Cited by

(- 17 (Minn. 1999); -07 (Minn. App. 2019); ).

Legislation will be upheld on rational- basis review if (1) “the objective of the law is permissible,” (2) “the means chosen to achieve that objective are reasonable,” and (3) “the legislative body did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in enacting the law.” Fletcher Props., Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 9 (-18 (Minn. 1999)).

(applying rational basis review because Holloway’s claim did not implicate a fundamental right); (holding that the predatory-offender-registration statute requiring that a person “charged with”—but not convicted of—a predatory offense, but convicted of another offense arising out of the same circumstances, must register as a predatory offender does not implicate a person’s fundamental right t

-19 (Minn. 1999); Werlich, d at 362 (reaffirming use of the “stigma-plus” test).

” -16 (Minn. 1999) (footnote omitted) (citing 1993 Minn. Laws ch. 326, art. 10, § 1, at 2090).

See Boutin v. LaFleur , -18 (Minn. 1999) (separately addressing due-process claims based on procedural violations and substantive rights).

The Due Process Clause prohibits “certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions, regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990)).

“[W]e ‘exercise our power to declare a statute unconstitutional with extreme caution and only when absolutely necessary.’ ” Fletcher Props., Inc. v. City of 13 Minneapolis, ().

If the statute implicates a fundamental right, the court applies strict-scrutiny review and “the state must show a legitimate and compelling interest for abridging that right.”

When a fundamental right is at stake, appellate courts apply the strict-scrutiny test to substantive-due-process challenges under which “the state must show a legitimate and compelling interest for abridging that right.”

-18 (Minn. 1999) (addressing separately the defendant’s due-process claims based on procedural violations and violations of substantive due- process rights).

Under this test, a liberty interest is implicated when “a loss of reputation is coupled with the loss of some other tangible interest.” (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710 (1976)).

Fletcher Props., d at 10; 718 (Minn. 1999).

If a procedural- due-process claim is asserted by a person required to register as a predatory offender

See Sawh, d at 632 (setting forth two -step process that considers “whether the government has deprived the indi vidual of a protected life, liberty, or property interest” and if so, whether the government’s procedures were constitutionally sufficient); 8 (Minn. 1999) (applying the “stigma -plus” test, which provides that “a liberty interest is implicated when a loss of reputation is coupled with the loss of some other tangible interest”).

Rational-basis review “requires only that th e statute not be arbitrary or capricious; in other words, the statute must provide a reasonable means to a permissible objective.”

To establish that the imposition of mandatory registration results in a procedural due-process violation, appellant must first demonstrate that he possesses “a protectable liberty interest [that] is at stake.”

-15 (Minn. 1999); (reviewing de novo the application of section 243.166 to undisputed facts).

“[T]he primary purpose of [Minn. Stat. § 243.166] is to create an offender registry to assist law enforcement with investigations.”

Boutin v. LaFleur , does not foreclose constitutional challenges to th e consequences resu lting from registration as a predatory offender when the Legislatur e has expanded the requirements and consequences of that registration beyond those considered in that decision.

The Due Process Clauses of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions provide that the government cannot deprive a person of “life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” (quoting U.S. Const. amends.

Because statutes are presumed constitutional, we “exercise our power to de clare a statute unconst itutional with extreme caution and only when ab solutely necessary.” Boutin v. Lafleur

“Where no fundamental right is at stake, judicial scrutiny is not exacting and substantive due process requires only that the statute not be arbitrary or capricious; in other words, the statute must provide a reasonable means to a permissible objective.” Boutin v. LaFleur

Boutin v. LaFleur , , 716 (Minn. 1999).

Boutin v. LaFleur , , 716 (Minn. 1999).

Boutin v. LaFleur , , 714 (Minn. 1999) (citing In re Haggerty , , 364 (Minn. 1989) ).

" Boutin v. LaFleur , , 716 (Minn. 1999) (quoting Zinermon v. Burch , 494 U.S. 113 , 125, 110 S.Ct.

’ ” Boutin v. LaFleur , (quoting Zinermon v. Burch , 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990)); see U.S. Const. amends.

If a statute implicates a fundamental right, “the state must show a legitimate and compelling interest for abridging that right.” 1 Collier did not present a due-process challenge in his petition, but he reserved his right to raise substantive and procedural due-process challenges on appeal.

ANALYSIS “The interpretation of statutes is a question of law which we review de novo.”

Excluding a correctional facility from the definition of primary residence would not only be contrary to the legislature’s intent, but it would also be contrary to the primary purpose of Minn. Stat. § 243.166 (2012) because “the primary purpose of the statute is to create an offender registry to assist law enforcement with investigations.”