Cited by

The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that Second Amendment protection extends to “the rights of law-abiding, responsible citizens to possess a handgun in the home for purpose of self-defense, and is fully applicable to the State of Minnesota.”

There, existing Minnesota Supreme Court precedent that held that the statute was constitutional prior to Bruen, remained good law.

Although the standards are similar, “the state bears the burden of establishing that [an] error was harmless.” aff’d

(citing Minn. Const. art. VII, § 1); (recognizing that felons are traditionally prohibited from possessing firearms).

In response, in which the Minnesota Supreme Court held, in resolving an as -applied challenge, that section 624.713, subdivision 1(2), did not violate the appellant’s Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms.

(highlighting connection between drug transactions and firearms).

(noting that a prior conviction for felony fifth-degree controlled-substance possession “is defined by statute as a ‘crime of violence’” because “a substantial nexus exists between drugs and violence”).

The Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged that the Heller and McDonald decisions extended Second Amendment protection to “the rights of law -abiding, responsible citizens to possess a hand gun in the home for purpose of self -defense, and is fully applicable to the State of Minnesota.” 2 The supreme court added, “But the right secured by the Second Amendment is ‘not unlimited’ .

at 784, 786 n.4, under which the classification must be “substantially related to an important governmental objective,” (quotation omitted), aff’d, d 789 (Minn. 2013) .

The Second Amendment is “fully applicable to the State of Minnesota.”

See State v. Craig , , 793 (Minn. 2013) (declining to determine whether the language in question was dicta because the language reflected a well-reasoned and persuasive analysis).

See Flowers, d at 248; -66 (Minn. App. 2011), aff’d

" State v. Rey , , 493 (Minn. 2018) (quoting State v. Craig , , 791 (Minn. 2013) ).

State v. Craig , 469 -70 (Minn. App. 2011), aff’d on other grounds

See Sanchez v. Dahlke Trailer Sales, Inc. , , 277 n.9 (Minn. 2017) (noting the utility of applicable and persuasive dicta); State v. Craig , , 793 (Minn. 2013) (declining to determine whether language was dicta but nonetheless electing to follow its analysis because *742 it was "well-reasoned and persuasive authority").

See Sanchez v. Dahlke Trailer Sales, Inc., n.9 (Minn. 2017) (noting the utility of applicable and persuasive dicta)

We presume s tatutes are constitutional and will exercise our “power to declare a statute unconstitutional with extreme caution and only when absolutely necessary.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

d 789, 791 (Minn. 2013).

(noting that under the harmless-error analysis, the “state bears the burden of establishing that [an] error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”), aff’d

Here, the officers had a general description of Red Elk, for whom there was an active arrest warrant, as they approached a known “dope house.” In addition to the generally understood relatedness of drug dealing, weapons, and violence, United States v. Bustos-Torres, 396 F.3d 935, 943 (8th Cir. 2005), the officers had specific knowledge that a person they believed to be at the residence had a history of assaultive behavior involving weapons.

aff’d, d 789 (Minn. 2013); review denied (Minn. Dec.

See, e.g., Lemert, d at 232 n.3 (describing case in which supreme court “held that the police unlawfully seized the driver of a truck when they stopped the truck”); (stating that “[t]he officers stopped the car”); –44 (Minn. 2007) (referring to “[t]he two officers who stopped [a vehicle driven by defendant],” both of whom were in same squad car); cf. Conaway, d at 39 (reasoning that “in the context of a suppressi

(stating that the $75 public-defender copayment is “mandatory”), aff’d

aff’d, review denied (Minn. Dec.

Id.; aff’d, review denied (Minn. Dec.