Cited by

cmt; see also State v. DeWald , (determining that an officer’s opinion testimony that the defendant killed the victim was admissible because it was “factual rather than legal”).

cmt; see also State v. DeWald , (holding that an officer’s opinion testimony that the defendant killed the victim was admissible because it was “factual rather than legal”).

See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009) (search of vehicle incident to lawful-arrest exception); Lester, d at 771 (automobile exception); State v. DeWald , (instrumentality-of-a-crime exception related to vehicles).

cmt; see also State v. DeWald , (holding that an officer’s opinion testimony that the defendant killed the victim was admissible because it was “factual rather than legal”).

“‘[U] ltimate conclusion testimony which embraces legal conclusions or terms of art’ is not considered helpful to the jury.” (), rev. denied (Minn. Nov.

7 It is true that “‘[u]ltimate conclusion testimony which embraces legal conclusions or terms of art’ is not helpful to the jury.” (), rev. denied (Minn. Nov.

“Probable cause exists where the facts available to the officer would warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of crime.” (quotation omitted).

In presenting opening and closing statements, prosecutors must not “inflame the passions of the jury or prejudice the jury against the defendant.” -45 (Minn. 1990).

oughout the trial, and the jury’s split verdict—finding Williams guilty of the significant-relationship criminal-sexual-conduct charge but not guilty of the mentally impaired/physically helpless charge—serves “ as an ‘indicat[ion] that the members of the jury were not unduly inflamed by the prosecutor’s comments .’” (d 741, 745 (Minn. 1990)).

A closing argument “should be based on the evidence presented at trial and inferences reasonably drawn from that evidence.” 13 (Minn. 1990).

Opinion testimony on an ultimate issue is inadmissible when it “embraces legal conclusions” or “render[s] a determination as to whether a defendant’s conduct falls within a legal standard.” rev. denied (Minn. Sept.

–48 (Minn. 1990) (holding that evidence that was not listed in a warrant pertaining to a separate homicide investigation was properly admitted under the plain view exception to the particularity requirement because its incriminating nature was immediately apparent when police executed that warrant).

(stating that “[w]here the jury has acquitted the appellant of some counts, but convicted the appellant of others, we view the verdicts as an ‘indica[tion] that the members of the jury were not unduly’ ” influenced by the trial error (second alteration in original) ().

The cited authorities on the role of a split verdict in the plain-error test, however, concern whether jurors were “unduly inflamed by the prosecutor’s comments.” ().

(explaining that expert testimony that “embraces legal conclusions or terms of art” is not admissible); 6 (stating that “ultimate conclusion testimony which embraces legal conclusions or terms of art is not considered helpful to the

“Probable cause exists where ‘the facts available to the officer would warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of crime.’” (quoting Texas v. Brown , 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983).

Testimony as to the ultimate issue in a case, by either expert or lay witnesses, is not objectionable unless the testimony is “conc lusion testimony which embraces legal conclusions.” State v. DeWald

Opinion testimony on an ultimate issue is unhelpful, however, if it “embraces legal conclusions or terms of art” and thus is inadmissible.

1992) (discussing in admissible psychiatric opinion on defendant’s criminal intent); State v. DeWald , (determining whether officer offered a legal or factual conclusion); (“An expert witness may not offer an opinion as 9 to a defendant’s intent.”), review denied (Minn. Apr.

(officer testified 7 that he believed defendant killed the victim but avoided legal term “murder”); Patzold, d at 808 (officers testified based on their “own perceptions” that they believed assault occurred).

See, -02 (Minn. 1992) (rejecting expert psychiatric opinion for embracing issue of criminal intent); (explaining that testimony should not embrace “legal conclusions or terms of art”).

“A number of factors may be examined in determining whether the information supporting a search warrant is stale.” State v. DeWald

A key factor in considering staleness is “whether the property sought is easily disposable or transferable.”

Information supporting probable cause may not be stale “even after the passage of several months where the items sought are of enduring utility to their taker.” (quotation omitted).

Factors to be considered in determining whether information contained in a search- warrant affidavit is stale include: “the age of the person giving the information , whether there is any indication of ongoing criminal activity, whether the items sought are innocuous or incriminating , and wh ether the property sought is easily disposable or transferable.” State v. DeWald

See State v. DeWald , -47 (Minn. 1990) (concluding that information concerning defendant ’s possession of kitchen knives 22 days earlier was not stale); 92-94 (Minn. App. 1984) ( concluding that information concerning defendant’s possession of sexually explicit photographs of minors two years

State v. DeWald , , 744 (Minn. 1990).

d 741, 745 (Minn. 1990) (stating the acquittal of some charges demonstrates that the jury considered the evidence in a case conscientiously and the jury was not “unduly inflamed” by information regarding the defendant’s history.)

“A prosecutor’s closing argument should be based on the evidence presented at trial and inferences reasonably drawn from that evidence.”