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Instead, “[t]he state bears the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”

“Unlike a harmless error analysis, the defendant generally bears the burden of persuasion with respect to the third plain error factor.” -84 (Minn. 2007).

10 (Minn. 2007) (determining that the district court reserving ruling on the admissibility of evidence was different from the court ruling on the admissibility of the evidence).

to appear for a nontestimonial purpose because “the court made no such ruling.” See, d 572, 588–89 (Minn. 2007) (stating that the appellant, who sought to challenge an alleged ruling by the district court on the admissibility of a prior conviction, “[could not] challenge the district court’s ruling .

In other words, “[t]he ‘affects substantial rights’ language of the third plain error factor is the same language used to define harmless error.” (citing Minn. R. Crim.

“Corroborative evidence need not, standing alone, be sufficient to support a conviction, but it must ‘affirm the truth of the accomplice’s testimony and point to the guilt of the defendant in some substantial degree.’ ” ().

“[W]here a district court fails to give a required accomplice corroboration instruction and the defendant does not object, an appellate court must apply the plain error analysis.” n.4 (Minn. 2007).

(“Reed cannot challenge the district court’s ruling on the admissibility of the conviction, as the court made no such 16 Foster does not cite authority for the proposition that a defendant can compel the attendance of a third party to appear at

801(d)(2)(A); (affirming admission of defendant’s statements to jailhouse informant); (affirming admission of defendant’s statements to witness).

“Corroborative evidence need not, standing alone, be sufficient to support a conviction, but it must ‘affirm the truth of the accomplice’s testimony and point to the guilt of the defendant in some substantial degree.’ ” ().

To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, “the circumstances must form a complete chain which, in light of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the accused as to exclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, any reasonable inference other than guilt.” (quotation omitted).

The supreme court has noted that “the third plain error factor is the same language used to define harmless error.” (citing Minn. R. Crim.

“[A]n error is plain if it was clear or obvious.” d 572, 583 (Minn. 2007) (quotations omitted).

Fo r a conviction to be upheld based on circumstantial evidence, “the circumstances must form a complete chain which, in light of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the accused as to exclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, any r easonable inference other than that of guilt.” (quotation omitted).

To uphold a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, “the circumstances must form a complete chain whic h, in light of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the accused as to exclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, any reasonable inference other than that of guilt.” 581 (Minn. 2007) (quotation om itted).

To uphold a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, “the circumstances must form a complete chain which, in light of the evidence as a whole, leads 7 so directly to the guilt of the accused as to exclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, any reasonable inference other than that of guilt.” (quotation omitted).

An error affects substantial rights when “there is a ‘reasonable likelihood’ that the absence of the error would have had a ‘significant effect’ 5 on the jury ’s verdict.” “[T]he burden shifts to the [s]tate to demonstrate that the plain error did not affect the [appellant]’s substantial rights.”

For a conviction to be upheld based on circumstantial evidence, “the circumstances must form a complete chain which, in light of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the accused as to exclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, any reasonable inference other than that of guilt.” (quotation omitted).

To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, “the circumstances must form a complete chain which, in light of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the accused as to excl ude, beyond a reasonable doubt, any reasonable inference other than that of guilt.” (quotation omitted).

To uphold a conviction based on circumst antial evidence, “the circumstances must form a complete chain which, in light of the ev idence as a whole, lead s so directly to the guilt of the accused as to excl ude, beyond a reasonable doub t, any reasonable inference other than that of guilt.” State v. Reed , (M inn.

Fo r a conviction to be upheld based on circumstantial evidence, “the circumstances must form a complete chain which, in light of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the accused as to exclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, any r easonable inference other than that of guilt.” (quotation omitted).

d 646, 658 (Minn. 2011) (noting that parties disagreed about standard of review and applying “less onerous” harmless-error analysis); -84 (Minn. 2007) (explaining that both harmless-error and plain-error review require that, for an error to be reversible, it must affect a defendant’s substantial rights).

Failure to give a required jury instruction affects a defe ndant’s substantial rights when “there is a ‘reasonable likelihood’ that the absence of the error would have had a ‘significant effect’ on the jury’s verdict.” State v. Reed , (M inn.

See, e.g., State v. Reed , ( “We are aware of no 10 court no longer was impartial because it made the State aware that if it objected or made a motion to the court, the court might reconsider its decision on the Spreigl motion.

An error is considered plain if it is “clear or obvious.” (quotation omitted).

“[T]he right of an indigent to have counsel does not give him the unbridled right to be represen ted by counsel of his own choosing.” (quotation omitted).

(applying abuse-of-discretion 11 standard to jury request to review evidence); WL 4234246, at *6 (Minn. App. Dec.

State v. Reed ( Reed I ), , 582, 584-85 (Minn. 2007).

“[W]here a district court fails to give a required accomplice corroboration instruction and the defendant does not object, an appellate court must apply the plain error analysis.” n.4 (Minn. 2007).

d 572, 583 (Minn. 2007).

See State v. Reed , (concluding that there was no basis to invalidate indictment because of false testimony where it was extremely unlikely that the testimony affected the decision to indict).

“[W]here a district court fails to give a required accomplice corroboration instruction and the defendant does not object, an appellate court must apply the plain error analysis.” State v. Reed , n.4 (Minn. 2007).