Cited by

Even if a defendant is particularly amenable to probation, a district court need not depart, -65 (Minn. App. 2009), and it need not provide reasons for imposing a presumptive sentence, State v. Johnson , review denied (Minn. Sept.

(holding the district court’s decision to impose presumptive sentence was not an abuse of discretion even when “[t]here [was] evidence in the record that appellant was amenable to probation”).

State v. Olson , see also State v. Pegel , (“[T]he mere fact that a mitigat ing factor is present in a particular case does not obligate the court to place [a] defendant on probation .

However, a district court is not required to depart “from a presumptively executed prison sentence, even if there is evidence in the record that the defendant would be amenable to probation.” State v. Olson

“[T]he district court has discretion to impose a downward dispositional departure if a defendant is particularly amenable to probation, but it is not required to do so.” -65 (Minn. App. 2009).

But a district court does not abuse its discretion by refusing to depart “from a presumptively executed prison sentence, even if there is evidence in the record that the defendant would be amenable to probation.”

[the court] is not required to do so.” State v. Olson , -65 (Minn. App. 2009).

-65 (Minn. App. 2009); -54 (Minn. App. 2011) (stating that the existence of a mitigating factor does not obligate the district court to depart).

However, a district court does not abuse its discretion by refusing to depart “from a presumptively executed prison sentence, even if there is evidence in the record that the defendant would be amenable to probation.”

[ it] is not required to do so.” -65 (Minn. App. 2009).

A district court is not required to depart “from a presumptivel y executed prison sentence, even if there is evidence in the record that the defendant would be amenable to probation.”

A district court is not required to depart “from a presumptively executed prison sentence, even if there is evidence in the record that t he defendant would be amenable to probation.”

-65 (Minn. App. 2009) (“[T]he district court has discretion to impose a downward dispositional departure if a defendant is particularly amenable to probation, but it is not required to do so.”).

14 Those mitigating circumstances must be “substantial and compell ing,” meaning that they make “the facts of a particular case different from a typical c ase.” State v. Olson , (quotation omitted).

A district court, however, is not required to depart “from a presumptively executed prison sentence, even if there is evidence in the record that the defendant would be amenable to probation.”

A district court is not required to depart “from a presumptively executed prison sentence, even if there is evidence in the record that the defendant would be amenable to probation.”

-65 (Minn. App. 2009) (“[T]he district court has discretion to impose a downward dispositional departure if a defendant is particularly amenable to probation, but it is not required to do so.”); see also State v. Pegel , 795 N.W.

But a district court does not abuse its discretion by refusing to depart “from a presumptively executed prison sentence, even if there is evidence in the record that the defendant would be amenable to probation.”

-65 (Minn. App. 2009) (“[T]he district court has discretion to impose a downward dispositional departure if a defendant is particularly amenable to probation, but it is not required to do so.”).

664-65 (Minn. App. 2009) (“[T]he district court has discretion to impose a downward dispositional departure if a def endant is particularly amen able to probation, but is not required to do so.”).

Indeed, t his court has repeatedly stated that “a defendant is not entitled to a reduction in his sentence merely because a codefendant received a lesser sentence.” review denied (Minn. Jan.

“ Only in a rare case will a reviewing court reverse a district court’s imposition of the presumptive sentence.”

-65 (Minn. App. 2009) (“[T]he district court has discretion to impose a downward dispositiona l departure if a defendant is particularly amenable to probation, but it is not required to do so.”).

t a finding that Anderson is particularly amenable to probation, “the mere fact that a mitigating factor is present in a particular case does ‘not obligate the court to place defendant on probation or impose a shorter term than the presumptive term.’” State v. Pegel , -54 (Minn. App. 2011) (quoting State v. Wall , ); see also State v. Olson , -65 (Minn. App. 20 09) (“[T]he district court has discretion to impose a downward dispositional departure if a defendant is particularly amenable to probat

State v. Olson , -65 (Minn. App. 2009) (“[T]he district court has discretion to impose a downward di spositional departure if a defendant is particularly amenable to probation, but it is not required to do so.”).

rt a finding that appellant is particularly amenable to probation, “the mere fact that a mitigating factor is present in a particular case does ‘not obligate the court to place de fendant on probation or impose a shorter term than the presumptive term.’” -54 (Minn. App. 2011) (); -65 (Minn. App. 2009) (“[T]he district court has discretion to impose a downward dispositional departure if a defe ndant is particularly amenable to probation, but it is not required to do so.”); State v. Evenson , (“Ev

“Substantial and compelling circumstances are those circumstances that make the facts of a particular case different from a typical case.” (quotation omitted).

15 “Only in a rare case will a reviewing court reverse a district court’s imposition of [a] presumptive sentence.” State v. Olson , (quotation omitted).

d 662, 664–65 (Minn. App. 2009).

–65 (Minn. App. 2009) (holding that a district court does not abuse its discretion by refusing to depart “from a presumptively executed prison sentence, even if there is evidence in the record that the defendant would be amenable to probation”).

–65 (Minn. App. 2009) (“[T]he district court has discretion to impose a downward dispositional departure if a defendant is particularly amenable to probation, but it is not required to do so.”).

“The district court does not abuse its discretion by refusing to dispositionally depart from a presumptively executed prison sentence, even if there is evidence in the record that the defendant would be amenable to probation.”

(stating that a district court does not abuse its discretion by refusing to depart “from a presumptively executed prison sentence, even if there is evidence in the record that the defendant would be amenable to probation”).