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to argue that the district court did not give adequate weight to the dissimilarities between the Ramsey County case and Finfrock’s present charges.

“To qualify for rule 404(b) admissibility, other-acts evidence must legitimately serve a relevant purpose other than to show propensity or character.”

“To qualify for rule 404(b) admissibility, other-acts evidence must legitimately serve a relevant purpose other than to show propensity or character.”

d 88, 93 (Minn. App. 2008).

(rejecting an argument that would allow a defendant to challenge “any allegedly erroneous procedural or evidentiary ruling” because it undermined “the rule that only jurisdictional challenges may be entertained after a” guilty plea); (“[W]hen [appellant] 12 pleaded guilty, his speedy-trial right evaporated, and any delay up to that time was nullified by his plea.”).

(“[W]hen Smith pleaded guilty, his speedy-trial right evaporated.”).

(“[W]hen [appellant] pleaded guilty, his speedy-trial right evaporated, and any delay up to that time was nullified by his plea.”).

evidence to lure the fact-finder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense charged.”

Here, the “strangle” tattoo conveyed the “nearly inescapable message” that Moore “celebrates assaulting others and has done so in the past.” (concluding that the district court abused its discretion in admitting a photo of a defendant in the presence of firearms).1 Accordingly, the danger of unfair prejudice from the tattoo evidence outweighed its nominal probative value.

Spreigl evidence may give rise to “unfair prejudice” if the evidence “lure[s] the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense charged.” State v. Smith , (quotation omitted).

Evidence may give rise to “unfair prejudice” if it “lure[s] the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense charged.” (quotation omitted).

(noting that “it is not illegal for [a prohibited person] to be in the presence of firearms – as long as he does not possess them”).

Spreigl evidence may give rise to “unfair prejudice” if the evidence “lure[s] the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense charged.” State v. Smith , (quotation omitted).

(noting that “it is not illegal for [an ineligible person] to be in the presence of firea rms—as long as he does not possess them”); see also Florine, 303 Minn. at 105, d at 611 ( noting that “one could not automatically infer from the mere fact that cocaine was found in the automobil

Id.; see also State v. Smith , (noting the difference between prejudicial evidence, which is true of almost any evidence the state submits, and unfairly prejudicial evidence).

Evidence may give rise to “unfair prejudice” if the evidence “lure[s] the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense charged.” (quotation omitted).

ndant has traditionally operated, in Minnesota and in other jurisdictions, as a waiver of all non-jurisdictional defects arising prior to the entry of the plea.” & n.4 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted) (clarifying that “[a]lthough we have used the term ‘waiver,’ the effect of a guilty plea is more accurately described as a forfeiture”); (“[W]hen [appellant] pleaded guilty, his speedy-trial right evaporated, and any delay up to that time was nullified by his plea.”).

(holding inadmissible a photograph of a defendant near a table with guns which “associate[d] [the defendant] with firearms and [did] so with a nefarious connotation”).

“The rule contains an illustrative, nonexclusive list of other purposes that can qualify.” - 93 (Minn. App. 2008) (quotation marks omitted).

often threatened to punch D.S., was angry and threatening toward the police officer who interviewed him in the jail, and that the gun was loaded when it was found.” 19 Soderbeck relies on State v. Smith, arguing that the state unfairly persuaded the jury to convict based “on a ground different from proof specific to the offense charged.” (quotation omitted).

(stating that Spreigl “precludes evidence of another act extrinsic to the case if the purpose is to show a person’s character and then to invite the inference that the person’s conduct conformed to that character”).