Cited by

See State v. Ostrem , (holding that “[m]ere presence at the scene of a crim e does not alone prove th at a person aided or abetted, because inaction, knowledge, or passive acquiescence does not rise to the level of criminal culpability”).

Presence “does not alone prove that a person aided or abetted, because inaction, knowledge or passive acquiescence does not rise to the level of criminal culpability.” (M inn.

A person’s mere presence at the scene of a crime is insufficient to prove liability “because inaction, knowledge, or passive acquiescence does not rise to the level of criminal culpability.” see also Mahkuk, d at 682 (stating that “to prove that [the defendant] aided and abetted the shooting and killing of the two victims, the state was required to prove more than [the defendant’s] intentional presence at the scene of the crime”).

While more is required of the defendant than inaction or “passive approval,” Hawes, d at 673, “active participation in the overt act which constitutes the substantive offense is not required.”

A procedure is unnecessarily suggestive if “the defendant was u nfairly singled out for identification.”

13 “To impose liability under the aiding and abetting statute, the state must show some knowing role in the commission of the crime by a defendant who takes no steps to thwart its completion.” (quotation omitted).

The latter does not, by itself, prove that a person is an accomplice because “inaction, knowledge, or passive acquiescence does not rise to the level of criminal culpability.” State v. Ostrem

d 916, 921 (Minn. 1995).

See Manson v. Brathwaite , 432 U.S. 98, 110, 97 S. Ct. 2243, 2251 (1977); State v. Ostrem , 21 (Minn. 1995).

(stating that accomplice crimes contain elements distinct from the elements of the underlying offense).

However, “possibilities of innocence do not require reversal of a jury verdict so long as the evidence taken as a whole makes suc h theories seem unreasonable.” State v. Ostrem

d 916, 921 (Minn. 1995).

” See State v. Ostrem , (providing the rule 17.05 “two -step process”).

“M ere presence at the scene of a crime does not alone prove that a pe rson aided or abetted.” State v. Ostrem

However, “possibilities of innocence do not require reversal of a jury verdict so long as the evidence taken as a whole makes such theories seem unreasonable.”

“[T]he [fact-finder] is free to question a defendant’s credibility, and has no obligation to believe a defendant’s story.”

“Mere presence at the scene of a crime does not alone prove that a person aided or abetted.”

“To impose liability under the aiding and abetting statute, the state must show some knowing role in the commission of the crime by a defendant who takes no steps to thwart its completion.” (quotation omitted).

in order to prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant, it must be shown that the amendment either added or charged a different offense.” Gerdes, d at 712; (quoting the above quoted passage in Gerdes in 1995).

But under the second prong of the test, even unnecessarily suggestive show-up evidence is reliable if “the totality of the circumstances shows the witness’ identification has adequate independent origin.”

“To impose liability under the aiding and abetting statute, the state must show some knowing role in the commission of the crime by a defendant who takes no steps to thwart its completion.” (quotation omitted).

Additionally, the “possibilities of innocence do not require reversal of a jury verdict so long as the evidence taken as a whole makes such theories seem unreasonable.”