects of multiple drugs on a person was relevant and helpful to the trier of fact to assess whether the defendant was involuntarily intoxicated); see also

Trial preparation, whether to call and which witnesses to call, what evidence to present, and whether to raise a defense are matters of trial strategy “within the proper discretion of trial counsel [that] will not be reviewed later for competence.” (counsel’s failure to file motion, call certain witnesses, and cross-examine certain witnesses represented matters of trial strategy); (counsel’s statements to jury “during closing argument, and his request that .

“What evidence to present to the jury, including which defense to raise at trial and what witnesses to call, represent an attorney’s decision regarding trial tactics which lie within the proper discretion of a trial counsel and will not be reviewed later for competence.” .

See Gillam, d at 449 (citing Fagerstrom for the proposition that dissatisfaction with defense counsel does not constitute an exceptional circumstance); d 241, 255 (Minn. 1999) (holding that district court did not err by denying defendant’s request for substitute counsel because “personal tension” between defendant and his counsel did not “go to issues of ability or competence” of representation).

see also Onyelobi, d at 280 (“[W]e generally do not second-guess matters of trial strategy.”).

See State 4 v. Voorhees, (“Sometimes [an] attorney is going to have to be very blunt and very honest with [a defendant] and [they are] going to say things that [the defendant is] not going to like to hear.

Nor can an attorney’s honest statements to a defendant about their case constitute exceptional circumstances, which require the de fendant to raise “serious allegations of inadequate representation.” -55 (Minn. 1999) (“Sometimes [an] attorney is going to have to be very blunt and very honest with [a defendant] and [they are] going to say things th at [the defendant is] not going to like to hear.

“Personal tension” between attorney and client does not constitute an exceptional circumstance warranting substitute counsel, see State v. Voorhees , nor does general dissatisfacti on with counsel’s “assessment of the case,” Worthy, d at 279; -87 (Minn. 2013) (concluding that statement that counsel “didn’ t represent [his] interest” did not establish exceptional circumstances warranting furt

State v. Bobo , State v. Voorhees

18 of trial counsel and will not be reviewed later for competence.”

“[T]he defendant’s burden of making a prima facie showing that would entitle him to a jury instruction and the defendant’s burden of proving to the trier of fact by a preponderance of the evidence each element of the defense proffered are two separate inquiries.” n.2 (Minn. 1999).

(agreeing with the district court’s conclusion that the defendant’s proff ered reason for requesting substitute counsel, that he had “been belittled, yelled at, in my trauma through this,” was merely “personal tension” betwe en counsel and the defendant and d i d n o t e s t a b l i s h excep

“[A] defendant has a constitutional right to due process in the form of a fair trial.” see U.S. Const. amends.

State v. Voorhees , (declining to review an attorney’s representation when defendant claimed that the attorney failed to call certain witnesses and did not thoroughly cross-examine the state’s witnesses).

State v. Voorhees , , 251 (Minn. 1999).

(concluding that personal tension between defendant and his attorney was not exceptional circumstance).

See, (holding general dissatisfaction and personal tension are not exceptional circumstances warranting substitute counsel).

d 181, 189 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn. June 29, 2010); (holding that a district court abused its discretion by instructing the jury on involuntary intoxication when the defendant had failed to make a prima facie showing of temporary mental illness).

Additionally, determining which witnesses to call constitutes trial strategy, “which lie[s] within the proper discretion of trial counsel and will generally not be reviewed later for competence.” (stating that counsel’s decision regarding which witnesses to call involves “trial strategy that [an appellate court] will not review”).

“What evidence to present to the [fact- finder], including which defenses to raise at trial and what witnesses to call, represent an attorney’s decision regarding trial tactics which lie within the proper discretion of trial counsel and will not be reviewed later for competence.” d 241, 255 (Minn. 1999).

A successful prosecutorial-misconduct claim requires that appellant demonstrate that “misconduct occurred and that [it] was prejudicial.” d 241, 253 (Minn. 1999).

(“What evidence to present to the jury .

“What evidence to present to the jury, including which 7 defenses to raise at trial and what witnesses to call, represent an attorney’s decision regarding trial tactics which lie within the proper discretion of trial counsel and will not be reviewed later for competence.” (holding that appellant’s argument “that his counsel failed to call certain witnesses in [appellant’s] defense and cross-examine the state’s witnesses [ ] represent matters of trial strategy that we will not review for competen

(stating that the fact that defendant was found guilty by the petit jury confirms that probable cause existed as to his guilt).