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Rather, we assess reasonableness through “an objective examination of the totality of the circumstances.” d 227, 230 (Minn. 2014).

“We evaluate whether a reasonable, articulable suspicion exists from the perspective of a trained police officer, who may make ‘inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person.”’ (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)).

(“Presence in a known drug house is a relevant, but not conclusive, factor” in reasonable-suspicion analysis); (concluding officer’s knowledge of defendant’s ties to drug-trafficking activities provided reasonable suspicion that defendant was armed and dangerous).

second basis for suspecting criminal drug activity was the car’s “short turnaround trip to the metro area,” which “stood out” to the deputy because “[a] lot of narcotics that come up to [that] area are from the metro.” We are mindful that reasonable suspicion must be evaluated from the perspective of a trained police officer, whose inferences may “elude an untrained person.” (quotation omitted).

Whether officers have reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct a pat-frisk is reviewed “from the perspective of a trained police officer, who may make inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person.’” (quotation omitted).

The reasonableness of an officer’s suspicions is judged by “an objective examination of the totality of the circumstances.”

The legality of a warrantless frisk for weapons “depends on an objective examination of the totality of the circumstances.”

And we consider reasonable suspicion from the perspective of a trained law-enforcement officer, whose inferences may “elude an untrained person.” (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)).

is generally unreasonable unless it falls within an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.”

(concluding officer’s knowledge of defendant’s ties to drug-trafficking activities provided reasonable suspicion that defendant was armed).

When evaluating reasonable suspicion, we do so from the perspective of a trained police officer, whose inferences may “elude an untrained person.” (quotation omitted).

“The legality of a pat search depends on an objective examination of the totality of the circumstances.”

When determining whether an officer reasonably suspected criminal activity and reasonably believe d a person might have been armed and dangerous , “our task is to determine whether, under the totality of the circumstances at the inception of the pat search, the officers had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that [defendant] might have been armed and dangerous.”

Although appellate courts frequently consider the actually articulated rationale that the seizing officer relied on for the stop, see, the more accurately described objective test is “whether a reasonable, articulable suspicion exists from the perspective of a trained police officer.” (emphasis added).

In doing so, the district court discussed caselaw concerning unlawful searches, and Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373 (1993).

State v. Lemert , d 227, 232–33 (Minn. 2014) (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996)).

We evaluate whether 6 reasonable suspicion exists from the perspective of a trained police officer, whose inferences may “elude an untrained person.” (quotation omitted).

Importantly, we consider reasonable suspicion from the perspective of a trained police 7 officer, whose inferences may “elude an untrained person.” State v. Lemert , (quoting United States v. Cortez , 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)).

A proper reasonableness analysis under the Fourth Amendment instead considers whether the “officer has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing” as derived from the totality of the circumstances, (emphasis added) (quotations omitted), not whether the acting officer actually relied on that objective basis.

A proper reasonableness analysis under the Fourth Amendment considers “whether the detaining officer has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing” as derived from the totality of the circumstances, (quotation omitted), not whether the detaining officer actually relied on that objective basis.

“The legality of a pat search depends on an objective examin ation of the totality of the circumstances.”

Askerooth, d at 368 (addressing the State’s argument that officer safety concerns made the expansion of a traffic stop reasonable, even though the officer “articulated no specific safety concerns during his testimony” because the “reasona bleness test is an objective test”); –31 (Minn. 2014) (stating that “the legality of a pat search” under Terry “depends on an objective ex amination of the totality of the circumstances,” rather than “the actual, subjective beliefs of the officer” (citation omi

We 8 The state cites three cases to support its position that officer safety concerns permit a search in the absence of reasonable suspicion: State v. Lemert

Shaka does not challenge the formal search of the master bedroom that occurred after S.S.

“We evaluate whether a reasonable, articulable suspicion exists from the perspective of a trained police officer, who may make ‘inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person.’” State v. Lemert , (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695 (1981)).

“We evaluate whether a reasonable, articulable sus picion [to conduct a pat-frisk] exists from the perspective of a trained police officer, who may make ‘inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person.’” (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695 (1981)).

We also note that the supreme court has recognized that a “substantial nexus exists between drug dealing and violence.” (citations omitted); see also State v. Ludtke , 3 (concluding frisk was justifiable where officer was alone on the highway with two people who possessed marijuana, one of whom was seen making a furtive movement in the back of the car).

And courts consid er this question “from the perspective of a trained police officer, who may make inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person.” State v. Lemert , (quotation omitted).

d 227, 231 (Minn. 2014) (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 (1996)).

–13 (Minn. App. 2012) (holding state trooper had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to perform an investigatory stop of vehicle after license -plate check revealed outstanding arrest warrant for registered owner); (“We evaluate whether a reasonable, articulable suspicion exists .

“The legality of a pat search depends on an objective examination of the totality of the circumstances.”

12 State v. Lemert , (quo tations and citations omitted), aff’d

“The protective pat search ‘must be strictly “limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others nearby.”’” d 227, 230 ( Minn. 2014) (quoting Minnesota v. Dickerson , 508 U.S. 366, 373, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1993) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 26, 88 S. Ct. at 1882)).

Because “a substanti al nexus exists between drug dealing and violence,” it is reasonable for police “to believe a person may be armed and dangerous when the person is suspected of being involved in a drug transaction.” United States v. Bustos -Torres, 396 F.3d 935, 943 ( 8th Cir. 2005)

This court considers the totality of the circumstances to determine “whether a reasonable, articulable suspicion exists from the perspective of a trained police officer, who may make inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person.” State v. Lemert , (quotation omitted) .

A protective pat search of a person’s outer clothing is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement if “the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person whom the officer has lawfully detained may be armed and dangerous.” (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26-27, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1882-83 (1968)).