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“Prosecutorial misconduct is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the jury’s verdict was ‘surely unattributable’ to the misconduct.” ().

Under the more stringent harmless-error test, “[p]rosecutorial misconduct is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the jury’s verdict was surely unattributable to the misconduct.” (quotation omitted).

judgment.” (stating “the prejudicial effect of misconduct can be cured by proper instructions to the jury”).

n.2 (Minn. 2016) (“Recent cases have questioned whether the two-tiered .

See, d 297, 304 n.2 (Minn. 2016) (“Recent cases have questioned whether the two- tiered .

2 “Prosecutorial misconduct is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the jury’s verdict was ‘surely unattributable’ to the misconduct.” ().

(stating that a prosecutor ’s question that elicited inadmissible testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the question was asked only once, and the prosecutor did not again attempt to elicit or refer to the answer).

2 After sentencing, a defendant may withdraw a guilty plea only if “ withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim.

“ Prosecutorial misconduct is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the jury’s verdict was ‘surely unattributable’ to the misconduct.” ().

“Prosecutorial misconduct is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the jury’s verdict was surely unattributable to the misconduct.” (quotation omitted).2 When determining whether misconduct in the presentation of evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we consider several nonexclusive factors, including (1) how the improper evidence was presented; (2) whether the evidence was highly persuasive; (3) whether the st

“Typically, an attorney’s decisions regarding which witnesses to interview constitute trial strategy that appellate courts will not second-guess.”

“Prosecutorial misconduct is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the jury’s verdict was surely unattributable to the misconduct.” (quotations omitted).

(concluding that a prosecutor’s question that elicited inadmissible testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the question was asked only once and the prosecutor did not again attempt to elicit or refer to the answer).

(quotations and citation omitted).

(declining to “reach the issue of the continued applicability of the Caron test to objected-to prosecutorial misconduct” based on the conclusion “that the one instance of objected-to prosecutorial misconduct here is harmless even under the standard for more serious misconduct”); 18 (explaining that “[p]rosecutorial misconduct is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the jury’s verdict was surely unattributable to the misconduct,” noting that “the prejudicial effect of misconduct can be cured by

-99 (Minn. 2006); n.2 (Minn. 2023) (indicating that the two-tiered harmless-error test is applicable in cases involving objected-to prosecutorial misconduct).

scretion in summarily denying Woodard’s postconviction petition, because Woodard’s appellate counsel could have legitimately determined that this 2 When defense counsel objects to instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct at trial, our court “use[s] a two-tiered harmless-error test under which the standard of review varies based on the seriousness of the misconduct.”

(determining the alleged misconduct was harmless because the prosecutor made no attempt to elicit the impermissible testimony again after the objection was sustained and did not refer to the answer at any other point during trial); (not

remains to be decided .” n.2 (Minn. 2008); d 297, 304 n.2 (Minn. 2016) ( listing cases questioning whether the two -tiered standard “remains viable”); State v. Graham , (noting that the Minnesota Supreme Court has “yet to decide whether the two-tiered approach for objected- to prosecutorial misconduct as set forth in State v. Caron

-28 (Minn. 2000) (holding we will only reverse a district court when the prosecution’s misconduct, considered in the context of the trial as a whole, was so serious and prejudicial that the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial was impaired); (stating that proper instructions to the jury can mitigate any prejudice or harm that may have occurred from the prosecution’s misconduct).

remains to be decided ,” n.2 (Minn. 2008) ; n.2 (Minn. 2016) (noting that many “cases ha ve questioned whether the two- tiered Caron standard for reviewing objected-to misconduct remains viable,” and listing cases); (noting that the Minnesota Supreme Court has “yet to decide whether the two -tiered appr

11 Objected-to Misconduct When an objection is made at trial, this court has utilized a “two-tiered harmless- error test under which the standard of review varies based on the seriousness of the misconduct.” see State v. Caron , (articulating the two-tiered standard).

remains to be decided.” n.2 (Minn. 2008); n.2 (Minn. 2016) (noting that “[r]ecent cases have questioned whether the two-tiered Caron standard for reviewing objected-to misconduct remains viable,” and listing cases); (noting that the Minnesota Supreme Court has “yet to decide whether the two-tiered app

Where, as here, the defendant has objected to alleged misconduct, we apply “a two-tiered harmless-error test under which th e standard of review varies based on the seriousness of the misconduct.” 3 In 3 We note that recent supreme court cases have questioned whether the two-tiered standard for reviewing objected-to misconduct remains viable.

6 If the defense objects to inadmissible testimony during trial, as was the case here, we apply “a two-tiered harmless-error test.”

(applying harmless-error analysis to prosecutorial misconduct); (applying modified plain-error analysis to prosecutorial misconduct).

In addition, the unintentional eliciting of inadmissible and prejudicial e vidence is not reversible error if it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because “the jury’s verdict was surely unattributable to the misconduct.” State v. Whitson , (quotation omitted).

State v. Whitson , & n.2 (Minn. 2016)

In addition, the unintentional eliciting of inadmissible and prejudicial evidence is not reversible error if it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because “the jury’s verdict was surely unattributable to th e misconduct.” (quotation omitted).

See n.2 (Minn. 2016); (applying standard for “unusually serious” misconduct without deciding the continued applicability of the Caron test).

“[T]he postconviction court must consider the alleged facts in the light most favorable to the petitioner.” (citation omitted).

Second, “the prejudicial effect of misconduct can be cured by proper instructions to the jury.” -27 (Minn. App. 1985) (concluding that “the prosecutor’s misstatement of the standard [did] not require reversal beca use the [district] cour t fully instructed the jury on [the] presumption of innocence”), review denied (Minn. Oct.

(alleged prosecutorial misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when the prosecutor “did not refer to the [prejudicial] answer at any other point in the trial ”); (a prejudicial comment did not entitle the defendant to a mistrial where i

To determine whether prosecutorial misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, courts evaluate “how the improper evidence was presented, whether the State emphasized it, whether it was highly persuasive, and whether the defendant countered it.”