Cited by

-49, 651-52 (Minn. 2006).

(“ The district court ’s imposition of an upward departure was permissible only if the facts authorizing the departure were either found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by [appellant].”).

10 Mongar next argues that the district court improperly relied on the facts admitted during the plea hearing to cover a different offense.

See State v. Dettman , (explaining that an aggravation -based upward-departure sentence is only permissible “if the facts authorizing the departure were either found by a jury .

“It is well established that a defendant’s waiver of his right to a jury trial on the elements of an offense must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.”

Still, Seelye asserts that Blakely v. Washington , 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), support her argume nt that the presence of a child was a sentencing aggr avating factor requiring a separate jury determination.

When the defendant accepts a plea deal and waives his right to a ju ry trial, he must ad mit the substantial and compelling fact supporting an upward departure, and his admission must “be accompanied by a knowing waiver of his right to a jury finding on that fact before the admission may be used to enhance his sentence.”

before a defendant’s statements at his guilty-plea hearing may be used to enhance his sentence .” State v. Dettman

“ Blakely reformulated the definition of ‘statutory maximum’ as the maxim um sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” (quoting Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303, 124 S. Ct. at 2537).

“[A] defendant must expressly, knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive his right to a jury determination of facts supporting an upward sentencing departure before his statements at his guilty-plea hearing may be used to enhance his sentence.” –51 (Minn. 2006).

–51 (Minn. 2006) (holding that a defendant may waive the right to have a jury determine whether aggravating factors exist for an upward durational departure).

We have stated that if a rule of constitutional criminal procedure “is considered ‘new,’ it must be applied to all cases pending on direct review.” see, (stating “the substantive rule of Blakely applies” because the defendant’s direct appeal was pending at the time Blakely was decided).

d 644, 651 (Minn. 2006).

“[A]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” (quotation omitted).

See, –52 (Minn. 2006) (applying de novo review to purported Blakely waiver).

(citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 , 90 S.Ct.

1463 , 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970)

“[A] defendant must expressly, knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive his right to a jury determination of facts supporting an upward sentencing departure before his statements at his guilty-plea hearing may be used to enhance his sentence.” -51 (Minn.2006) (discussing Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct.