Cited by

The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that although the decision to sequester witnesses is a “matter which is within the trial court’s discretion,” a request to sequester a witness “should rarely be denied.” Jones, d at 802; , 619 (Minn. 2013) ().

(noting that the “‘exclusion of witnesses from [the] courtroom [is] a time-honored practice designed to prevent the shaping of testimony by hearing what other witnesses say’”) (emphasis added) (quoting Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 281 n.4 (1989)).

“[P]hysical objects connected with a crime or which are the subject matter of an investigation are admissible, as are objects that connect the defendant to the crime scene.” (quotation omitted).

Finally, t he state argues that the evidence is admissible because it was part of the “crime scene.” The state cites cases that discuss the admissibility of objects connected to a crime scene, including State v. Hallmark

“[E]xclusion of witnesses from the courtroom is a time-honored practice designed to prevent the shaping of testimony by hearing what other witnesses say.” (quotation omitted).

at 552 (-21 (Minn. 2013) (concluding that removing the victim’s brother, who was on the witness list, from the courtroom was not a true closure); Brown, d at 617-18 (concluding that lo cking the courtroom doors during jury instructions was not a true closure); State v. Lindsey , -61 (Minn.

See, -21 (Minn. 2013) (concluding that removal of one v ictim’s brother, who was on witness list, was not true closure); Brown, d at 617-18 (concluding that locking of courtroom doors during jury instructions was not true closure); Lindsey, d at 660-61 (concluding that removal of two minor children

“because S pencer lacked probable cause to believe [he] had committed or was about to commit a crime,” he was subjected to “an unlawful de facto arrest when, moments after seizing him, Spencer search ed [him], handcuffed him, and confined him in a squad car.” 2 “[A] district court’s legal conclusions related to a Fourth Amendment search and seizure are reviewed de novo.”

State v. Zornes , , 624 (Minn. 2013) ("[T]he fact that the objects are not directly tied to a defendant only affects the weight of the evidence.").

(stating that admission of physical evidence will be upheld unless it constitutes an abuse of discretion).

3 State v. Zornes , , 621 (Minn. 2013).

needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Although a district court also has “substantial discretion to sequester witnesses from the trial process,” the district court here made no finding that A.W.

However, “if a witness is convicted again or sent back to prison, then the witness’s ‘history of lawlessness’ enhances an otherwise ‘stale’ conviction’s probative value.” cert.

In support, he cites to State v. Zornes , , 616 (Minn. 2013).

“A defendant has a constitutional right to present his version of events to a jury.”

State v. Zomes (Zomes I), -26 (Minn. 2013).

This reasoning comports with State v. Zornes, in which the supreme court noted that, “i f a witness is convicted again or sent back to prison,” the later event “enhances an otherwise stale conviction’s probative value.” (M inn.

See, (stating that Jones established “five factors relevant to determining if a prior conviction is more probative than prejudicial” ).

-27 (Minn. 2013) (applying Jones).

609(a)(1), (b); -27 (Minn. 2013).

“A defendant has a constitutional right to present [her] version of events to a jury.” State v. Zornes

609(a)(1), (b); -27 (Minn. 2013) (citing Minn. R. Evid.

But the supreme court has said that “any felony conviction is probative of a witness’s credibility because it allows the fact-finder to see the whole person and his general lack of respect for the law.” (internal quotations omitted).

Impeachment value of prior crime A felony conviction is probative of a witness’s credibility because it “allows the fact-finder to see the whole person and his general lack of respect for the law.” (quotations omitted); see also Flemino, d at 328 (concluding that a district court may permit the state to admit evidence of a prior controlled-substance conviction, despite criticism of the whole-person rationale).

(stating that Jones established “five factors relevant to determining if a prior conviction is more probative than prejudicial”); Swanson, d at 654 (noting the district court examines the Jones factors to determine if the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect).

(providing for impeachment by evidence of conviction of a crime “involv[ing] dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment” (emphasis added)); −27 (Minn. 2013) (stating that rule 609(a) standard “appl[ies] .

609(a)(1), (b); -27 (Minn. 2013).

Date of Conviction and Subsequent History “[A] history of lawfulness since a conviction can limit a conviction’s probative value; but, if a witness is convicted again or sent back to prison, then the witness’s history 8 of lawlessness enhances an otherwise stale conviction’s probative value.” (quotation marks omitted).

609(a)(1), (b); - 27 (Minn. 2013).