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For mental impairment to be a mitigating factor, “a defendant’s impairment must be extreme to the point that it deprives [him] of control over his actions.” (quotation omitted).

In reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence pursuant to section 244.11, subdivision 2(b), we are “guided by past sentences imposed on other offenders.” (quotation omitted).

For a mental impairment to constitute a mitigating factor in sentencing, a defendant’s impairment must be so extreme that it “deprives the defendant of control over [their] actions.” d 703, 716 (Minn. 2007).

Minnesota courts have explicitly recognized that age is a relevant factor when considering whether an offender is particularly amenable to probation, Trog, d at 31, and have considered an offender’s youth as a mitigating factor when evaluating whether a sentence is commensurate with the offender’s culpability, -16 (Minn. 2007).

“The mental- health impairment must be extreme ‘to the point that it deprives the defendant of control over his action.’” (), rev. denied (Minn. Dec.

(stating that mental impairment mitigates culpability only if it is “extreme to the point that it deprives the defendant of control over his actions” (quotation omitted)).

3 Indeed, as we have repeatedly held, “Caselaw is settled that offender-related factors do not support durational 3 See, (discussing the relevance of youth to a district court’s determination whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences); Trog, d at 31 (listing factors relevant to dispositional departures); see also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68, 82 (2010) (observing that “parts of the brain

The mental-health impairment must be extreme “to the point that it deprives the defendant of control over his actions.”

Williams is correct that o ur review of sentencing decisions is “guided by past sentences imposed on other offenders.” (quotation omitted).

To support a downward departure on the basis of me ntal impairment, the impairment must be “extreme” and deprive the defendant “of control over his actions.” State v. McLaughlin , State v. Lee , .

State v. McLaughlin , d 703, 716 (Minn. 2007).

Our review of senten cing decisions is “guide d by past sentences imposed on other offenders.” State v. McLaughlin , (quotation omitted).

acknowledges that “only ‘extreme’ mental impairment that deprives a juvenile of control over his actions justifies sentence mitigation,” but argues that his struggles with trauma and his behavioral diagnoses “heavily impaired his decision- making.”

Specifically, he argues that the court erred in concluding that his intellectual disability was not extreme enough to be considered a mitigating factor under the s d 703, 716 (Minn. 2007).

See State v. McLaughlin , (quotation omitted).

“In cases with multiple victims, consecutive sentences are rarely, if ever, disproportionate to the offense.” Ali, d at 259 (emphasis added); see also State v. McLaughlin , -16 (Minn. 2007).

According to McInnis, every other juvenile who has been given consecutive sentences on murder convictions ha s “intentionally directed [the criminal act ] towards more than one person .” He cites State v. Ali , , and State v. Brom , .

Guidelines 2.D.3.a(3) (2016) (listing, as a mitigating factor, that the “offender, because of physical or mental impairment, lacked substantial capacity for judgment when the offense was committed) ; see also State v. McLaughlin , Wall, d at 25 (indicating that lack of capacity, caused by paranoia and schizophrenia, is a mitigating factor) .

Guidelines II.F (2004); -15 (Minn. 2007) (citing Minn. Sent.

Reviewing courts “are also guided by past sentences imposed on other offenders.” (quotation omitted).

Specifically, the record lacks evidence that Royster had a mental impairment 15 that deprived him of “control over his actions.” (stating that “in order to constitute a mitigating factor in sentencing, a defendant’s impairment must be ‘extreme’ to the point that it deprives the defendant of control over his actions” (); see also State v. Martinson

Vargas also claims that the district court failed to consider that it is his “low cognitive functioning” that resulted in his inability to express “real insight.” But the district court commented that Vargas “carried on a normal life.” (stating that in order to be considered a mitigating factor in 8 sentencing, a mental impairment must be “ extreme to the point that it deprives the defendant of control over his actions.”).

2 2 Although neither party discusses the issue in this appeal, we note that a party challenging the constitutionality of a statute must give notice to the Minnesota Attorney General where “neither the state nor any of its agencies, officers, or empl

This court will not interfere with a district court’s sentencing decision unless the sentence is “disproportionate to the offense or unfairly exaggerates the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.” (quotation omitted).

See, e.g., State v. McLaughlin , ( “[T]o constitute a mitigating factor in sentencing, a defendant’s impairment must be ‘extreme’ to the point that it deprives the defendant of control over his actions.” ).

In order for mental illness to constitute a mitigating factor in sentencing, impairment “must be ‘extreme’ to the point that it de prives the defendant of contro l over his actions.” State v. 8 McLaughlin, () (concluding McLaughlin’s mental health appeared to be “insufficiently extreme” to be a mitigating factor when evidence lacking that M cLaughlin frequently suffered delusions or engaged in wholly irrational behavior).

Our review of whether Lott’s sentence unfairly exaggerates the criminality of his conduct is “guided by past sentences imposed on other offenders.” State v. McLaughlin , (quotation omitted).

For mental illness to mitigate against imposing c onsecutive sentences, “a defendant’s impairment must be ‘extreme’ to the point that it deprives the defendant of control over his actions.” .

But the impairment must be “ext reme to the point that it deprives the defendant of control over his actions.” (quotation omitted).

A d istrict court abuses its discretion when its reasons for departure are improper or inadequate, State v. Edwards , or where the sentence “unfairly exaggerates the criminality of the defendant’s conduct,” (quotations omitted).

State v. McLaughlin , (quotation omitted).

But the supreme court has limited the application of this factor to cases in which a defendant’s impairment is “extreme to the point that it deprives the defendant of control over his actions.” (quotation omitted).

In “order to constitute a mitigating factor in sentencing, a defendant’ s [mental-health] impairment must be ‘extreme’ to the point that 17 it deprives the defend ant of control over his actions.” State v. McLaughlin , d 703, 716 (Minn. 2007).

Our review of whether Rabold’s sentence unfairly exaggerates his criminality is also “guided by past sentences imposed on other offenders.” d 703, 715 (Minn. 2007).

(“As to mental illness, we have held that in order to constitute a mitigating factor in sentencing, a defendant’s impairment must be ‘extreme’ to the point that it deprives the defendant of control over his actions.”).