Cited by

(stating that appellant “must point to [circumstances proved] that [are] consistent with a rational theory other than guilt”).

See Firkus, d at 483 (“[W]e will not reverse a conviction based on mere conjecture.”) (quotation omitted); (stating appellant 9 “must point to evidence in the record that is consistent with a rational theory other than guilt” to successfully challenge guilty verdict based on circumstantial evidence).

“[T]o succeed in a challenge to a verdict based on circumstantial evidence, a convicted person must point to evidence in the record that is consistent with a rational theory other than guilt.”

See 10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 3.08 (2024) ().

“Inconsistencies in the state’s case or possibilities of innocence do not require reversal of a jury verdict so long as the evidence taken as a whole makes such theories seem unreasonable.”

(noting that, for an inference to be rational, appellant must point to evidence in the record that is consistent with a rational theory other than guilt).

(noting that, for an inference to be rational, appellant must point to evidence in the record that is consistent with a rational theory other than guilt).

However, “to succeed in a challenge to a verdict based on circumstantial evidence, a convicted person must point to evidence in the record that is consistent with a rational theory other than guilt.”

Al-Naseer, d at 480; see also Tscheu, d at 858; State v. 8 Ostrem, (noting that, for an inference to be rational, the appellant must point to evidence in the record that is consistent with a theory other than guilt).

“To impose liability under the aiding and abetting statute, the state must show some knowing role in the commission of the crime by a defendant who takes no steps to thwart its completion.” (quotation omitted); see also Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd.

(a hypothesis is not rational unless the appellant points to evidence in the record that is consistent with a theory other than guilt).

See Al-Naseer, d at 473 (“We will not overturn a conviction based on circumstantial evidence on the basis of mere conjecture.” (quotation omitted)); (noting that a successful challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence must be based on evidence in the record).

And “to succeed in a challenge to a verdict based on circumstantial evidence, a convicted person must point to evidence in the record that is consistent with a rational theory other than guilt.”

(citing Simmons, 390 U.S. at 381).

ant did not show evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict where it was theoretically possible that a third person was involved in and committed the crime, but there was physical forensic evidence connecting the appellant to the victim and the appellant pointed to no physical evidence in the record to provide reasonable support for his alternative hypothesis); d 916, 923 (Minn. 1995) (noting that a successful challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence must be based on evidence in the re

d 916, 921 (Minn. 1995).

See Balandin , d at 217 (explaining that our standard of review requires us to “assume the fact -finder disbelieved any testimony conflicting with [its] verdict”); State v. Ostrem , (explaini ng that we view “the evidence in the light most favorable to the state,” when concluding sufficient evidence supported a conviction, despite the presence of conflicting evidence); State v. Bliss , (“Defendant’s attempt to retry his case by asking us to

“The first inquiry focuses on whether the procedure was unnecessarily suggestive.” ().

See Manson, 432 U.S. at 104, 97 S. Ct. at 2248 (condemning single-photo lineups); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 383–84, 88 S. Ct. 967, 971 (1968) (discouraging use of single photo); d 916, 921 (Minn. 1995) (presuming unnecessary suggestiveness of single-photo lineup and observing that courts “have [] widely condemned” this approach).

The evidence must allow a reasonable inference that the 6 defendant’s presence “is intended to and does aid the primary actors.” -25 (Minn. 1995) (quotations omitted).

The Minnesota Supreme Court has “long he ld that aiding and abetting is not a separate substantive offense.” (“It is undisputed that aiding and abetting is not a separate substantive offense.”); Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd.