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Courts “review in effective assistance cl aims with a strong presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable.” Swaney v. State , d 207, 217 (Minn. 2016).

1 (2018); see Swaney v. State , d 207, 214 (Minn. 2016).

See, e.g. , Swaney v. State , (deciding that the interests -of-justice exception did not apply because the appella nt offered “no argument as to why his failure to raise this issue in his pro se brief on direct appeal was not deliberate and inexcusable”).

This decision will not be reversed “unless the [district] court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an error of law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.” Swaney v. State

See Swaney v. State , d 207, 217 (Minn. 2016).

Brocks v. State , , 675 (Minn. 2008) ; see also, e.g. , Swaney v. State , , 215 (Minn. 2016) (" Knaffla's interests-of-justice exception ...

“A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the case.”

Swaney v. State , n.7 (Minn. 2016).

Sullivan “must show that (1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”

“To prove ineffect ive assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show (1) that his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Swaney v. State

” Swaney v. State , (quotation omitted).

A claim may not be procedurally b arred (1) “if the claim involves an issue so novel that its legal basis was not reasonably available at the time of the direct appeal” or (2) if reviewing the claim would be in the interests of justice because it “has substantive merit and the petitioner d id not deliberately and inexcusably fail to raise the issue.” ; see also id .

(noting that claims based solely on events that occurred at or before trial are Knaffla-barred because these claims were or should have been known to the petitioner at the time of his direct appeal).

To 8 establish ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must demonstrate that “(1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standa rd of reasonableness and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”

“A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the case.”

d 207, 214 (Minn. 2016).