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The supreme court has emphasized that appellate courts should refrain from reviewing such decisions to afford trial counsel “the flexibility to represent a client to the fullest extent possible.” (declining to review allegations that “counsel should have sought a change of venue, should have hired an investigator, and should have interviewed prospective witnesses” because “none of [those] contentions concern errors in professional performance but instead relate to trial strategy”).

Appellate courts apply “a strong presumption that a counsel’s performance falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” (quotation omitted).

about the other officer, and he also points out that trial counsel admitted during the postconviction hearing that eliciting hearsay was “absolutely an error.” But appellate courts have repeatedly declined to review trial tactics because doing so with the benefit of hindsight may constrain trial counsel’s flexibility to represent their client “to the fullest extent possible.”

Given the wide discretion we afford attorneys in trial strategy and the presumption of reasonable professional assistance, Banks’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim fails.

See, -36 (Minn. 1986) (holding that even though first three Barker factors weighed in defendant’s favor, a seven-month delay did not violate defendant’s right to a speedy trial because there was no demonstrable prejudice to his defense); (“Although three of th

“There is a strong presumption that a counsel’s performance falls within the wide range of ‘reasonable professional assistance.’”

See, e.g., 5 n.10 (Minn. 2012); (“Which witnesses to call at trial .

A strong presumption exists “that a counsel’s 9 performance falls within the wide range of ‘reasonable professional assistance.’”

23, 1986), deciding how to impeach adverse witnesses, Andersen, d at 13, and determining “[w]hich witnesses to call at trial and what information to present to the jury,”

“There is a strong presumption that a counsel’s 16 performance falls within the wide range of ‘reasonable professional assistance.’”

Appellate courts apply “a strong presumption that a counsel’s performance falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” (quotation marks omitted).

There is “a strong presumption that a counsel’s performance falls within the wide range of ‘reasonable professional assistance.’”

The length of the delay “is calculated from the point at which the [S]ixth [A]mendment right attaches: when a formal indictment or information is issued against a person or when a 5 person is arrested and held to answer a criminal charge.”

Trial strategy decisions “lie within the proper discretion of the trial counsel.”

We apply “a strong pre sumption that [an attorney’s] performance falls within the wide range of ‘reasonable professional assistance.’”

We apply “a strong presumption that [an attorney’s] performance falls within the wide range of ‘reasonable professional assistance.’”

Instead, he contends we should declare the delays to be “excessive.” But had the 3 to argue the district court erred by failing to schedule his trial within 60 days of his arrest.

And we apply a strong presumption that an attorney’s “performance falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” (quotation omitted).

neffective assistance of counsel because of “counsel’s lack of investigation and hiring of an expert witness.” Marrison’s claim is not persuasive because appellate courts “generally will not review attacks on counsel’s trial strategy.” (“[t]he extent of counsel’s investigation is considered a part of trial strategy); (rejecting an ineffective-assistance- of-counsel claim that counsel failed to hire an investigator and interview witnesses).

And we apply a strong presumption that an attorney’s “performance falls within the wide range 8 of reasonable professional assistance.” (quotation omitted).

And we apply a strong presumption that an attorney’s “performance falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” (quotation omitted).

And we apply a strong presumption that an attorney’s “performance falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” (quotation omitted).

(“[T]rial tactics should not be reviewed by an appellate court, which, unlike the counsel, has the benefit of hindsight.”); (reasoning that the decisions to call certain witnesses falls within trial strategy and are not reviewable); State v. Davis

to investigate and failure to call a witness were matters of trial strategy and could not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel); Hodgson v. State , (noting that failure to present alternative perpetrator evidence and failure to investigate leads were matters of trial strategy and could not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel ); State v. Jones , (noting that challenges to counsel’s investigation were matters of trial strategy and could not constitute ineffective assistance of cou

A strong presumption exists “that a counsel’s performance falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”

(noting that appellate courts do not “review ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on trial strategy”).

There is a strong presumption that a 19 counsel’s performance falls within the “wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” .

Johnson argues that the second delay is analogous to the delay in State v. Jones, which held that a seven-month trial delay resulting from an “overburdened judicial system” cannot “rest with the defendant,” and “[t]he reason for this delay must weigh against the state.”

-36 (Minn. 1986); d 563, 573 (Minn. App. 2018), aff’d

We apply a strong presumption that counsel’s “performance falls within the wide range of ‘reasonable professional assistance.’”

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)

The length of delay is measured “from the point at which the sixth amendment right attaches.”