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The Knaffla bar “applies even in postconviction proceedings raising constitutional issues of criminal procedure.”

1 (codifying the same rule for “grounds that could have been raised on direct 6 appeal”).1 The Knaffla bar “applies even in postconviction proceedings raising constitutional issues of criminal procedure.” (quotation omitted).

7 The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that an “appellate counsel’s failure to raise meritless claims does not constitute deficient performance.” Schleicher v. State

To prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a petitioner must first show that their representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687- 88 (1984)).

This exception applies to claims for ineffective assistance of counsel “when the court needs to conduct additional fact -finding to consider the claim on its merits.” ().

“A court may address the two prongs of the test in any order and may dispose of the claim on one prong 4 without analyzing the other.” Schleicher v. State , .

(noting that issues not raised in a petition for postconviction relief cannot be raised on appeal).

Moreover, “[i]t is well settled that a party may not raise issues for the first time on appeal from denial of postconviction relief.” (quotations omitted).

“A court may address the two prongs of the test in any order and may dispose of the claim on one prong without analyzing the other.”

“ ‘It is well settled that a party may not raise issues for the first time on appeal’ from denial of postconviction relief.” (); d 499, 502 (Minn. 2007) (declining to consider an argument that the postconviction petitioner did not raise before the district court).

Additionally, “claims asserted in a second or subsequent postconviction petition are procedurally barred if they could have been raised on direct appeal or in the first postconviction petition.”

(noting that issues not raised in a petition for postconviction relief cannot be raised on appeal).

“A court may address the two prongs of the test in any order and may dispose of the claim on one prong without analyzing the other.”

(“It is well settled that a party may not raise issues for the first time on appeal from denial of postconviction relief.” (quotations omitted)).

“It is well settled that a party may not raise issues for the first time on appeal from denial of postconviction relief.” (quotations omitted).

(noting that issues that are not raised in a petition for postconviction relief cannot be raised on appeal); –20 (Minn. 2014) (holding that challenges consisting of “factual assertions with no support in the record and conclusory declarations detached from

“A court may address the two prongs of the test in any order and may dispose of the cl aim on one prong without analyzing the other.” .

“A court may address the two prongs of the test in any order and may dispose of the claim on one prong without analyzing the other.”

“A court may address the two prongs of the test in any order and may di spose of the claim on one prong without analyzing the other.”

To justify holding a hearing to consider the allegedly newly discovered evidence, the evidence must be more than mere “argumentative assertions without factual support,” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A court may address the two prongs “in any order and may dispose of the claim on one prong without analyzing the other.” Schleicher v. State

A motion to dismiss appellant’s charges based on the 2001 police investigation would therefore have failed, see Schleicher v. State , (rejecting ineffective -assistance-of-counsel claim when asserted defense would have failed on merits) , and thus a ppellant cannot meet the “performance” prong of the Strickland test.

(instructing th at procedural bar applies to claims that could have been raised in previous appeal).

“It is well settled that a party may not raise issues for the first time on appeal from denial of postconviction relief.” (determining an appellant’s claims raised for the first time on appeal are forfeited).

We review a postconviction court’s determinations of legal issues de novo.” - 45 (Minn. 2006) (quotations and citations omitted).

No Knaffla exception applies because i neffective-assistance grounds are not novel, –48 (Minn. 2006), and the interests of justice do not warrant review.

The first exception is not present here because“[a]n ineffective [-]assistance[-]of- counsel claim is not a novel legal claim.” Schleicher v. State , -48 (Minn. 2006).

“This procedural bar applies even in postconvictio n proceedings raising constitutional issues of criminal procedure.” Ferguson v. State

Generally, we will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal, and “[i]t is well settled that a party may not raise issues for the first time on appeal from denial of postconviction relief.” (refusing to decide postconviction claims raised for the first time on appeal) (); (“We will not address [an] argument for the first time on appeal from a postconviction petition.”).

(stating reviewing court may dispose of an ineffective-assistance- of-counsel claim on one pro ng without analyzing the other).

d 499, 502 (Minn. 2007); -47 (Minn. 2005).

“A c ourt may address the two prongs of the test in any order and may dispose of the claim on one prong without analyzing the other.” Schleicher v. State

The reasonableness of an attorney ’s performance is measured aga inst the “representation by an attorney e xercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney wou ld perform under similar circu mstances.” (quotation omitted).

See Schleicher v. State , (concluding petitioner’s ineffective-assistance-of-postconviction-counsel claim was properly raised on appeal from denial of first petition for postconviction relief); (holding that ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim must be rai

Lynch v. State , , 321 (Minn. 2008) (quoting Schleicher v. State , , 445 (Minn. 2006) ).

Accordingly, Williams has not overcome t he “strong presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable.” (quotation omitted ).

“An attorney’s failure to raise meritless claims does not constitute deficient performance and cannot provide the basis for a claim of ineffective assistance.” ().