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the credibility of the defendant is important because the jury must often decide between competing accounts of the events leading up to the crime.”

See, 656 (Minn. 2011) (concluding that the bullet trajectory and wounds contradicted the defendant’s claim that the victim was standing and facing him at the time of the shooting); (concluding that bullet trajectory and wounds were consistent with the eyewitness test

–52 (Minn. 2023); –55 (Minn. 2011).

We have held, in rare cases, that the cumulative effect of trial errors can deprive an appellant of their constitutional right to a fair trial when the “errors and indiscretions, none of which alone might have been enough to tip the scales, operate to the [appellant’s] prejudice by producing a biased jury.” (quotations omitted).

The cumulative effect of errors at trial can deprive a defendant of his constitutional right to a fair trial even when the errors, “none of which alone might have been enough to tip the scales, operate to the defendant’s prejudice by producing a biased jury.”

We review a district court’s ruling on the impeachment of a witness by prior convictions for “a clear abuse of discretion.” (quotation omitted).

sence of the misconduct in question would have had a significant effect on the verdict of the jury,” Ramey , d at 302 (quotation omitted), we consider “(1) the strength of the evidence against the defendant ; (2) the pervasiveness of the improper conduct; and (3) whether the defendant had an opportunity (or made efforts) to rebut the prosecutor’s improper suggestions,” d 646, 654-55 (Minn. 2011).

An appellate court may reverse a conviction based on cumulative trial errors if “errors and indiscretions, none of which alone might have been enough to tip the scales, operate to the defendant’s prejudice by producing a biased jury.” d 646, 659 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted).

“We will not reverse a district court’s ruling on the impeachment of a witness by prior conviction absent a clear abuse of discretion.” (quotation omitted).

In deciding whether the state has met this burden, we may consider “(1) the strength of the evidence against the defendant; (2) the pervasiveness of the improper conduct; and (3) whether the defendant had an opportunity (or made efforts) to rebut the prosecutor’s improper suggestions.” -55 (Minn. 2011).

When deciding whether the state has met this burden, we consider “(1) the strength of the evidence against the defendant; (2) the pervasiveness of the improper conduct; and (3) whether the defendant had an opportunity (or made efforts) to rebut the prosecutor’s improper suggestions.” -55 (Minn. 2011).

Knott finally argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the “sheer number of errors operated to [his] prejudice by producing a biased jury.” d 646, 659 (Minn. 2011) (stating that cumulative errors can “tip the scales, operate to the defendant’s prejudice by producing a biased jury” (quotation omitted)).

When deciding whether the state has met this burden, we consider “(1) the strength of the evidence against the defendant; (2) the pervasiveness of the improper conduct; and (3) whether the defendant had an opportunity (or made efforts) to rebut the prosecutor’s improper suggestions.” -55 (Minn. 2011).

Substantial Rights Even assuming that the prosecutor committed plain error during closing argument, we only reverse a conviction due to prosecutorial misconduct if such plain error “affects the defendant’s substantial rights.”

(recognizing that the district court is in a “unique position” to assess and weigh the Jones factors and “must be accorded broad discretion”), rev. granted (Minn. Apr.

Impeachment evidence of a previous felony conviction is sanitized when it is admitted “without revealing the nature or details of the convi ction at the time of impeachment.” State v. Hill , n.1 (Minn. 2011).

State v. Hill , d 646, 654-55 (Minn. 2011).

(concluding that having, but not taking, the opportunity to rebut does not affect an appellant’s substantial rights); d 35, 40 (Minn. 1994) (failing to object or seek curative instruction weighs against reversal).

5 -52 (Minn. 2011) (quotations and citations omitted).

State v. Hill , ; (noting that we apply an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to evidentiary rulings that invoke constitutional rights).

d 646, 658 (Minn. 2011) (noting that parties disagreed about standard of review and applying “less onerous” harmless-error analysis); -84 (Minn. 2007) (explaining that both harmless-error and plain-error review require that, for an error to be reversible, it must affect a defend

“We will not reverse a district court’s ruling on the impeachment of a witness by prior conviction absent a clear abuse of discretion.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

(applying harmless-error analysis to prosecutorial misconduct); (applying modified plain-error analysis to prosecutorial misconduct).

An appellate court “will not reverse a district court’s rulin g on the impeachment of a witness by prior conviction absent a clear abuse of discretion.” (“We must uphold the trial court’s ruling [on impeachment evidence under Rule 609] unle ss a clear abuse of discretion is shown.” (quotatio n omitted)).

P. 31.01; see also State v. Hill, 4 (providing a court may disregard an error where it did not affect the substantial rights of a defendant and did not meaningfully affect the verdict).

d 646, 651 (Minn. 2011).

And the supreme court in State v. Hill explained that “it is the general lack of respect for the law, rather than the specific nature of the conviction, that informs the fact- 6 finder about a witness’s credibility.” (Mi nn.

Appellate courts “will not reverse a district court’s ruling on the impeachment of a witness by prior conviction absent a clear abuse of discretion.” (quotation omitted).

“[T]he decision about what details, if any, to disclose about the conviction at the time of impeachment is a decision that remains within the sound discretion of the district court.” State v. Hill

In other words, any felony conviction is probative of a witness’s credibility.” State v. Hill

(4) the importance of the defendant’s testimony, and (5) the centrality of the credibility issue.” ().

(explaining that the fact that a witness has been convicted of a felony tends to prove a “genera l lack of respect for the law,” thus making that witness less credible; the court’s reasoning only makes sense if the fact of conviction tends to prove that the witness actually vio lated the law); St

An appellate court “will not reverse a district court’s ruling on the impeachment of a witness by prior conviction absent a clear abuse of discretion.” d 646, 651 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted).

” State v. Hill , (quoting State v. Jones , ).

If a court finds that “the prejudicial effect of disclosing the nature of a felony conviction outweighs its probative value, then it may still allow a party to impeach a witness with an unspecified felony conviction if the use of the unspecified convi ction satisfies the balancing test of Rule 609(a)(1).” State v. Hill , -53 (Minn. 2011).

-40 (Minn. 2016); -59 (Minn. 2011).

An appellate court “will not reverse a district court’s ruling on the impeachment of a witness by prior conviction absent a clear abuse of discretion.” d 646, 651 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted).