Cited by

See, e.g., Foreman, d at 538-39(affirming a conviction of domestic assault); (involving a conviction for aggravated robbery); (involving a conviction for aggravated robbery).

execute a warrant); (ordering a new trial when (1) the complainant testified he was robbed shortly after visiting a friend in a hospital even though it was closed to visitors before the alleged offense occurred and (2) there was no evident reason for the defendant to rob the complainant, “with whom he was well acquainted”); (ordering a new trial when “the victim’s identification [was] based on an inadequate opportunity for observation; the description given at the time of the offense [did] not c

He cites Foreman, in which the supreme court acknowledged that convictions had been reversed in a few cases where the victim was the only witness and the case “involved additional reasons to question the victim’s credibility.” d at 539 ( -93 (Minn. 1993); State v. Gluff , ).

ly exposed to “a highly suggestive book on sexual abuse” with “the express intention of encouraging the child to state that [the defendant] had abused her”); (reversing in the interests of justice and stating, “[t]he reason why defendant would have held up [the victim], with whom he was well acquainted, is left a mystery”); State v. Gluff , , 64-65 (Minn. 1969) (reversing because an armed robbery victim observed defendant for fewer than two minutes, during which time her eyes were “riveted on th

to support his argument that corroboration is necessary for his conviction to be upheld.

To support his argument, Gray cites State v. Gluff where an identification did not satisfy the five-factor test, in part, because the victim testified “her eyes were riveted on the gun.” d 63, 65 (Minn. 1969).

(reversing an aggravated robbery conviction because parts of the complaining witness’s version of events were “unexplained,” and “[t]he reason why defendant would have held up [ the complaining witness], with whom he was well acquainted, [was] left a mystery” ); State v. Gluff , -66 (Minn. 1969) (reversing aggravated-robbery conviction based on doubt regarding the accuracy of the complaining witness’s identification of the perpetrator).

-66 (Minn. 3 And, contrary to R.A.C.’s assertions, the record demonstrates that J.E.D.

(involving aggravated robbery); (same).

o corroborating evidence, Minnesota’s appellate courts will reverse convictions.” In support of this assertion, Holloway cites three supreme court cases in which the court reversed convictions because the evidence was insufficient: 6

The interests of justice [require] a new trial”); -66 (Minn. 1969) (reversing when there was reason to question the identification of the defendant).

Maani relies on three cases— —to argue that the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law because of issues regarding the victims’ credibility.

1993) (reversing conviction for child sexual abuse based on the victim’s repeated exposure to a highly suggestive book by the child’s therapist and mother); (reversing in the interest s of justice and stating, “[t]he reason why defendant would have held up [the victim], with whom he was well acquainted, is left a mystery.” ); (reversing because armed robbery victim observed defendant for fewer than two minutes, during which time her eyes were “riveted on the gun,” and “there was no evidence what

First, a case of aggravated robbery in which the supreme court reversed and remanded for a new trial because the victim “had a limited opportunity to observe the robber briefly during a time when her attention was concentrated on a gun pointed at her” and there was “no corroboration of the identification”

Still, when the appellant challenges the sufficiency of identity evidence, “[t]he trustworthiness of an identification must necessarily be judged by the opportunity the witness has had for a deliberate and accurate observation of the accused.” State v. Gluff

and State v. Gluff , as providing support for his argument.

eman, the distinction between cases like Reichenberger, where credibility is left to the jury, and cases where evidence may be insufficient as a matter of law, is when there are “additional reasons to question the victim’s credibility.” Foreman, d at 539 (- 93 (Minn. 1993)); ).

the supreme court reversed a ro bbery conviction based on an uncorroborated identificati on of the defendant because th e witness had seen the perpetrator for only a short time and there had been errors in the lineup process.

In State v. Gluff , the supreme court overturned an aggravated -robbery conviction because the eyewitness called to testify made a highly unreliable identification of the defendant, leading 5 the court to say that “proof on the one critical issue is permeated with doubt.” 285 Minn. 148, 151

“The trustworthiness of an identification must necessarily be judged by the opportunity the witness has had for a deliberate and accurate observation of the accused while in his [or her] presence.” State v. Gluff, 285 Minn. 148, 151

“The trustworthiness of an identification must necessarily be judged by the opportunity the witness has had for a deliberate and accurate observation of the accused while in his presence.” State v. Gluff, 285 Minn. 148, 151

-93 (Minn. 1993); State v. Gluff, 285 Minn. 148, 151

Appellant relies on State v. Gluff, 285 Minn. 148, 151-53, -66 (1969) (reversing a conviction on the ground that the victim’s identification of the defendant was not trustworthy), but Gluff is distinguishable here, as it was in Foreman.

Heidemann relies on three cases, and State v. Gluff, 285 Minn. 148, d 63 (1969).

Finally, in State v. Gluff, the supreme court criticized an identification lineup procedure, stating that testimony about the defendant’s identification “clearly lacked probative value.” 285 Minn. 148, 151

5 conduct where child victim’s testimony lacked credibility and victim had been exposed by the state to highly suggestive material); (ordering a new trial “in the interests of justice” where victim’s actions were left “unexplained” and motive for defendant to commit robbery against an acquaintance was “left a mystery”); State v. Gluff, 285 Minn. 148, 151-53, -66 (1969) (reversing aggravated-robbery conviction “in the interest of justice” where uncorroborated identification of the defendant was n