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Lueck relies on Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438 (2016), to support his constitutional argument.

Instead, it acknowledged that the 11 d 216 (Minn. 2016), the Minnesota Supreme Court “applied the rule announced in Birchfield to hold that the warrantless blood and urine test refusal convictions under Minnesota’s test refusal statute were unconstitutional.” Aili, d at 444–45.

“In determining whether exigent circumstances exist, courts follow a totality- of-the-circumstances approach.” (citing Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 149 (2013)).

12 a blood or urine test without a warrant violates the Fourth Amendment”); (holding “that the Fourth Amendment prohibits convicting Trahan for refusing the blood test requested of him absent the existence of a warrant or exigent circumstances”).

In support of this argument, he cites Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438 (2016)

to assess whether there was a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement sufficient to sustain test-refusal convictions.” d at 679, 684; see also Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438, 476-77 (2016) (holding that blood test-refusal statutes are valid only if law enforcement has a search warrant or a valid exception to the warrant requirement applies); (applying Birchfield and holding that the Fourth Amendment prohibits convictions for refusing a blood test requested by law enforcement

4 B. Second postconviction proceeding On June 5, 2019, Cibulka again petitioned for postconviction relief, asking the district court to vacate his 2012 conviction based on Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438 (2016), which together articulated the Birchfield rule.1 Cibulka contended the Birchfield rule applied retroactively to his conviction under Johnson I

The Birchfield rule rests on three opinions: (1) Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2185–86 (2016), which held the Fourth Amendment prohibits a driver from being convicted of refusing a blood test unless the officer obtained a search warrant or exigent circumstances justified a warrantless search; (2) which applied Birchfield to conclude Trahan could not be prosecuted for refusing to submit to an unconstitutional warrantless blood test; and (3) which extended Birchfield to warrantless

Johnson I and Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2185-86 (2016) .

He also agreed that, when the o fficers asked him to submit to chemical testing, “they knew [he had] been drinking based upon their observations.” In 2016, the United Stat es Supreme Court decided Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016)

On October 12, 2016, d 224 (Minn. 2016), and applied the rule 1 Respondents were charged and convicted under prior versions of section 169A.20, the test refusal statute, which criminalized a refusal to submit to a blood, breath, or urine test in accordance with Minn. Stat. §§ 16 9A.51–.52 (2020).

3 In 2017, Shaheed filed a postconviction petition, asserting that the Minnesota Supreme Court’s and State v. Thompson , rendered his conviction unconstitutional.

Whether the newly raised issue relate s to an issue actu ally raised in 6 She cites only State v. Trahan , aff’d, in support of this proposition.

See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2184 (2016)

(citing Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2186 (2016)).

On May 23, 2017, Fagin filed a rendered his test- refusal conviction unconstitutional.

2 In 2016, Ullrich petitioned for postconviction relief based upo n the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decisions in State v. Thompson , which held that a person may not be prosecuted for refusing to submit to a warrantless blood or urine test unless an exception to the warrant requirement is shown to apply.

See State v. Trahan , , 224 (Minn. 2016) (concluding driver could not be prosecuted for refusing to submit to unconstitutional warrantless blood test and that test-refusal statute was unconstitutional as applied); State v. Thompson , , 234 (Minn. 2016) (concluding driver could not be prosecuted for refusing to submit to unco

2160 , 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016) ; State v. Trahan , We recognize that Hunn is based on a prior version of Minnesota's implied-consent law, d at 821 , and that significant amendments were made to Minnesota's DWI and implied-consent laws in 2017.

2160 , 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016), and our decisions in State v. Trahan , and State v. Thompson , announced a new rule of constitutional law that applies retroactively to cases on collateral review.

Because the Supreme Court ’s decision in Birchfield v. North Dakota , 579 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016), d 216 (Minn. 2016), created a class of people constitutionally immune from p unishment, the rule announced by these cases is substantive and applies retroactively to final convictions on collateral review.

“The exigent circum stances exception to the warrant requirement applies when the exigencies of the situation make the ne eds of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” (quotations omitted).

State v. Trahan , 224 (Minn. 2016).

___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2184 (2016); (sam e).

But Brooks was decided prior to Thompson, (holding it is unconstitutional to prosecute a defendant for refusing a warrantless blood test), and those cases do not apply retroactively.

22, 2018) (Hooten, J., dissenting), that the new rules announced in State v. Trahan , are substantive as applied to the criminalization of test refusal, Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd.

-05 (Minn. App. 2015) (holding that a driver may not be prosecuted under test-refusal statute for refusing to submit to a warrantless blood test), aff’d, see 4 -80 (Minn. App. 2015) (holding that a driver may not be prosecuted under Minnesota’s test -refusal statute for re fusing to submit to a warrantless urine test), aff’d

1338 , 197 L.Ed.2d 520 (2017), aff'd on other grounds

20, 2 2017), regarding the search-incident- to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, are new rule s of federal constitutional criminal procedure t hat generally do not apply retroactively on collateral review of a final conviction.

Applying Johnson here, we hold that the district court correctly reasoned that, aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016), aff’d, d 216 (Minn. 2016), aff’d, 886 the advisory read to De Los Reyes inaccurately assumed the state’s authority to prosecute him for refusing to submit to a blood test.