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Counsel’s performance is “not unreasonable when counsel does not object to properly admitted evidence.” see also Zumberge, d at 414.

(“Prosecutors must not interject their personal opinions into a case.”).

A defendant must prove this “actual prejudice” “by a preponderance of the evidence.” State v. Blanche

Under that test, a defendant must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing “(1) that a member of a protected racial group has been peremptorily excluded from the jury and (2) that circumstances of the case raise an inference that the exclusion was based on race.” State v. Blanche , -65 (Minn. 2005).

Accordingly, a “district court may not base an upward departure on facts necessary to prove elements of the offense being sentenced.” Edwards, d at 602; -79 (Minn. 2005) (“The reasons used for departing must not themselves be elements of the underlying crime.”).

which demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct was significantly more or less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the crime in question.” (quotations omitted).

-65 (Minn. 2005) (quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767 (1995)); see also Minn. R. Crim.

To do so, the objecting party must show “(1) that a member of a protected racial group has been peremptorily excluded from the jury and (2) that circumstances of the case raise an inference that the exclusion was based on race.”

The Batson analysis first requires Paschal to establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing “(1) that a member of a protected racial group has been peremptorily excluded from the jury and (2) that circumstances of the case raise an inference that the exclusion was based on race.”

First, a defendant must establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing “(1) that a member of a protected racial group has been peremptorily excluded from the jury and (2) that circumstances of the case raise an inference that the exclusion was b ased on race.” - 65 (Minn. 2005).

the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court”), (“Witness credibility determinations are strictly the domain of the jury.”).

was very credible.” A prosecuting attorney’s use of the phrase “‘I think’ to interject personal opinion into a closing argument is improper.” see 8 also Swanson, d at 656 (determining that the prosecuting attorney impermissibly vouched for the credibility of a witness by stating, “The state believes she is very believable”).

(stating that assessing witness’s credibility is “strictly the domain of the jury”).

“[T]o prevent exploitation of the influence of the prosecutor’s office,” prosecutors must not “interject their personal opinions into a case.” State v. Blanche , (quotation omitted).

This is so because whether a witness is credible or not credible is “strictly the domain of the jury.”

nt a liar in closing argument, 791 (Minn. 2006), shifting the burden of proof to the defendant, McDaniel, d at 750, commenting on the defendant’s failure to call a witness, McDaniel, d at 750, expressing personal opinions, as indicated by the use of “I” 32 statements, and disparaging the defense, 4 We are not persuaded by Foster’s assertions that the prosecutor plainly erred by calling Foster a liar, by shifting the burden of proof to Foster, see

9 Assessing credibility is “strictly the domain of the jury.” State v. Blanche

State v. Blanche , (quotation omitted).

Assessing credibility is “strictly the domain of the jury.”

A later 2 A more complete description of the facts can be found in State v. Blanche , –60 (Minn. 2005).

See Hall, d at 842 (explaining that an appellate court considers the strength of the evidence of guilt, ho w the evidence was presented and whether it was highly persuasive, if the evidence was used in closing argument, and the defense’s ability to counter the evidence in determining whether wrongfully admitted evidence was harmless); (holding that an error is harmless if the guilty verdict is surely unattributable to the error).

Whether a witness is credible or not credible is “strictly the domain of the jury.”

“Reversal is warranted only when the error substantially influences the jury’s decision.” (quotation omitted).

-79 (Minn. 2005) (“The reasons used for departing must not themselves be elements of the underlying crime.”).

10 in support of his argument that the PA’s testimony that T.B.’s injuries were consistent with T.B.’s claim of having been stabbed by appellant from behind was plain error.

5 Whether a witness is credible or not credible is “strictl y the domain of the jury.”

In reviewing a joinder issue, this court conducts “an independent inquiry into any substantial prejudice to defendants that may have resulted from their being joined for trial.” (quotation omitted).

First, a defendant must establish a prima facie case of purpo seful discrimination by showing “(1) that a member of a protected racial group has been peremptorily e xcluded from the jury and (2) that circumstances of the case rai se an inference that the exclusion was based on race.” - 65 (Minn. 2005).

State v. Blanche , d 351, 372 (Minn. 2005).

State v. Blanche , , 364-65 (Minn. 2005).

“The reasons used for departing must not themselves be elements of the underlying crime.” -79 (Minn. 2005).

A gang expert’s general testimony that “gang members have to retaliate if a gang member is involved in an incident with a rival gang” is prejudicial because it creates “a risk that the jury would improperly use this evidence to conclude that [the defendant] was the shooter simply because he is a member of a gang.” d 351, 362, 374 (Minn. 2005).

Appellate courts consider “the impact on both the victim of the crime as well as the trauma to the eyewitnesses who would be compelled to testify at multiple trials.” State v. Johnson , ().

B. Impact on the victim Appellate courts consider “the impact on both the victim of the crime as well as the trauma to the eyewitnesses who would be compelled to testify at multiple trials.” (d 351, 371 (Minn. 2005)).