Cited by

d 248, 267 (Minn. 2014).

Compelling circumstances may exist when “the sentence is disproportionate to the offense or unfairly exaggerates the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.”

and rejecting a plea based on a plausible but ultimately unsuccessful defense.” d 248, 268 (Minn. 2014).

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88 ; -67 (Minn. 2014).

(applying the Strickland test in a Minnesota criminal case); , 535 (Minn. App. 2017) (applying the two- prong test and not an abuse-of-discretion standard when an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim was brought on direct appeal).

(applying Strickland); (applying the two- prong test when an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim was brought on direct appeal).

“The objective standard of reasonableness is defined as representation by an attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances.” -67 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted).

C-1 912 – Milaca, (reversing Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals because it relied on a claim not raised on appeal to reverse compensation judge’s decision); n.4 (Minn. 2014) (“Because appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence that appellant was in or had just exited a motor vehicle, we do not address that issue.”); d 541, 551 n.4 (Minn. 2010) (noting that, because the parties did not raise an issue, the issue was not b

“The objective standard of reasonableness is defined as representation by an attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances.” –67 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted).

” -67 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted).

Appellate courts “afford the district court great discretion in the imposition of sentences and cannot substitute [their] judgment for that of the district court.”

“The objective standard of reasonableness is defined as representation by an attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney 19 would perform under similar circumstances.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

” 6-67 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted).

For the first prong, “ [t]he objective standard of reasonableness is defined as representation by an attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances.” 6-67 (Minn. 2014) (quotations omitted).

(“Generally, we will not review an ineffective -assistance-of-counsel claim that is based on trial strategy.”).

(“Generally, we will not review an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim that is based on trial strategy.

“The objective standard of reasonableness is defined as representation by an attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances.” − 67 (Minn. 2014) (quotations omitted).

“The objective standard of reasonableness is defined as representation by an attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances.” -67 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted).

A district court abuses its discretion if the instructions given to the jury “confuse, mislead, or materially misstate the law.”

Compelling circumstances may exist when the defendant’s “sentence is disproportionate to the offense or unfairly exaggerates the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.”

Compelling circumstances may exist when the defendant’s “sentence is disproportionate to the offense or unfairly exaggerates the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.”

“The objective standard of reasonableness is defined as representation by an attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances.” -67 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted).

A defendant has the burden to present “evidence to support a claim of self-defense, but once the defendant has 4 met that burden, the [s]tate has the burden of disproving one or more of the elements of the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.”

e Court has expressly held that a district court “did not abuse its discretion by imposing a longer sentence upon appellant after his trial and conviction,” reasoning that “[t]here are significant justifications for a sentencing judge to impose a more onerous sentence after trial than that received pursuant to a plea agreement.” State v. Vang, 7

d 248, 267 (Minn. 2014).

in which a defendant was convicted based on a guilty plea, was successful on appeal in invalidating the plea, was convicted a second time after a jury trial, and received a more onerous sentence than he previously had received.

466 U.S. at 687-88; -67 (Minn. 2014).

See Rhoades, d at 137-38; (noting that, appellate courts review the imposition of multiple and consecutive sentences when multiple victims are involved under the abuse-of-discretion standard, and multiple sentences will be upheld so long as they do not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the conduct); (“[Appellate courts] will not interfere with a district court’s discretion in sentencing unless the sentence is disproportionate to the offense or unfairly exaggerates the criminality of the def

“An error is plain if it is clear or obvious; usually this means an error that violates or contradicts case law, a rule, or an applicable standard of conduct.”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88; -67 (Minn. 2014).

However, Minn. Stat. §§ 260B.001-.446 (2022) carve out “a narrow category of cases from the subject matter jurisdiction of district courts and vest[] that jurisdiction exclusively in the juvenile court.”2

In assessing whether the representation by Winston’s counsel fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under the first prong of the Strickland test, we look to 6 whether his counsel performed to the standard of “an attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances.” -67 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted).

On appeal, we do not interfere with a district court’s discretion in sentencing “unless the sentence is disproportionate to the offense or unfairly exaggerates the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.”

An error is plain if “it is clear or obvious; usually this means an error that violates or contradicts caselaw, a rule, or an applicable standard of conduct.”

(“The determination of which defenses to raise represents an attorney’s trial strategy.”).

We “will not interfere with a district court’s discretion in sentencing unless the s entence is disproportionate to the offense or unfairly exaggerates the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.”

See Sanchez-Diaz v. State , (stating that appellate courts “will not review ineffective -assistance-of-counsel claims based on trial strategy ); (stating that trial strategy includes extent of counsel’s investigation); (“The determination of which defenses to raise represents an attorney’s trial strategy.”).

In determining whether a punishment is cruel under Article I, Section 5 , of the Minnesota Constitution, we “compare the gravity of the offense to the severity of the sentence.” 7 State v. Vang , (citation omitted) (internal quotaton marks omitted) .

(“We need not analyze both prongs if either one is determinative.”).

State v. Meyers , (reviewing length of sentencing departure); State v. Vang , (reviewing decision to impose consecutive sentences).

“The objective standard of reasonableness is defined as representation by an attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances.” State v. Vang , -67 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted).

d 665, 671 (Minn. 2020) ().

“T he objective standard of reasonableness is defined as representation by an attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perfo rm under similar circumstances.” -67 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted).