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“In closing arguments, counsel has the right to present to the jury all legitimate arguments on the evidence, to analyze and explain the evidence, and to present all proper inferences to be drawn therefrom.” (“While the state’s argument need not be colorless, it must be based on the evidence 2 Milhausen did not renew his objection at the time the state offered the unredacted warrant of commitment.

In closing arguments, the state has “the right to present to the jury all legitimate arguments on the evidence, to analyze and explain the evidence, and to present all proper inferences to be drawn therefrom.”

“In closing arguments, counsel has the right to present to the jury all legitimate arguments on the evidence, to analyze and explain the evidence, and to present all proper inferences to be drawn therefrom.” (“While the state’s argument need not be colorless, it must be based on the evidence produced at trial, or the reasonable inferences from that evidence.” (quotation omitted)).

22 “[T]he prosecutor and the defense have considerable latitude in closing argument, for neither is required to make a colorless argument.”

To begin, a prosecutor need not make a “colorless argument,” State v. Smith , however, a prosecutor’s argument must comport with certain standards of conduct.

Prosecutors have “considerable latitude in closing argument” and are not “required to make a colorless argument.” State v. Smith , 4 “Rambo” appears to refer to John Rambo, the titular character in an American action film series.

Prosecutors have “considerable latitude in closing argument” and are not “required to make a colorless argument.”

13 In closing arguments, the state has “the right to present to the jury all legitimate arguments on the evidence, to analyze and explain the evidence, and to present all proper inferences to be drawn therefrom.”

5 Prosecutors have “considerable latitude in closing argument” and are not “required to make a colorless argument.”

Burden of Proof Prosecutors have “considerable latitude in closing argument” and are not “required to make a colorless argument.”

Prosecuting attorneys have “considerable latitude in closing argument” and are not “required to make a colorless argument.”

(explaining that the prosecution and the defense have “considerable latitude in closing argument” and have “the right to present to the jury all legitimate arguments on the evidence, to analyze and explain the evidence, and to present all proper inferences to be drawn therefrom”).

[and] all proper inferences to be drawn therefrom.”

A prosecutor is permitted “to present to the jury all legitimate arguments on the evidence” and “to present all proper inferences to be drawn therefrom.” - 53 (Minn. App. 2008), rev. denied (Minn. Sept.

See, (denying a new trial on the ground of prosecutorial misconduct when a reasonabl e jury would not have reached a different result if it had learned of state’s witness’s plea bargain, when the witness’s credibility had been impeached by other methods).

We give a prosecutor considerable latitude 14 during closing argument because a prosecutor need not “make a colorless argument.” .

Ultimately, it is within a prosecutor’s “right to present to the jury all legitimate arguments on the evidence, to analyze and explain the evidence, and to present all proper inferences to be drawn therefrom.”

However, a prosecutor has “considerable latitude” during a closing argument and need no t 18 make a “colorless argument.” State v. Smith

Prosecutors may present “legitimate arguments on the evidence, to analyze and explain the evidence, and to present all proper inferences to be drawn therefrom,” but it is “unprofessiona l conduct for the prosecutor intentionally to misstate the evidence or mislead the jury as to the inferences it may draw.” (citation omitted).

“[T]he prosecutor and the defense have considerable latitude in closi ng argument, for neither is required to make a colorless argument.”

It is true that “the prosecutor and the defense have considerable latitude in closing argument, for neither is required to make a colorless argument.”

B. Closing argument “[T]he prosecutor and the defense have considerable latitude in closing argument, for neither is required to make a colorless argument.”

d 584, 589 (Minn. 1996).

Prosecutors may present “legitimate arguments on the evidence, to analyze and 8 explain the evidence, and to present all proper inferences to be drawn therefrom,” but it is “unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor intentionally to misstate the evidence or mislead the jury as to the inferences it may draw.” (citation omitted).

present all proper inferences to be drawn therefrom.”

(holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Spreigl evidence to show that the defendant intentionally participated in a robbery, rather than firing his weapon in self-defense).

We have explained that “particular cruelty” involves the gratuitous infliction of pain and cruelty “ ‘of a kind not usually associated with the commission of the offense in question.’ ” (); (noting that “particular cruelty” involves gratuitous infliction of pain).

An appellate court will reverse a conviction, or reverse the district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial, on the ground of prosecutorial misconduct only if the misconduct was “inexcusable and so serious and prejudicial that a defendant’s right to a fair trial [was] denied.”

(finding particular cruelty where victim “was knocked unconscious by the first blow and that when he regained consciousness he was being punched and kicked.”).

This court will reverse a conviction on the ground of pros-ecutorial misconduct only if the misconduct was “inexcusable and so serious and prejudicial that a defendant’s right to a fair trial is denied.” (citation omitted).

rious than that typically involved in the commission of the crime in question” (emphasis added) (quotations omitted)); (stating court “should consider whether the defendant’s conduct was significantly more or less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the crime in question” (emphasis added) (quotation omitted)); (stating district court must look to see “whether a defendant’s conduct was significantly more or less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the c