Cited by

For example, all matters raised on direct appeal, and all claims known but not raised, “will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.” , 741 (Minn. 1976).

Consequently, the court held that those claims were barred by the rule set forth in State v. Knaffla , 309 Minn. 246 , , 741 (1976).

(“[W]here direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.”).

(noting that “where direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, 4 will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief”).

1 The postconviction court found that Jackson was not entitled to relief because his petition was procedurally barred by the rule articulated in State v. Knaffla , 309 Minn. 246 , , 741 (1976).

However, “where direct appe al has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be c onsidered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.”

2 The postconviction court also denied relief on the claims for failure to disclose exculpatory evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel after determining that Campbell could have raised those claims on direct appeal, and they were therefore barred by State v. Knaffla , 309 Minn. 246

See State v. Knaffla , 309 Minn. 246, 252, (providing that claims that were raised on direct appeal , or were known or should have been known but were not raised on direct appeal, are procedurally barred).

The district court considered Gustafson’s allegation of ineffective assistance of appellate couns el, determined that he had not established a claim warranting relief, and concluded that Gustafson had not alleged 2 State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246

The district court determined that appellant’s cl aims were procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, and that appellant’s claims failed on the merits.

The district 1 State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246

subsequent postconviction petition are procedurally barred under this court's Knaffla rule if they could have been raised on direct appeal or in a previous postconviction petition."); see also State v. Knaffla , 309 Minn. 246 , , 741 (1976).

1 (2016) ; see State v. Knaffla , 309 Minn. 246 , , 741 (1976) (barring postconviction review of all claims raised "and all claims known but not raised," on direct appeal); see also White v. State , , 109 (Minn. 2006) (barring all postconviction claims that were known "or should have been known" at the time of direct appeal).

We affirmed, stating that the DNA testing revealed only further evidence of Wayne's guilt and that the other claims were barred by State v. Knaffla , 309 Minn. 246

After an offender has had a direct appeal, “all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.” State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, see also Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd.

In this first-degree murder case, appellant Kemen Lavatos Taylor II appeals from a postconviction order that summarily denied his public-trial claim, concluding that Taylor's claim was barred by the rule announced in State v. Knaffla , 309 Minn. 246

See State v. Knaffla , 309 Minn. 246, 252

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N HALBROOKS, Judge Appellant challenges the postconviction court’s

3 The bases for Arrington’s challenge to his guilty plea appear to exceed the scope of issues that this court preserved for postconvictio n review on Arrington’s direct appeal, see Arrington, 2016 WL 102476, at *3 (preserving “the issue of whether Arrington’s guilty plea is invalid based on ineffective assistance of counsel”), and may be procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla , 309 Minn. 246, 252, (holding that, once a petitioner has had a direct appeal of a conviction, all matters that were

The Knaffla rule is “that where direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.” State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252

5 a review of statutory assertions.” 309 Minn. 246, 252 n.6, n.6 (1976).

Under the well-recognized rule of State v. Knaffla, once a petitioner has had a direct appeal of a conviction, “all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.” 309 Minn. 246, 252, see Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd.

Once a direct appeal has been taken, “all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.” State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252

at 373 , We concluded that even if the claims were not barred by State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246 , the record conclusively showed that Zornes was not entitled to relief.

See State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, (holding that, once a petitioner has directly appealed a conviction, neither matters raised in that appeal nor matters known but not raised will be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief); (“Similarly [to the

The postconviction judge, who had presided over Johnson’s trial, concluded that his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel were barred by State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, because they were known at the time of his direct appeal.

Doppler, d at 873 (citing State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, ).

The Scott County postconviction court ruled that, with the exception of Brooks’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, all of his claims were procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246

The Scott County postconviction court ruled that , with the exception of Brooks’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, all of his claims were procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, .

The postconviction court denied appellant’s petition without an evidentiary hearing, reasoning that all of appellant’s prosecutorial-misconduct claims were procedurally barred 3 under State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, because they were either raised or could have been raised on direct appeal .

The postconviction court summarily denied Mosley’s petition, concluding that (1) Mosley’s newly discovered evidence claim failed because he knew or should have known of the alibi witnesses at the time of trial, and (2) his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims were meritless and his trial-counsel claims were also procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246

See McDonough v. State , -27 (Minn. 2013); State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252

4(a), (c) (2016), and State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246

After an offender has had a direct appeal, “all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.” State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, see also Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd.

4(a)(2) (2016), and procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246

The postconviction court ruled that this claim is procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246