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ere markedly similar.” Gomez relies on State v. Clark, in which the supreme court summarized the similarities between the Spreigl evidence “as described to the jury” and the charged offense: “(1) both acts involved the use of a gun to threaten the victims; (2) both acts occurred in the victims’ bedrooms; and (3) both acts involved vaginal penetration or attempted vaginal penetration.”

But if Spreigl evidence is offered for that purpose, “the misconduct must have a marked similarity in modus operandi to the charged offense.” (quotation omitted).

Even if the district court abused its discretion by admitting Spreigl evidence, an appellate court will n ot reverse unless the appellant can show prejudice, meaning that there is “a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.” see Barthman, d at 128; Smith, d at 93 (“If there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been favorable to the defendant had the evidence not been allowed, the evidence is prejudicial and its admission

If Spreigl evidence is being offered to show a common scheme or plan, “the misconduct must have a marked similarity in modus operandi to the charged offense.” d 316, 346 (Minn. 2007) (quotation omitted).

If Spreigl evidence is being offered to show a common scheme or plan, “the misconduct must have a marked similarity in modus operandi to the charged offense.” d 316, 346 (Minn. 2007) (quotation omitted).

- 47 (Minn. 2007); Kennedy, d at 391; State v. Blom , -12 (Minn. 2004).

And we previously have recognized that “the validity of a waiver of the right to counsel under either the Sixth or Fifth Amendment [of the United States Constitution] is judged by essentially the same standard.” ().

But Spreigl evidence “may be admissible for other purposes,” including to show a 7 “common scheme or plan” and to rebut a defendant’s contention “that the conduct on which the charge was based was a fabrication.” (quotation omitted).

“When determining whether past misconduct is admissible under the common scheme or plan exception, the misconduct must have a marked similarity in modus operandi to the charged offense.” State v. Clark , d 316, 346 (Minn. 2007) (quotation omitted).

(concluding that the defendant was not prejudiced by the admission of the Spreigl evidence because, among other factors, the district court provided a “cautionary jury instruction before the Spreigl evidence was admitted”).

In considering whether a statement was involuntary, “courts inquire whether police conduct, together with other circumstances surrounding the interrogation, was so coercive, so manipulative, and so overpowering as to deprive a defendant of his ability to make an unconstrained and wholly autonomous decision to speak as he did.” (quotation omitted).

is subject to adverse judicial proceedings, including arraignments.”

Moreover, common-scheme evidence must meet a heightened standard of relevance—the Spreigl act “must have a marked similarity in modus operandi to the charged offense.” (quotation omitted).

“[W]hen a defendant contends that the conduct on which the charge was based was a fabrication, Spreigl evidence is admissible to rebut that contention as long as the district court is satisfied that the evidence is sufficiently relevant to the charged crime.” (quotation omitted).

of the things considered when determining the admissibility of Spreigl evidence are : (1) “whether there is clear and convincing evidence that the defendant participated in the prior act”; (2) “whether the evidence is relevant and material to the state’s case”; and (3) “whether the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by its potential prejudice to the defendant.” State v. Clark , (quotation s omitted).

See, e.g. , State v. Clark , , 346 (Minn. 2007) ("Generally, as the time span increases between the past misconduct and the crime charged, the similarity between the acts in terms of modus operandi must likewise increase in order for the past misconduct to be relevant."

“[I]f the prior crime is simply of the same generic type as the charged offense, it ordinarily should be excluded.” (alteration in original) (quotation omitted).

State v. Clark , , 347 (Minn. 2007) (quotation omitted).

d 316, 347-48 (Minn. 2007).

Although we have referred to the language of Rule 4.2 as "plain and unambiguous," State v. Clark , , 339 (Minn. 2007), we have never parsed the language to explain what each element and the exception means, as we are required to do here.

Prejudice exists when “there is a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence sig nificantly affected the verdict.” (quotation omitted).

But “if the prior crime is simply of the same generic type as the charged offense, it ordinarily should be excluded,” – “Spreigl evidence may be introduced to establish, by showing a common scheme or plan– –that a sexual act occurred.” (citation omitted).

See, e.g., Fardan, d C/D-5 at 320 (affirming after erroneous admission of Spreigl evidence due, in part, to the manner in which it was presented); State v. Riddley , (noting that other-crime evidence “was not graphi c or inflammatory,” which made it less prejudicial); State v. Clark , -48 (M inn.

339 n.10 (Minn. 2007) (inviting review by the appropriate committee(s) of Minn. R. Prof.

See State v. Clark , –48 (Minn. 2007); State v. Bolte , –99 (Minn. 1995).

Ness, d at 688; Wermerskirchen, d at 242.

You can never f*** up again if you don’t want to.”