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7 In determining whether the probative value of impeachment evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect, appellate courts apply the five factors pursuant to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s -38 (Minn. 1978): (1) the impeachment value of the prior crime, (2) the date of the conviction and the defendant’s subsequent history, (3) the similarity of the past crime with the charged crime (the greater the similarity, the greater the reason for not permitting use of the prior crime to impeach), (4) the

(“[Appellate courts] will not consider pro se claims on appeal that are unsupported by either arguments or citations to legal authority.”) In addition, which addresses the admissibility of prior convictions to impeach a witness under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 609, insinuating that he was denied the right to a fair trial because he was deterred from testifying due to the possibility that his prior convictions would be erroneously admitted.

609(a); see also State v. Jones , - 38 (Minn. 1978) (outlining five factors considered under rule 609).

First, the district court properly recognized that it should consider the five factors set out in State v. Jones in deciding whether the probative value of evidence of Newton’s prior felony convictions outweighs its prejudicial effect, and the district court considered and made specific findings on the Jones factors here.

(4) the importance of [the] defendant’s testimony, and (5) the centrality of the credibility issue.”

Two years later, we held that a similar instruction was “legally sound,” –27 (Minn. 1970), and 8 years after that, we concluded that a similar instruction “correctly state[d] the law,” –40 (Minn. 1978).

The district court 3 Foster uses a two-step approach in analyzing the issue : first, he applies the five factors commonly called the Jones factors that are used for evaluating the admissibility of felony convictions under rule 609(a)(1), (), and then he evaluates “unusual need” under rule 609(b).

In determining whether the probative value of a prior conviction as impeachment evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect, a - 38 (Minn. 1978).

ictim kicked and shot defendant); (victim hit defendant); (victim punched defendant); (victim kicked defendant in the head); (victim police officer pushed defendant’s friend); –36 (Minn. 1978) (victim fired shots); (victim hit defendant with umbrella); (victim punched and kicked defendant); (victim grabbed and kicked defendant); State

“District courts exercise discretion under this evidentiary rule, and in do ing so must consider th e factors established in State v. Jones.” ().

609 and State v. Jones , , 537-38 (Minn. 1978), t he district court determined that “the probative value of [Rath’s] 2003 conviction does not substantially outweigh its prejudicial effect,” and denied the state’s motion.

(4) the importance of [the] defendant’s testimony; and, (5) the centrality of the credibility issue.”

“(1) the impeachment value of the prior crime, (2) the date of the conviction and the defendant’s subsequent history, (3) the similarity of the past crime with the charged crime (the greater the similarly, the greater the reason for not permitting use of the prior crime to impeach), (4) the importance of defendant’s testimony, and (5) the centrality of the credibility issue.”

State v. Griffin , -04 (Minn. App. 2014), (quoting State v. Jones , ), review denied (Minn. Aug.

The Court is going to depart in an upward departure, and the Court is going to impose 1 538 (Minn. 1978) (identifying factors to consider in determining admissibility of prior convictions for impeachment purposes).

ial may be granted upon newly discovered evidence if a defendant shows: (1) that the evidence was not known to the defendant or his/her counsel at the time of trial; (2) that the evidence could not have been discovered through due diligence before trial; (3) that the evidence is not cumulative, impeaching, or doubtful; and 5 -38 (Minn. 1978) (discussing factors for district courts to consider when exercising discretion to admit evidence of a defendant’s prior crimes for impeachment purposes).

(4) the importance of the defendant’s testimony, and (5) the centrality of the credibility issue.” ().

Appellant’s criminal record provided grounds for a jury to disbelieve his 3 The district court admitted appellant’s -38 (Minn. 1978).

” State v. Hill , (quoting State v. Jones , ).

he conviction and the defendant’ s subsequent history, (3) the similarity of the past crime with the charged crime (the greater the similarity, the greater the reason for not permitting use of the prior crime to impeach), (4) the importance of defendant’s testimony, and (5) the centrality of the credibility issue.” (d 534, 538 (Minn. 1978)).

Swanson, d at 654 () (applying Jones factors to Minn. R. Evid.

) the impeachment value of the prior crime, (2) the date of the conviction and the defendant’s subsequent history, (3) the similarity of the past crime with the charged crime (the greater the similarity, the greater the reason for not permitting use of the prior crime to impeach), (4) the importance of defendant’s testimony, and (5) the centrality of the credibility issue.”

-38 (Minn. 1978), characterizing her conviction as a “subsequent criminal conviction[ ]” and contending that the purpose of the impeachment rule is to reveal a testifying defendant’s “character at the time of the crime” being tried.

1 The district court must demonstrate on the record that it has considered and weighed the Jones factors.