Cited by

State v. Gunderson , (quotation omitted).

Circumstantial evidence of knowledge may include evidence that an individual was served with an order and that the terms of the order “clearly and unambiguously prohibit certain conduct.”

d 156, 159 (Minn. App. 2012).

But pattern instructions are “not precedential or binding” legal authority, State v. Gunderson , (quotation omitted), and Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd.

5(a), required defendants to know that they were violating registration statute to be convicted); 8 (distinguishing felony and misdemeanor harassment-restraining-order violations based on additional requirement that felony offenders “knowingly violate[]” existing restraining orders).

–64 (Minn. App. 2012); see also Minn. R. Crim.

ree with Anderson’s interpretation that the phrase “knowingly expect the presence of a child” means “aware of or believed in the probable or anticipated presence of a child.” (defining knowingly as a derivative of “know,” which means “to perceive directly; grasp in mind with clarity or certainty” (quotation omitted)); -61 (Minn. App. 2012) (applying the Model Penal Code definition of “knowingly”); The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 623 (5th ed. 2011) (defi ning “expect” as

(“[P]roof of knowledge may be by circumstantial evidence.”) ( (internal quotations omitted)).

3 When considering whether someone’s substantial rights were implicated, we consider fact ors such as the strength of the evidence against the defendant, the perv asiveness of the improper behavior, and whether the defendant had an opportunity to rebut the improper suggestions.

Knowledge may be proved by circumstantial evidence “ that an individual was served with ” a protective order with terms “clearly and unambiguously prohibit [ing] certain conduct.”

Unobjected -to jury instructions are reviewed by appellate courts for “plain error affecting substantial rights or an error of fundamental law.” State v. Gunderson , (quotation omitted).

which arose from a felony-level violation of an HRO, this court concluded th at the district court erred by not 12 instructing the jury on the “knowingly” element of th e offense.

State v. Gunderson , , 159 (Minn. App. 2012) .

Nonetheless, “a failure to object will not cause an appeal to fail if the instructions contain plain error affecting substantial rights or an error of fundamental law.” Id.; see also State v. Gunderson , (reviewing unobjected-to jury instructions for plain error).

State v. Taylor , (stating that pattern jury instructions are neither precedential nor binding).

(reviewing unobjected-to instructions for plain error).

-30 (Minn. 2013) (discussing the phrase “knowingly violates this subdivisi on” as it relates to violation of the DANCO statute); -61 (Minn. App. 2012) (discussing the phrase “knowingly violates ” as it relates to violation of an HRO).

d 156, 159 (Minn. App. 2012) (reviewing unobjected-to jury instructions for plain error).

(reviewing unobjected-to jury instructions for plain error).

Nonetheless, “a failure to object will not cause an appeal to fail if the instructions contain plain error affecting substantial rights or an error of fundamental law.” Id.; (reviewing unobjected-to jury instructions for plain error).

- 61 (Minn. App. 2012), Mikulak argues that, to prove a knowing violation of the statute, the state had to show not only that he knew that he was required to register, but that he also knew that his action, or inaction, violated the statute.