Cited by

A state may create a liberty interest “by placing substantive limitations on official discretion” and “mandating the outcome to be reached upon a finding that the relevant criteria have been met.” Thompson, 490 U.S. at 462 (quotation omitted); (applying Thompson); (same); State ex rel.

(recognizing that section 518B.01 was enacted “for a remedial, nonpunitive purpose” of protecting victims of domestic abuse, and “not to punish abusers for their conduct.”).

(describing motion to vacate order for protection on constitutional grounds).

657 (Minn. 2012); In re Individual 35W Bridge Lit.

U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10; Minn. Const. art. 1, § 11; (“Both provisions prohibit laws that render an act punishable in a manner in which it was not punishable when it was 6 committed.” (quotation omitted)).

(stating that generally, a parent has a liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her children).

ing on the government officials’ direction that they could invoke the privilege against self- incrimination, each of the witnesses asserted the privilege and refused to answer the 9 “We generally do not construe the Minnesota Constitution to provide more protection for individual rights than the United States Constitution unless there is a principled basis to do so.” –95 (Minn. 2014) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Second, appellate courts analyze “whether the procedures followed by the government were constitutionally sufficient.” (quotation omitted).

401- 03; - 88 (Minn. 2014) (affirming district court’s exclusion of testimony refuting an allegation of a violation of an OFP as “irrelevant”); Doe 136 v. Liebsch, (stating “evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice” (qu

See Rew v. Bergstrom , (rejecting the appellant’s as -applied challenge on the ground that “the district court carefully crafted the specific terms and conditions of the extended [OFP] in light of the significant government interest at stake: the prevention of future of domestic abuse against [the respondent ],” and th

(concluding that constitutional protection against ex post facto laws does not apply to OFPs because they are civil remedies, not criminal penalties).

Miller observes that the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that courts must employ the same constitutional standard to an as- applied challenge to a statute as to a facial challenge, see, and points out that we applied strict scrutiny when we upheld section 211B.02 against a d 664, 668 (Minn. App. 2017).

The first step in determining whether the government has violated procedural due-process rights is to consider “whether the government has deprived the individual of a protected life, liberty, or property interest.”

“In general, prior restraints are viewed unfavorably under the First Amendment because they forbid certain communications before they occur, usually through the issuance of an administrative or judicial order.” Rew v. Bergstrom

d 764, 788 (Minn. 2014) (“District courts have broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence .

(“[P]arents have a fundamental liberty interest in the ca re, custody, and control of their children.”).

Prior restraints on speech, which “forbid certain communications before they occur, usually through the issuance of an administrative or judicial order,” are generally “viewed unfavorably under the First Amendment.”

“The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law that we review de novo.”

Isensee’s argument is a facial challenge to the constitutional validity of the statute, see Rew v. Bergstrom , - 85 (Minn. 2014) and the supreme court in Mrozinski held that “the Statute is not facially overbroad.” d at 247.

(Deny Petitions) (), rev. denied (Minn. Apr.

Rew v. Bergstrom , (setting forth analysis to determine whether ex post facto prohibition applies to civil- regulatory laws).

(“The fundamental requirements of due process are notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful ma nner.”).

“The free -speech protections of the Minnesota Constitution are coextensive with those of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.”

Appellate courts may decline to decide an issue when an appellant “has not provided an adequate record for appellate review .”

U.S. Const. art. I, § 10; Minn. Const. art. I, § 11; Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28, 101 S. Ct. 960, 964 (1981)

6 (Minn. 2014) (citing Schatz v. Interfaith Care Ctr.

These factors are “neither exhaustive nor dispositiv e; rather, they serve as usef ul guideposts to determine whether a statute creates a civil or criminal sanction.”

6a(b); (“Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd.

in which the supreme court rejected numerous constitutional challenges to the issuance of a 50-year HRO.

2 The United States and Minnesota Constituti ons “provide that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” (citing U.S. Const. amend.

In a procedural-due-process challenge, we first determine whether the government deprived a person of a protectable liberty interest, and, if so, we “determine whether the procedures followed by the government were constitutionally sufficient.” Rew v. Bergstrom , (quotation omitted).