Cited by

See, (noting that “[t]he shorter the departure, the greater the deference given to the district court’s discretion” and that “[d]epartures that enhance a sentence to a term that falls between the presumptive sentence and twice the presumptive sentence invite the greatest deference”).

rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2010).

rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2010).

4 “Departures that enhance a sentence to a term that falls between the presumptive sentence and twice the presumptive sentence invite the greatest deference.”

In conclusion, we are “extremely deferential” to a district court’s decision whether to impose a departure, -96 (Minn. App. 2010), rev. 15 denied (Minn. July 20, 2010), “and we cannot simply substitute our judgment for that of the [district] court,” Spain, d at 88.

“The shorter the departure, the greater the deference given to the district court’s discretion.” rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2010).

rev. 15 denied (Minn. July 20, 2010).

Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.3(b)(2), (13) (2022); see Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.F.204 (2022); (acknowledging that committing crime in presence 10 of child is valid aggravating factor); -603 (Minn. App. 2010) (concluding that district court did not abuse its discretion in finding aggravating factor of particular cruelty based on “the serious and permanent injuries [appellant] inflicted”).

But we are less deferential when a district court imposes a sentence that is more than double the presumptive length, which requires the existence of “severe aggravating circumstances.” (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2010).

We are “extremely deferential” to a district court’s decision whether to impose a departure, -96 (Minn. App. 2010), rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2010), and we “cannot simply substitute our judgment for that of the [district] court,” d 473, 476 (Minn. App. 1984) (explaining that appellate courts “are loath to interfere” with

Once we determine as a matter of law that the district court has identified proper grounds justifying a challenged departure, we review its decision whether to depart for an abuse of discretion.” (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2010).

C/D - 11 Minnesota jurisprudence is replete with examples of appellate courts affirming upward durational departures because they are “extremely deferential” to district court departure decisions, –96 (Minn. App. 2010), rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2010), and because they recognize that “[t]he district court has great discretion in the imposition of a sentence and the reviewing court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the district court[,]” Murphy, d at 916.

rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2010).

rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2010).

Soto, d at 307- 08 (quotation omitted) (stating that appellate courts “afford the [district court] great discretion in the imposition of sentences and reverse sentencing decisions only for an abuse of that discretion” (quotation omitted)); (“Once we determine as a matter of law that the d istrict court has identified proper grounds justifying a challenged departure, we review its decision whether to depart for an abuse of discretion.”), rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2010).

rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2010).

E.g., Dillon v. State , rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2010) (concluding that if “the district court has identified proper grounds justifying a challenged departure, we review its decision whether to depart for an abuse of discretion” (emphasis omitted)).

rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2010).

rev. denied (Minn. July 10, 2010).

More specifically, w e review de novo whether the district court has identified proper grounds justifying a departure, but our review of the district court’s decision to depart is “extremely deferential.” -96 (Minn. App. 2010), rev. denied (Minn. July 10, 2010).

“Substantial and compelling circumstances are factual circumstances that significantly distinguish the case, making it atypical.” (quotation omitted), rev. denied, (Minn. July 20, 2010).

calls for resolving the legal question de novo.” Soto, d at 308 n.1; rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2010); rev. denied (Minn. Aug.

rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2010).

calls for resolving the legal question de novo.” Soto, d at 308 n.1; accord State v. Jackson , State v. Dentz , rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2010); rev. denied (Minn. Aug.

But this “is a broad umbrella standard that encompasses varying degrees of deference.” rev. denied (Minn. July 10, 2010).

review denied (Minn. July 20, 2010) (concluding that if “the district cour t has identified proper grounds justifying a challenged departure, we review its decision whether to depart for an abuse of discretion”); (concluding that

Even when some reasons for a departure ar e improper or insufficient, we may affirm a sentence “if we conclude that the district court would have depa rted based on other aggravating factors suppor ted by its findings.” Dillon v. State , review denied (Minn. July 20, 2010); see also State v. Vance , -96 (Minn. 2009) (affirming sentencing departure notwithstanding district court’s reliance on an improper aggravating factor because two remaining departure bases independently supported the departur

(“Once we determine as a matter of law that the district court has identified proper grounds justifying a challenged departure, we review its decision whether to depart for an abuse of discretio n.” (emphasis in original) ), review denied (Minn. May 11, 2010).

review denied (Minn. July 20, 2010).

(observing that a de novo standard of review applies “when reviewing whether a particular reason for an upward departure is permissible”), review denied (Minn. July 20, 2010).

calls for resolving the legal question de novo.” Soto, d at 308 n.1; accord State v. Jackson , State v. Dentz , Dillon v. State , review denied (Minn. July 20, 2010); review denied (Minn. Aug.

calls for resolving the legal question de novo.” Soto, d at 308 n.1; accord State v. Jackson , State v. Dentz , review denied (Minn. July 20, 2010); State v. Grampre , review denied (Minn. Aug.

“The statutory maximum sentence is the absolute ceiling on the district court’s sentencing discretion.” review denied (Minn. July 20, 2010).

Our review of a district court’s decision whether to impose a sentencing departure is “extremely deferential.” 5- 96 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn. July 20, 2010).

see also D illon v. State , 5 (Minn. App. 2010) (observing that a de novo standard of review applies “when reviewing whether a particular reason for an upward departure is permissible”) review denied (Minn. July 20, 2010).

Dillon v. State , -96 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn. July 20, 2010).

(noting that a greater than double upward departure is warranted only in the rare case where severe aggravating circumstances exist), review denied (Minn. July 20, 2010).

State v. Jackson , review denied (Minn. May 11, 2010) (observing that a de novo standard of review applies “when reviewing whether a particular reason for an upward departure is permissible”).5 Wang Navas raises two challenges to the validity of the district court’s stated reason for departure.

.” review denied (Minn. July 20, 2010).

Dillon v. State , review denied (Minn. July 20, 2010).

For appellant’s conduct to be particularly cruel, it must be “significantly more cruel than conduct typically associated with the offense of conviction.” Dillon v. State , review denied (Minn. July 20, 2010).

For Muhammad’s conduct to be particularly cruel, it must be “significantly more cruel than conduct typically associated with the offense of conviction.” d 588, 600 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn. July 20, 2010).

Our review of a district court’s decision whether to impose a sentencing departure is “extremely deferential.” 5-96 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn. July 20, 2010).