Cited by

See Burkstrand v. Burkstrand , (“When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it is assumed to manifest legislative intent and must be given effect.”).

(explaining that the domestic-abuse act “was enacted in 1979 to provide an efficient remedy for victims of abuse as an alternative to other available legal remedies”).

3 Lastly, we conclude that the district court’s decision is consistent with the purpose of the Act, which is “to provide speedy, effective relief to victims of domestic abuse.” (describing the Act as a “remedy for victims of abuse”).

d 206, 210 (Minn. 2001).

Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2022); Goodman v. Best Buy, Inc., (“In reading the statute, it is necessary to consider not only the bare meaning of the word or phrase, but also its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme.” (quotation omitted)); (explaining that when statutory language is silent, courts consider other factors to interpret its meaning, including the statute’s purpose).

v. Comm ’r of Revenue , - 83 (Minn. 2005)

“When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it is assumed to manifest legislative intent and must be given effect.”

“When th e language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it is assumed to manifest legislative intent and must be given effect.”

A. The purpose of the Domestic Abuse Act is “to provide speedy, effective relief to victims of domestic abuse.”

“When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it is assumed to manifest legislative intent and must be given effect.” Burkstrand v. Burkstrand

“When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it is assumed to manifest legislative intent and must be given effect.”

In support of his argument, Jazdzewski cites the supreme court’s 2001 decision in Burkstrand v. Burkstrand

see Henderson, 562 U.S. at 436, 131 U.S. at 1203 (explaining that, when d etermining whether a procedure or rule is jurisdictional, courts consider whether there is any clear indication that the legislature intended the rule 12 to be jurisdictional).

“When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it is 7 assumed to manifest legislative intent and must be given effect.”

“When the language of a statute 5 is plain and unambiguous, it is assumed to manifest legislative intent and must be given effect.”

*691 Burkstrand v. Burkstrand , , 210 (Minn. 2001).

(subject-matter jurisdiction is reviewed de novo).

is a fundamental difference between finding that a deadline is mandatory and concluding that it operates to take away the district court’s authority to act”); (holding that “60-day time limit for hearing new trial [or] amended findings motions is a procedural tool and does not divest the district court of jurisdiction”); (holding that district court’s failure to hold hearing within statutory' timé frame did not divest it of subject .matter jurisdiction over petition seeking order for protection)

“When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it is assumed to manifest legislative intent and must be given effect.”

-85 (Minn.2015); see also Allan, d at 33 (“When the language of a statute is plain'and unambiguous, it is assumed‘to manifest legislative intent and must be given effect.”) ().

“When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it is assumed to manifest legislative intent and must be given effect.”

“When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it is assumed to manifest legislative intent and must be given effect.”

8 assumed to manifest legislative intent and must be given effect.”

25, 2003), but we review statutory interpretation de novo, d 206, 209 (Minn. 2001).

9 (stating that “[w]hen interpreting the statutes, it is our role to rely on what the Legislature intended over what may appear to be supported by public policy”).

“When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it is assumed to manifest legislative intent and must be given effect.”