Cited by

A. As a threshold matter, we note that the state may obtain appellate review of a pre- trial order only if the order, if not reversed, would have a “critical impact on the outcome of the trial.” (quotation omitted); see also Minn. R. Crim.

The standard for reasonable suspicion is not high, and the standard is met when a police officer “can articulate specific facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, objectively support the officer’s suspicion.”

d 476, 481 (Minn. 2016).

“Searches and seizures conducted without warrants are presumptively unreasonable.” .

For that reason, “[i]t is enough that a law enforcement officer can articulate specific facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, objectively support the officer’s suspicion.” (emphasis added).

“Searches and seizures conducted without warrants are presumptively unreasonable.”

IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10; d 476, 486 (Minn. 2016).

Warrantless searches and seizures are “presumptively unreasonable.” 486 (Minn. 2016).

d 476, 481 (Minn. 2016) (citation omitted).

Reasonable suspicion is “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person 10 stopped of criminal activity.” (quotation omitted).

(“It is enough that a law enforcement officer can articulate specific facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, objectively support the officer’s suspicion.”).

In this way, in which the appellant was seen leaving a drug house, took an unusually long time to stop, and had recently been arrested for a drug crime.

“It is enough that a law enforcement officer can articulate specific fac ts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, objectively support the officer ’s suspicion.”

-87 5 (Minn. 2016) (noting that an appellate court can consider the merits of the state’s pretrial appeal if the state establishes critical impact).

Nevertheless, “[p]resence in a known drug house is a relevant, but not conclusive, factor for an officer to consider.”

15 in a known drug house is a relevant, but not conclusive, factor for an officer to consider.” 7 (Minn. 2016) (citing Illinios v. Wardlow , 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000)).

See District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 588 (2018); (stating courts must consider “the whole picture” when applying the totality-of-the-circumstances test for reasonable suspicion (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 -18, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695 (1981))).

An of ficer must “articulate specific facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, objectively support the officer ’s suspicion.”

(considering recent arres t on a similar charge as contributing to reasonable suspicion); accord State v. Holiday , (stating that a person’ s criminal record may contribute to probable cause).

2; -86 (Minn. 2016); State v. McLeod

See State v. Lugo , (defining reasonable suspicion as “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person st opped of criminal activity”).