Cited by

In doing so, : (1) there is no Confrontation Clause issue because the declarant testifies, admits to making the prior statement, and is available for cross-examination by the defense counsel; (2) the statement is recorded, removing any real dispute about what the declarant said; (3) the statement is against the d

And the supreme court has held that in some cases, when evidence admitted for impeachment purposes is independently admissible as substantive evidence, the “defendant has no legitimate cause to complain.” -44 (Minn. 1985) (holding that a prior inconsistent statement introduced for impeachment purposes could be properly considered as substantive evidence because the statement was independently admissible as substantive evidence).

Vangrevenhof, d at 736 n.1

at 293 (citing State v. Ortlepp , ); see also Robinson, d at 408 (clarifying that Ortlepp ’s four factors are nonexclusive and merely an application of the totality- of-circumstances standard).

The rule articulated in Dexter—–43 (Minn. 1985)—applies when evidence of an inconsistent statement is admitted to impeach a witness’s’ credibility.

The district court’s failure to hold a hearing, even if erroneous, is harmless for the same reason.6 d 39, 44–45 (Minn. 1985) (noting that a harmless-error standard of review applies to a failure to hold a hearing and to prevail a defendant must show that the hearing would have benefitted 6 Although we have discussed hearings to establish foundational reliability, we have never held that such hearings are required i

the supreme court held even if the state is precluded from calling a witness pursuant to Dexter, the state may still offer the witness’s testimony as substantive evidence if an exception to the hearsay rule applies.

First, he argues that a Dexter violation occurred, relying on the language of State v. Ortlepp that, when it is clear that a witness recants early on in his testimony, “there is a large risk that the jury, even if properly instructed, will consider the prior statement as substantive evidence.”

See State v. Ortlepp , -45 (Minn. 1985) (holding that the failure to hold a hearing was harmless in part because defendant did not demonstrate that the hearing would have benefitted him).

See id.; see also, -10 (Minn. 2006) ( affirming as harmless error the admission of evidence under an improper hearsay exception because the evidence was admissible under a different exception not mentioned by the district court); -44 (Minn. 1985) (affirming where a statement was inappropriately admitted under an impeachment exception but was admissible under the residual exception); -14 (Minn. App. 2001) (upholding the district court’s admission of out-of-court statements because, contrary to th

Gotchie’s initial argument is that the district court erred in in placing “exclusive reliance” on the factors from State v. Ortlepp , -44 (Minn. 1985), in determining the trustworthiness of the out-of-court statements.

See State v. Ortlepp , ( noting that statement was more reliable because it was made against declarant’s penal interest) ; see also Davis, d at 537 (stating that “declarant’s relationship to the parties” is relevant to statement’s trustworthiness).

44 (Minn. 1985); see also State v. Martinez , –38 (Minn. 2007).

d 39, 42–43 (Minn. 1985).

(holding that witness’s prior inconsistent statement was admissible under catchall exception of Minn. R. Evid.

Instead, he argues that based on the Ortlepp factors, P.J.C.’s statement was unreliable because (1) she was not subject to “meaningful cross- 13 examination” since her testimony did not cover the details of the alleged sexual abuse; (2) the statement was “not against her penal interests”; and (3) her prior statement “was not consistent with her trial testimony.” (relying on the following factors in concluding that a statement had circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness: (1) the witness was

See Martinez, d at 737 (); review denied (Minn. Sept.

(), review denied (Minn. Sept.

See Martinez, d at 737 (); review denied (Minn. Sept.