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We held in State v. Hennum that expert testimony on battered woman syndrome is admissible because “the theory underlying the battered woman syndrome … has gained a substantial enough scientific acceptance to warrant admissibility” and the testimony “would help to explain a phenomenon not within the understanding of an ordinary lay person.” –99 (Minn. 1989).

Severtson cites two cases to persuade us that his sentence is inappropriate and unreasonable: which reversed a presumptive sentence because the appellant wife’s culpability was mitigated when she was subjected to years of brutal abuse by husband and, following another beating, shot and killed him, WL 1344203, at *6-7 (Minn. App. Apr.

sentence and remanded for imposition of a durational departure as recommended by the PSI based on mitigating factors, specifically, “the victim physically abused defendant on the night of the incident” and “there was substantial evidence that the 6 victim had subjected defendant to severe physical and mental abuse throughout their relationship.” 800-01 (Minn. 1989).

To support his argument that the district court abused its discretion by sentencing him at the top of the presumptive range, and Solberg, both of which are distinguishable for reasons discussed below.

See, (reducing the defendant’s sentence where “the victim physically abused defendant on the night of the incident”); 910 (Minn. App. 1991) (affirming the district court’s decision to grant a dispositional departure on the basis that the victim was the initial agg

Roach cites two cases of the supreme court as authority for his argument: State v. Hennum, in which the supreme court reduced a sentence from the presumptive sentence that had been imposed by the district court when the defendant killed her husband after suffering severe physical and mental abuse throughout their relationship, including physical abuse on the night of the homicide, 7 4 and State v. Wall, in which the supreme court reversed an upward durational departure that was almost 50% longer

See Soto, d at 310-15 (reversing grant of downward departure); d 793, 800-01 (Minn. 1989) (reversing denial of downward departure).

-01(Minn. 1989) (holding that mitigating factors justified reducing the sentence imposed by the district court)

in which the supreme court determined that a downward departure from the presumptive sentence was warranted because “the victim physically abused defendant on 8 the night of the victim’s murder.” Engen’s “long history involving trauma and drug use, including being abused by his alcoholic father

e Minnesota Supreme Court has held that expert testimony on battered- woman syndrome passes the helpfulness test when it “help[s] the jury to understand the behavior of a woman suffering from the syndrome, which might otherwise be interpreted as a lack of credibility” and which is “not within the understanding of an ordinary lay person.” Grecinger, d at 195 ().

1991) (affirming downward durational departure where defendant was suffering from major depression at the time of the offense); , 25 (Minn. 1984) (reversing district court’s imposition of upward durational departure where defendant had a nearly 20 -year documented history of mental illness that included hospitalization and civil commitment); State v. Hennum , (affirming downward duration al departure where defendant suffered from alcohol dependence, psychoneurotic depression, and an antisocial -

Appellant next argues that the district court abused its discretion “in concluding that the many circumstances demonstrating [appellant] was a good candidate for probation did not justify a dispositional departure.” , in which an appellate court reversed a di strict court’s application of a presumptive sentence.

See State v. Wermerskirchen , , 240-42 (Minn. 1993) (holding that prior uncharged acts of sexual abuse are admissible as relevant to the issue of whether the charged act of sexual abuse occurred); State v. Hennum , , 798-99 (Minn. 1989) (holding that expert testimony regarding battered woman syndrome is admissible); see also State v. Glowacki , , 401 (Minn. 2001) (justifying a rule of law that a person has no duty to retreat from one's home premised in part on "the realities facing those persons

9 Appellant argues that the Minnesota Supreme Court’s permit expert-opinion testimony “on typical characteristics of and behaviors of certain witnesses” as helpful to the jury.

(holding that the case qualified as a rare case justifying reversal of the district court’s imposition of the presumptive sentence because of evidence that the victim had physically and mentally abused the defendant).

See State v. Hennum , (emphasizing that appellate court’s “reduction of district court’s sentence” is rarely appropriate, and reducing defendant’s sentence only because victim had physically and mentally abused defendant throughout their relationship).

Expert testimony on the behavior of domestic-violence victims “is admissible since it would help to expl ain a phenomenon not within the understanding of an ordinary lay person.”

702); -99 (Minn. 1989) (expert testimony on battered-woman syndrome admissible if it met the standard of Minn. R. Evid.

See, (permitting testimony regarding battered woman syndrome because it would “help explain a phenomenon not within the understanding of an ordinary lay person”); (permitting testimony regarding behavioral characteristics frequently seen in adol

(stating that evidence concerning battered-woman syndrome is generally admissible “since it would help explain a phenomenon not within the understanding of an ordinary 12 This claim was tried to the district court.

(finding that defendant, who suffered from depression, anger, and impulsivity, did not suffer from extreme mental impairment when “experts overwhelmingly concluded that [his] mental condition did not deprive him of control over his actions”); (concluding that years of abuse by victim constituted substantial grounds to mitigate defendant’s culpability).

The next day the court ruled that “the testimony of an expert [about battered woman syndrome] in this case [does not] fit[ ] any of the prior decisions that the Courts of Minnesota have held that such testimony is admissible.” The court explained that because Hanks was not claiming she acted in self-defense, -99 (Minn.1989).

702 when determining whether syndrome evidence would be helpful to the jury)); -94 (Minn.2011); -99 (Minn.1989) (concluding that expert testimony on battered-woman syndrome would be helpful to the jury under a Minn. R. Evid.

(stating that “while we have previously applied Frye-Mack to evidence falling into the general field of psychology, we have not applied F'rye-Mack in cases addressing the admissibility of ‘syndrome’ evidence offered to explain behavior.” (footnote omitted)); -99 (Minn.1989) (applying rule 702 instead of Frye-Mack standard in concluding that expert testimony regarding battered-woman syndrome was admissible in the context of defendant’s claim of self-defense because it would be helpful to the jury

In State v. Hennum, we found that expert testimony on BWS “would help to explain a phenomenon not within the understanding of an ordinary lay person.”

-99 (Minn.1989), we held that expert testimony about the general characteristics of battered woman syndrome met the helpfulness requirement in Minn. R. Evid.

2266 , 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006); -02 (Minn.2001) (recognizing the realities facing victims of domestic violence and eliminating the duty to retreat from one’s own home when acting in self-defense in the home); (recognizing the value of battered women syndrome evidence to dispel common misconceptions, bolster the battered woman's credibility, and show the reasonableness of fear of bodily harm).