Cited by

P. 28.04 (describing prosecutor’s limited “right of appeal”); d 476, 481 (Minn. 2016) (“The [s]tate’s ability to appeal in a criminal case is limited.”).

But as a threshold matter, we must consider whether the state is entitled to appellate review because “[t]he [s]tate’s ability to appeal in a criminal case is limited.”

A. Critical Impact The state’s right to appeal is “strictly construed because such appeals are not favored.”

(considering appellant’s criminal history and change in supervisory status as two factors among others in a reasonable suspicion analysis), rev. denied (July 17, 2012); (“Arrests not resulting in conviction may be considered when the arrest was for an offense of the same general nature.”); (concluding that “the trial court properly considered [Lieberg’s criminal history] as one factor in the totality

4 The state’s right to appeal is “strictly construed because such appeals are not favored.”

“Whether there is reasonable suspicion is a mixed question of fact and constitutional law.”

Under this standard, trained police officers may “draw inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person.” State v. Lugo , (quotation omitted).

“[A] trained police officer is entitled to draw 7 inferences and deductions ‘that might well elude an untrained person.’” (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)).

d 476, 481 (Minn. 2016) (noting state’s right to appeal is “strictly construed because such appeals are not favored”).

8 a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” (quotation and citation omitted).

-87 (Minn. 2016) (reiterating that, when forming reasonable, articulable suspicion, an officer may “draw inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person,” though it requires “more than an unarticulated hunch” (quotations omitted)).

“Whether there is reasonable suspicion is a mixed question of fact and constitutional law.”

An exception to the warrant requirement permits a police officer to conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that 5 criminal activity is afoot.” (quotation and citation omitted).

d 697, 699-701, 706 (Minn. 2024) (defendant’s suspicious behavior, passenger’s suspicious explanations, physical indicia of passenger’s “prolonged drug use,” and officer’s observation of plastic bag possibly containing drugs); -88 (Minn. 2016) (defendant’s vehicle leaving known drug house, defendant’s recent arrest for drug possession, defendant’s untruthful statement, and defendant’s incriminating statement).

d 476, 488 (Minn. 2016) (reiterating that, when forming reasonable, articulable suspicion, an officer may “draw inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person,” though it requires more than an unarticulated hunch)(quotations omitted); (statin

“The State’s ability to appeal in a criminal case is limited.”

d 476, 481 (Minn. 2016).

We begin by noting that, as a general matter, the state may obtain appellate review of a pre-trial order only if the order, if not reversed, would have a “critical impact on the outcome of the trial.” (quotation omitted); see also Minn. R. Crim.

Before the time for appellate briefing, Enno moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the state cannot show that the suppression order, if not reversed, would have a “critical impact on the outcome of the trial.” (quotation omitted); see also Minn. R. Crim.

“It is enough that a law enforcement officer can articulate specific facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, objectively support the officer’s suspicion.”

The standard for reasonable suspicion is not high, and the standard is met when a police officer “can articulate specific facts which, taken together with 3 rational inferences from those facts, objectively support the officer’s suspicion.”

(“Presence in a known drug house is a relevant, but not conclusive, factor” in reasonable-suspicion analysis);2 Askerooth, d at 369 (supporting officers’ training and experience 2 Because officer J.H.

-87 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted).

An officer must “articulate specific facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, objectively support the officer’s suspicion.”

“Whether there is reasonable suspicion is a mixed question of fact and constitutional law.”