Cited by

See, d 32, 40 (Minn. 2011) (stating that disorderly conduct “may be committed when there is only one witness to the defendant’s conduct”); (holding that it may be enough to constitute disorderly conduct under a predecessor 9 statute “if the peace of only one member of the

to the defendant’s blood sample and test results and, consequently, the district court erred in suppressing such evidence at a pretrial hearing); Expose I, d at 259 (concluding that the district court abused its discretion in allowing the defendant’s therapist to testify at trial because such testimony was prohibited by the therapist-client privilege in subdivision 1(g)); (holding that the marital privilege in subdivision 1(a) did not prohibit the defendant’s wife from testifying against him at

I. “We review evidentiary rulings by a district court regarding the availability of a privilege established by statutory or common law for an abuse of discretion.”

(noting that the State has the burden of showing critical impact).

(noting that the State has the burden of showing critical impact).

d 32, 36 (Minn. 2011) (holding that state showed critical impact because suppression of wife’s statement bore directly on whether state could establish elements of disorderly conduct); (stating that district court’s suppression of confession “in .

P. 28.04, subd s. 1–2; State v. Zais , –36 (Minn. 2011); (“We strictly construe the rules governing appeals by the State in criminal cases because such appeals are not favored.”).

-36 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted).

(stating “the exclusion of evidence need not affect all charges against the defendant” and “[i]t is enough if the exclusion affects the State’s ability to prosecute a specific charge”).

See, (reviewing de novo a question of statutory interpretation arising from the district court’s evidentiary ruling in a criminal case); (holding that we review questions of statutory interpretation de novo).

3(c) (2018); see also State v. Zais , d 853, 861 (Minn. App. 2010) (stating that although unpublished opinions are not precedential, they may have persuasive value), aff’d

As we recognized in Murray, jury instruction guides are a resource for the district courts but do (Minn. App. 2010) (stating that unpublished cases, although not precedential, may have persuasive value), aff’d

“Conduct is disorderly in the ordinary sense when it is of such nature as to affect the peace and quiet of persons who may witness it and who may be disturbed or provoked to resentment.” (quotation omitted), aff’d

“We review evidentiary rulings by a district court regarding the availability of a privilege established by statutory or common law for an abuse of discretion.” ().

d 32, 35–36 (Minn. 2011).

(stating that unpublished cases, although not precedential, may have persuasive value), aff’d

When a pretrial order suppresses evidence in a criminal prosecution, the State must show that excluding the evidence “significantly reduces the likelihood of a successful prosecution.” (citations omitted).

3 n.1 (Minn. 2011) (quotations omitted).

To satisfy the critical-impact test, the state must show “clearly and unequivocally (1) that the district court’s ruling was erroneous and (2) that the ruling will have a critical impact on the [s]tate’s ability to prosecute the case.” (quotation omitted).

(stating that unpublished cases, although not precedential, may have persuasive value), aff’d