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A district court has “wide flexibility to structure restitution orders that take into account a defendant’s ability to pay.” - 86 (Minn. 1995).

–86 (Minn. 1995); see also Wigham, d at 666.

When the goal of restitution is to rehabilitate, “the amount of restitution should be set according to the [juvenile]’s ability to pay.” aff’d

App. P. 110.01; State v. Maidi , d 414, 419-20 (Minn. App. 1994) (“Generally, we may not base our decision on matters outside the record on appeal, and may not consider matters not produced and received in evidence below.”), aff’d

285 (Minn. 1995) (affirming a district court’s November 1993 restitution order of $147,251.27 because the court considered defendant’s ability to pay, and it was an appropriate amount to compensate the victims).

He relies on State v. Maidi , in which the supreme court affirmed a restitution order of approximately $150,000, set to be paid in $200 monthly payments.

See, e.g., State v. Paludicki , - 68 (Minn. 2007) (evidence provided by the record); (evidence found in restitution payment schedule); (evidence provided by the PSI and the defendant’s statement); (reversing and remanding because there was no PSI and no de

at 660 (recounting that appellant was ordered to pay $87,500); Steinbuch v. State , (affirming $30,762.28 award); State v. Maidi , -86 (Minn. 1995) (requi ring defendant to pay $147,251.27 despite incarceration).

See State v. Maidi , (stating that legislative hi story of Minnesota Statutes section 611A.045 shows the restitution statut e was intended primar ily to compensate victims); (indicating the primary purpose of restitution is to compensate the victim).

Because the statute does not indicate how courts should consider those factors, dist rict courts have “wide flexibility to structure restitution orders that take into account a defendant’s ability to pay.” State v. Maidi , - 86 (Minn. 1995).

Palubicki, d at 666; State v. Terpstra , d 280, 283 (Minn. 1996)

s the source of restitution payments shows that the court did in fact consider appellant’s payment capabilities.”), aff’d as modified, (“[A]lthough it is possible that appellant may not be able to pay the entire restitution award, the court was also required to consider [the victim’s] economic losses.”), aff’d

a reduced monthly payment that is within the defendant’s means.” State v. Maidi (Maidi II), -86 (Minn. 1995).

(finding no abuse of discretion for failure to consider defendant’s ability to pay where the trial court ordered an indigent defendant to pay $32,682.93 in restitution using prison wages); d 280, 285 (Minn. 1995) (finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court ordered a restitution award that was mathematically impossible to pay based on the defendant’s wages); but see Miller, d at 479 (reversing a restitution order because the record lacked a presentence investigation addressing ability t

-86 (Minn. 1995) (concluding that the district court properly considered the defendant’s ability to pay when it considered the defendant’s resources in imposing a payment schedule even though it was mathematically impossible for the defendant to pay the full restitution award at the monthly installment payment

Although the district court is required to consider a defendant’s ability to pay, courts have “wide flexibility to structure restitution orders.” d 280, 285-86 (Minn. 1995) (affirming a restitution order that was mathematically impossible for the appellant to pay).

1(a), 2a (2014); d 280, 285 (Minn. 1995).

The supreme court has stated that this provision of the statute is “intended to give the courts wide flexibility to structure restitution orders that take into account a defendant’s ability to pay.” -86 (Minn. 1995).

WL 2185004, at *5 (Minn. App. May 11, 2015) (stating that because the victim suffered psychological trauma as a result of the offense, and moving expenses were directly linked to that trauma, it was within the district court’s discretion to award restitution for those expenses); Tenerelli, d at 672 (affirming restitution awarded for a Hmong Hu Plig healing ceremony); (concluding that expenses relating to counter-abduction operation was compensable as restitution); Keehn, d at 408-09 (affirming a

m’s car); -64 (Minn.2001) (concluding that the restitution amount imposed by the district court was not an abuse of discretion in light of the defendant’s ability to pay); (concluding that the district court was within its discretion by ordering restitution for the cost of a healing ceremony); -86 (Minn.1995) (concluding that district courts have flexibility to structure restitution orders that consider a defendant’s ability to pay).

1998), aff’d as modified, (“Since the statute is not explicit as to how the court must consider the appellant’s ability to pay, the court’s reference to the appellant’s [prison] earnings as the source of restitution payments shows that the court did in fact consider appellant’s payment capabilities.”); aff’d, (“[A]lthough it is possible that appellant may not be able to pay the entire restitution award, the court was also required to consider [the victim’s] economic losses.”).

-86 (Minn.1995) (affirming a restitution award even though it was mathematically impossible for defendant to pay entire amount with his hourly wage).

See, (“Restitution is intended to be compensatory, not punitive.”); State v. Maidi (stating primary purpose of restitution is to compensate victim); (“ ‘restitution’ connotes restoring or compensating the victim for his loss”).

-72 (Minn.1999) (concluding that the need for a Hmong healing ceremony resulted from the appellant’s assault on the victim and that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered the appellant to pay restitution); -85 (Minn.1995) (affirming a trial court order granting restitution for counter-abduction expenses when the appellant had been convicted of interfering with parental or custodial rights in violation of Minn.Stat.

Service of a summons must be done “knowingly and intentionally.” Lee v. Skrukrud, 231 Minn. 203, 204 , aff'd

(Amund-son, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (observing that section 580.225 was an attempt "to prevent economic serfdom by outlawing deficiency judgments in mortgage foreclosure actions”), aff’d, see also National City Bank of *878 -92 (Minn.App.)

Exam’rs, trial courts are given broad discretion in awarding restitution, -86 (Minn.1995).