Cited by

(citing Griller, d at 740).

As for the case Yusuf relies on to assert that the district court plainly erred, Yusuf asserts that unlike in Vick, the district court here had notice of the Spreigl evidence.

“[O]ne witness may not vouch for or against the credibility of another witness.” (quotation omitted).

(“What evidence to present to the jury, what witnesses to call, and whether to object are part of an attorney’s trial strategy which lie within the proper discretion of trial counsel and will generally not be reviewed later for competence.”); (noting trial counsel’s alleged failure to vigorously cross-examine a witness and object to certain testimony are matters of trial strategy).

(holding that the district court’s failure to intercede was not plain error where the witness’s testimony “was an ambiguous description of what may or may not have been a separate Spreigl 6 incident and where no objection was made to that testimony”).

Vouching occurs when a witness testifies “for or against the credibility of another witness.”

“A defendant bears a heavy burden to overturn a jury verdict.” d 676, 690 (Minn. 2001).

-87 (Minn. 2001) (holding that defendant was not prejudiced by evidence where defendant’s theory of defense was not affected by admission).

negates the possibility of an innocent explanation.”

We are guided by the supreme court’s

The “nature of the touching” may also “negate[] the possibility of an innocent explanation.”

See State v. Vick , (stating that circumstances of sexual contact “negate[d] the possibility of an innocent explanation such as accidental touchin g or touching in the course of caregiving”).

d 676, 689 (Minn. 2001).

-90 (Minn. 2001) (concluding expert testimony about the common behaviors of adolescent victims of sexual abuse is not impermissible vouching); (concluding an officer did not impermissibly vouch for other witness’ credibility as the officer did not sta

Leake , d at 539 ; see also State v. Vick , (explaining that an attorney’s alleged failure to vigorously cross-examine or impeach witnesses were “matters of trial strategy”).

(explaining that Vick, the appellant, “bears the burden of showing that the court abused [its] discretion”); (same).

(stating that because a witness’s “testimony was an ambiguous description of what may or may not have been a separate Spreigl incident and .

Third, Hibbler argues that the expert testimony “unfairly influenced the jury’s determination of A.H.’s credibility.” We recognize that vouching testimony is inadmissible: “[O]ne witness may not vouch for or against the credibility of another witness.” (quotation omitted).

(declining to review for competency trial counsel’s claimed failures to vigorously cross-examine a witness and to object to Spreigl testimony); (stating that whether to object is part of trial counsel’s strategy and “will generally not be re

“[O]ne witness may not vouch for or against the credibility of another witness.” (quotation omitted).

in which the supreme court concluded that there was sufficient evidence of sexual intent because the appellant’s touching of the young victim’s buttocks, both over and under her clothes, which was “accompanied by vaginal touching, negates the possibility of an innocent explanation such as accidental t

The sexual contact here was not an 10 “accidental touching or touching in the course of caregiving.” (stating that the “nature of the touching” could demonstrate an actor’s sexual intent).

(declining to review failure to object to vouching testimony, because not objecting to it was a matter of trial strategy).

“One witness may not vouch for or against the credibility of another witness.” State v. Vick , (quotation omitted).

” State v. Epps , (stating that failure to object to admission of evidence at trial amounts to a forfeiture of that issue on appeal ).

(explaining that decisions regarding what evidence to present to the jury, which defenses to raise, and what witnesses to call are matters of trial strategy).

is not whether the trial court erred in admitting the evidence, but instead whether the trial court’s failure to sua sponte strike the testimony or provide a cautionary instruction was plain error.”

See State v. Vick , d 676, 685 (Minn. 2001).

Even if, in the context of the charges in this case, Hansen’s possession of the contents of the Tahoe on May 4 was other-bad-acts evidence, “a trial court’s failure to sua sponte strike unnoticed Spreigl evidence or provide a cau tionary instruction is not ordinarily plain error.”