Cited by

(stating that “if there is a remission of [petitioner’s] sexual disorder, if his deviant sexual assaultive conduct is brought under control,” the petitioner “is entitled to release”).

To establish a “habitual course” under the SPP statute, there must be “evidence of a pattern of similar conduct.” Stone, d at 837 ().

-76, 878 (Minn. 1999) (Linehan IV) (holding that the SDP 9 commitment act does not violate substantive due process because the statute is narrowly tailored to address a compelling state interest)

(stating that: “[i]t also seems somewhat incongruous that a sexual offender should be able to prove he is untreatable by refusing treatment”).

degree of violence involved,” (3) “the relationship (or lack thereof) between the offender and the victims,” (4) “the offender’s attitude and mood,” (5) “the offender’s medical and family history,” (6) “the re sults of psychological and psychiatric testing and evaluation,” (7) and any “other factors that bear on the predatory sex impulse and the lack of power to control it.” In re Blodgett

red due process before revocation); Foucha v. Louisiana , 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (addressing substantive due process in the context of indefinite psychiatric confinement); Carrillo v. Fabian , –74 (Minn. 2005) (a procedural due process case holding that an inmate serving his prison sentence had a protected liberty interest in his supervised release date); In re Blodgett , –15 (Minn. 1994) (same); In re Linehan , cert.

In re Blodgett , a case involving the psychopathic -personality statute, the predecessor statute to the MCTA: SDP/SPP, the supreme court stated that “[s]o long as civil commitment is programmed to provide treatment and periodic review, due process is provided.”

The supreme court has explained that “treatment” refers to the need for “inpatient treatment and supervision for [a patient’s] sexual disorder.” Call, d at 319 (emphasis added); (noting that if there is a remission of a committed person’s sexual disorder, the person is entitled to be released).

In In re Blodgett, a person who had refused a “litany” of treatment programs was committed as what is now a n S P P a p p e a l e d h i s c o m m i t m e n t , a r g u i n g , a m o n g o t h e r t h i n g s , t ha t t h e c o m m i t m e n t constituted a preventive detentio n.

The supreme court in , rejected appellant’s third argument.

Citing to In re Blodgett , ap pellant 9 contends that the commissioner’s continuous disregard of the mandates of section 253B.03 constitutes a violation of his due-process rights.

See In re Blodgett , (upholding the constitutionality of the predecessor to the SDP statute under which appellant is indeterminately committed).

d 910, 915 (Minn. 1994).

In re Linehan , (applying Pearson construction of the SPP statute); In re Blodgett , (holding that the SPP statute is constitutional and reaffirming Pearson construction of statute), cert.

See Foucha v. Louisiana , 504 U.S. 71 (1992); Call v. Gomez

f the sexual assaults, the degree of violence involved, the relationship (or lack thereof) between the offender and the victims, the offender’s attitude and mood, the offender’s medical and 16 family history, the results of psychological and psychiatric testing and evaluation, and such other factors that bear on the predatory sex impulse and the lack of power to control it.”

(SDP); (psychopathic personality statute).

(citing In re Blodgett , ).

Dr. Meyers provided a thorough Blodgett-factor analysis, based on In re Blodgett , and a Linehan-factor analysis, based on Matter of Linehan , .

see, -46 (Minn. 1986) (conducting a substantive-due-process analysis of a statute involving intrusion on personal liberty); d 499, 501 (Minn. 1979) (discussing the high stakes of loss of liberty upon criminal conviction).

1 Here, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to commit him as an SPP because the evidence was insufficient to commit him as an SDP and the standard to commit as an SDP is higher.