Cited by

6 in arguing that the district court may only revoke probation when rehabilitation is not possible, adding that rehabilitation was still possible and the district court did not consider whether an intermediate sanction was appropriate.

to argue that probation revocation is not appropriate when rehabilitation is still possible, but his reliance is misguided.

Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781-82 (1973)

A district court “must make specific findings on all three Austin factors before revoking probation,” and should “not assume that [it has] satisfied Austin by reciting the three factors and offering general, non-specific reasons for revocation, ”

The district court “has broad discretion in determining whether to impose an intermediate sanction.”

7 Thuok argues that the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that intermediate sanctions are appropriate after a violation, “at least in part, because rehabilitation is still possible.”

Before revoking probation, the district court must find that the state proved by clear and convincing evidence that the probation violations were “intentional or inexcusable.” (quotation omitted).

(citing Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 668-69 (1983)).

(citations omitted); see also Modtland, d at 607.

“A violation is mitigated where it was unintentional or excusable.” see also Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 668-69 (1983) (stating that where a violation is committed “through no fault of [the defendant’s] own,” the court 7 should “consider[] whether adequate alternative methods of punishing the defendant are available” before revoking the defendant’s probat

The district court “must make specific findings on all three Austin factors before revoking probation.” -37 (Minn. 2008).

d 632, 638 (Minn. 2008).

2(1)(c)(b), 3(1), (2)(b); (“[T]he district court must determine whether there is clear and convincing evidence that a condition of probation has been violated.”).

(stating that district court may impose intermediate sanctions).

e. 8 full responsibility for his conduct” by turni ng himself in on the warrant and “readily admitted [to the] violations at the outset of his hearing.” Moreover, he points out that “he had not yet received, let alone exhausted, community-based treatment.” “[A] district court has broa d discretion in determining whether there is sufficient evidence to revoke probation.” -37 (Minn. 2008).

see also Minn. Stat. § 609.14, subd.

because rehabilitation is still possible.” State v. Cottew

(quoting Austin, d at 251).

(quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781 -82, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 1759 (1973)).

(quotation omitted); see also Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 668-69 n.9, 103 S. Ct. 2064, 2070-71 n.9 (1983).

2a, 3 (2018) (addressing consequences for probation violation) ; (noting district court’s discretion to determine whether to impose an intermediate sanction or revoke probation).

(quoting Austin, d at 251).

See State v. Cottew , (“When a probationer challenges the probation violation, the state must prove the violation by clear and convincing evidence.”); see also Minn. R. Crim.

See, e.g. , State v. Cottew , , 639-40 (Minn. 2008).

(holding that Austin findings are 10 not required when a district court imposes lo cal incarceration as an intermediate sanction for a probation violation and does not execute an underlying sentence); −23 (Minn. App. 2010) (concluding that due process did

In deciding whether to revoke probation, a district court must employ “cons cientious judgment, not arbitrary action.”

d 246, 250 (Minn. 1980) (holding that “before probation [is] revoked, the [district] court must (1) designate the specific condition or conditions that were violated; (2) find that the violation was intentional or inexcusable; and (3) find that need for confinem

d 632, 636-37 (Minn. 2008); (holding that “before probation [is] revoked, the [district] court must (1) designate the specific condition or conditions that were violated; (2) find that the violation was intentional or inexcusable; and (3) find that the need for c