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The district court rejected his illegal sentence and plea withdrawal arguments stating, “In this case the court sentenced [Hodges] to a presumptive sentence based on the correct criminal[-]history score range and the applicable gui delines sentence.” The district court also rejected Hodges’s remaining arguments as procedurally barred or time-barred under State v. Knaffla

Finally , the district court determined that Pearson knew or should have known about his third claim no later than April 2016, 8 The district court also concluded that Pearson’s claims were procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla

He contends that the district court erred by construing his motion as a petition for post -

The district court construed Daniels’s motion as a postconviction petition and found Daniels ’s postconviction petition barred by State v. Knaffla , , and time-barred from relief.

In response, the state argued that Rodriguez’s

When an individual files a petition for postconviction relief after a direct appeal is resolved, like here, “[c]laims that were raised on direct appeal, or were known or should have been known but were not raised on di rect appeal, are procedurally barred.” (d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976)); see also Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd.

Generally, “[o]nce a party takes a direct appeal, any claim raised in that appeal will not be considered in a petition for postconviction relief.” (citing State v. Knaffla , (M inn.

Assuming without deciding that his claim is not barred by State v. Knaffla , (Minn .

First, we consider the Knaffla rule, which states that “where direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.”

Concerning his request for postconvic tion relief, and concluded that appellant raised six issues in his petition, all of which were known, but none of which were raised on direct appeal.

“Claims that were raised on direct app eal, or were known or should have been known but were not raised on direct appeal, are procedurally barred.” Sontoya v. State , 6 (); see also Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd.

4 In the alternative, the district court concluded that Goodloe’s

The district court did not abuse its discretion when, without holding a hearing, the court denied the claims raised in the postconviction petition because, even when the alleged facts are viewed in a light most favorable to appellant

2 U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N KLAPHAKE, Judge In this appeal from the denial of his petition for postconviction relief, appellant Joseph Harvey Bellanger alleges that his ineffective -assistance-of-counsel claim is not barred under State v. Knaffla , and that he rec eived ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The postconviction court denied relief

“It is well 4 established that proper impeachment evidence includes prior inconsistent statements.”

But if the offender has had a direct appeal, “all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.” State v. Knaffla

Second, This was Fagin’s fourth qualifying impaired- driving incident within 10 years; he had previously pleaded guilty to driving while impaired ( DWI) in 2006 and had two test- refusal convictions in June 2005.

his Fifth Amendment right against compelled self- incrimination by “forcing stipulations of facts,” and that his trial attorney was ineffective because he “stipulate[d] to the facts of the case without first obtaining a valid waiver from [him] in open court.” The postconviction court determined that Holt’s .

The postconviction court decide d that Corrigan’s

(d 737, 741 ( Minn. 1976)).

Additionally, “where direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief .” State v. Knaffla

309 Minn. 246 , , 741 (1976) ; see also Minn. Stat. § 590.01 , subd.

Under State v. Knaffla, “where direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.” see Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd.

Once a direct appeal has been taken, “ all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.” State v. Knaffla

2 (noting that when “direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief”).

(“When a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel can be adjudicated on the basis of the trial record, it must be brought on direct appeal or it is barred by the Knaffla rule if raised in a postconviction petition.”); (barring postconviction review of all claims raised “and all claims known but not raised” on direct appeal).

The district court rejected Padilla’s which bars a defendant from 4 raising an issue in a postconviction petition if the defendant has already raised the issue in a direct appeal or knew of the issue but failed to raise it.

The postconviction court also concluded that Jackson's claims were procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla , 309 Minn. 246 , and meritless.

A postconviction petition may be procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla

“[W]here direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.” State v. Knaffla , see Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd.

5 “Claims that were raised on direct appeal, or were known or should have been known but were not raised on direct appeal, are procedurally barred.” Sontoya v. State , (); see also Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd.

d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976) (“[W]here direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.”); Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd.

(noting that o nce “direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequen t petitio n for postconviction relief”).

In the alternative, the postconviction court concluded, Jackson's claims were both procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla , 309 Minn. 246 , , 741 (1976), and without substantive merit.

The postconviction court, without an evidentiary hearing, concluded that appellant’s ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim was barred 2 and that appellant’s ineffective- assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim was vague and conclusory.

1 (2018); see also State v. Knaffla , d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976).

4(a) (2018), and State v. Knaffla , 309 Minn. 246 , and that Reed's evidence supporting the remaining claim (the recantation by one of the State's witnesses) failed to satisfy the test for a new trial, even when viewed in the light most favorable to Reed.

“[W]here direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.” State v. Knaffla