Cited by

“We will not disturb a verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and for the necessity of overcoming it by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the 6 defendant was proven guilty of the offense charged.” (quotation omitted).

n.2 (Minn. 2010) (declining to apply circumstantial-evidence standard of review when direct evidence existed).

Frye asserted that the Plano records contained allegations by the children against someone other than Frye that 2 “A police officer must give an individual in custody a Miranda warning before interrogating that individual.” (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)).

The reviewing court will affirm a guilty verdict “if the jury, acting with due regard for the [ defendant’s] presumption of innocence and [ the state’s burden of proof], could reasonably conclude that the defendant was proven guilty of the offense charged.” (quotation omitted).

We will not disturb a guilty verdict when “the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and for the necessity of overcoming it by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, 11 could reasonably conclude that [the] defendant was proven guilty of the offense charged.” (quotation omitted).

“We will not disturb a verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and for the necessity of overcoming it by proof beyond a 12 reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the defendant was proven guilty of the offense charged.” (quotation omitted).

Appellate courts will not disturb a guilty verdict where “the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and for the necessity of overcoming it by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the defendant was proven guilty of the offense charged.” (quotation omitted).

A reviewing court “will not disturb a verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and for the necessity of overcoming it by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the defendant was proven guilty of the offense charged.” (quotation omitted).

State v. Flowers (Flowers I)

n.2 (Minn. 2010) (stating that, when state presented direct evidence on each element of aiding and abetting first -degree murder, court would not apply circumstantial-evidence standard of review).

An appellate 6 court should not “disturb a verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and for the necessity of overcoming it by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the defendant was proven guilty of the offense charged.” (quotation omitted).

We will not “disturb a verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and for the necessity of overcoming it by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the defendant was proven guilty of the offense charged.” (quotation omitted).

This court will not “disturb a verdict if the [fact-finder], acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and for the necessity of overcoming it by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the defendant was proven guilty of the offense charged.” (quotation omitted).

When the state presents both direct and circumstantial evidence of an element, but the direct evidence alone sufficiently supports the element, the supreme court has applied the direct-evidence standard.2 (applying direct-evidence standard because state presented sufficient direct evidence on disputed element) ( n.2 (Minn. 2010 )).

We will not “disturb a verdict if the jury, 8 acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and for the necessity of overcoming it by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the defendant was proven guilty of the offense charged.” (quotation and alterations omitted).

“In reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, we make a pa instaking review of the record, to ascertain[ ] whether, given the facts in the record and the legitimate inferences that can be drawn from those facts, a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the offense charged.” State v. Flowers , (quotations omitted).

for the proposition that a district court should instruct the jury on a lesser, non -included offense if it is the defendant’s theory of the case.

-40 (Minn. 2016); -61 (Minn. 2015); n.2 (Minn. 2010).

In evaluating a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, we conduct “a painstaking review of the record to ascertain whether, given the facts in the record and the legitimate inferences that can be drawn from t hose facts, a jury could reasonably conclude that the 14 defendant was guilty of the offense charged .” State v. Flowers , (alteration omitted) (citation and quotation omitted).

In evaluating a claim of insufficiency of the ev idence, we conduct “a painstaking review of the record to ascertain whether, given the facts in the record and the legitimate inferences that can be drawn from those facts, a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the offense charg ed.” State v. Flowers , (alteration omitted) (citation and quotation omitted).

(“We cannot retry the facts, but must take the view of the to your second question is that you must rely on your own recollections of what the Evidence is and rely solely on your own memories.” 15 evidence most favorable to the state and must assume

When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial, we undertake a “painstaking review of the record,” (), and review the evidence “to determine whether, given the facts in the record and the legitimate inferences that can be drawn from those facts, a [fact-finder] could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the offense charged

-61 (Minn. 2015); n.2 (Minn. 2010).

See, -600 (Minn. 2013); -34 (Minn. 2010).

See, -600 (Minn. 2013); -34 (Minn. 2010).

See, -600 (Minn. 2013); -34 (Minn. 2010).

(“[W]e decline to consider adopting Brown”).2 The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s request for a second-degree assault instruction.

See, d 120, 133 n.2 (Minn. 2010).