Cited by

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result 12 of the proceedings would have been different.” (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694)).

See Davis v. State, 7 (stating that allegations in a petition for postconviction relief must be more than argumentative assertations without factual support).

Gail v. State , (stating that ineffective assistance of counsel claims must contain more than “conclusory, argumentative assertions without factual support ”).

To prevail on such a claim, Salad must demonstrate that (1) “‘counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness’” and (2) there is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, ‘the result of the proceedings would have been different.’” d 369, 372 (Minn. 2020) ().

To prevail on such a claim, appellant must demonstrate (1) that “counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and (2) that there is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, ‘the result of the proceedings would have been different.’” ().

1 (2018); see also Davis v. State , (stating that a hearing is unnecessary if petitione r fails to allege facts sufficient to entitle him to relief).

(“We will not address that argument for the first time on appeal fro m a postconviction petition.”).

“An evidentiary hearing is unnecessary if the petitioner fails to allege fact s that are sufficient to entitle him or her to the relief requested.” Davis v. State , (M inn.

t consider issues raised for the first time on appeal, and “[i]t is well settled that a party may not raise issues for the first time on appeal from denial of postconviction relief.” (refusing to decide postconviction claims raised for the first time on appeal) (); (“We will not address [an] argument for the first time on appeal from a postconviction petition.”).

See Davis v. State , (affirming postconviction court’s rejection of ineffective -assistance-of- counsel claims that were based solely on “conclusory, argumentative assertions without 8 factual support”).

“We review postconviction decisions under the abuse -of-discretion standard of review.” Davis v. State

(citations omitted); Davis v. State , , 391 (Minn. 2010).

There is no abuse of discretion in a denial of postconviction claims presented “solely as c onclusory, argumentative assertions without factual support.” (Mi nn.

See Davis v. State , (stating that allegations in postconviction petition must be more than argumentative assertions lacking factual support).

(stating that allegations in a postconviction petition must be more than argumentative assertions without factual support).

(rejecting petitioner’s claim because it was based on “conclusory, argumentative assertions without factual support”).

“An evidentiary hearing is unnecessary if the petitioner fails to allege facts that are sufficient to entitle him or her to the relief requested.”

do not comprehend that a petitioner may have a full evidentiary hearing on the basis of bald assertions”); (requiring postconviction petition to include allegations that are not mere argumentative assertions without factual support).

In doing so, we review the postconviction court’s legal conclusions de novo, and its findings of fact for clear error